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 Financial regulations designed to counter the financing of terrorism have 
spread internationally over past several decades, but little is known about their 
effectiveness or why certain banks get penalized for financing terrorism while others 
do not.  This research addresses this question and tests for the effects of institutional 
linkages between banks and states on the enforcement of these regulations.  It is 
hypothesized here that a bank’s institutional link to its home state is necessary to 
block attempted enforcement.  This research utilizes comparative studies of cases in 
which enforcement and penalization were attempted, and examines the role of 
institutional links between the bank and state in these outcomes. 
 The case comparisons include five cases in all, with three comprising positive 
cases in which enforcement was blocked, and two in which penalty occurred.  
Combined, these cases control for rival variables such as rule of law, state capacity, 
	v 
authoritarianism, and membership of a country in a regulatory body while also testing 
for the impact of institutional linkage between a bank and its state in the country’s 
national political economy.   
 Within cases, institutional linkages and independence are traced through the 
creation of histories for each bank, and its role in its home state’s political economy.  
These histories are developed using documentary data from court cases, bank 
publications, existing historical studies, economic studies, memoirs, government 
reports, and diplomatic data.  This same data is used to examine the adoption of 
financial regulations designed to counter terrorist financing, and the defensive 
measures taken by states to defend their banks.   
 The finding of this research concludes that institutional links between banks 
and their home states are necessary to block attempts at regulatory enforcement.  The 
implications of this research are profound for both studies of international law and 
finance, as well as for issues of counterterrorism and security at the policy level.  The 
key theoretical takeaway for questions of international finance is that state power 
continues to matter despite assertions of globalization and a neoliberal financial order.  
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Introduction 
 International politics in the 21st century has thus far been characterized by 
terrorism and financial crisis.  The new millennium’s optimism came to an abrupt halt in 
September 2001, when Al Qaeda hijacked jets and crashed them into the World Trade 
Center in New York, and the Pentagon in Washington DC.  With nearly 3,000 casualties, 
few at the time could imagine that the literal fusing of capitalism’s epicenter and religious 
fanaticism in a fireball would open a new era of financial regulation.  This new era of 
financial rules and geopolitics related to counter-terrorist finance (CTF) not only heralded 
the creation and expansion of a set of financial institutions worldwide, but was also 
driven by the power politics and security considerations behind them.   
 The expansion of financial regulations designed to counter terrorist financing 
served to further integrate different countries into the American-led international 
financial system, and brought a liberalized financial system into direct conflict with the 
logic of national security.  On the practical level, the expansion of these regulations 
mixed the market-oriented world of financial institutions and bankers with that of 
terrorists, spies, and law enforcement.  Complicating matters further, the international 
prominence of the dollar and the origins of the CTF regime in a US legal system 
characterized by adversity brought other states and their banks into complicated issues of 
jurisdiction and hegemony.  This research is about the efficacy of these regulations; and 
more importantly, the determinants of enforcement outcomes of these regulations when 
banks finance terror. 
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 Since 2001 the research on threat finance has grown substantially; however,  
research on both anti-money laundering (AML), and CTF lacks theoretical cohesion, as 
well as a clear theoretical and analytical center.  Largely due to divisions within political 
science as a discipline, work on threat finance has either focused on the political 
economy of regulatory growth and harmonization, or on the financing and resource 
management of specific terrorist groups.  With scholarly attention divided between the 
financial regulatory world and terrorism, a focus on banks and financial institutions as 
actors, and their relationships to terrorist groups has been neglected.  This inattention to 
banks leaves a theoretical blank spot for understanding the inner-workings of counter-
terrorist financing institutions within the financial system.  It is banks that connect the 
worlds of regulation and terrorist groups, and this connection warrants focusing upon 
them as a unit of analysis.  
 Criminal organizations and terrorist groups have long used financial institutions 
for holding wealth, moving it around the globe, and laundering it to separate funds from 
illicit activity.  Since the advent of AML/CTF rules in the 1970s, banks have also taken 
on the additional role of serving as instruments of security for the states that regulate 
them.  Tasked with following customer due diligence rules, collecting data, adhering to 
sanctions regimes, and gathering financial intelligence, banks have emerged as the 
intersection of criminal and terrorist organizations on the one hand, and the states seeking 
to counter them on the other.  With banks comprising the central actor involved in the 
phenomenon of threat finance, this lack of scholarly focus on them as a unit of analysis 
leaves significant questions unanswered.   
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 Regarding terrorist financing and CTF, literature focused on the regulatory side of 
the equation outlines a contradictory understanding of the effectiveness of such 
institutions.  At the international level, an image emerges of profound regulatory 
harmonization and deepening.  Beginning in the 1980s onwards, great powers and 
financial centers pioneered the development of financial regulation as a means of 
advancing security against the threat of transnational crime and terrorism.  Embodied first 
in the domestic regulatory regimes of the United States and United Kingdom, such 
institutions quickly spread across the industrialized world, despite overall financial 
deregulation.  In the 1990s, these regulations spread further internationally, with 
institutions such as the UN passing resolutions to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.  The 1989 founding of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) by states of 
the G7 brought additional pressures on states to adopt AML/CTF measures.  After 2001, 
such regulations spread worldwide in a global effort to insulate the financial system from 
crime and utilize financial regulations to combat terrorism.   
 While the international CTF regime has proliferated, and such regulations are now 
legally present in virtually every state,1 little certainty remains about their effectiveness.  
Aside from a select few rogue states, such as North Korea, Iran, and others, AML/CTF 
regulations have been adopted by states across the globe.  Yet, even in states that are not 
rogue nations, the overall success of the international threat finance regime remains a 
mystery.  One problem stems from the unknowable nature of how much illicit finance 
exists within the international banking system at any given time.  Estimates largely 																																																								
1 It should be noted here that certain states such as rogue regimes in North Korea and elsewhere are no t  
considered. in this trend.   
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consist of educated projections, and even approximated levels of laundered money and 
terrorist funds remain unknowable.  Adding to this empirical challenge in assessing 
effectiveness is the uncertainty of how committed banks are to upholding the spirit of the 
AML/CTF regime.  The incorporation of financial institutions operating under a profit 
motive into an extension of a state’s security apparatus creates a number of conflicting 
interests.  Unfortunately, assessing accurate amounts of illicit funds in the international 
financial system remains impossible, as does using this as a metric for analyzing the CTF 
regime’s effectiveness.  However, some measures of effectiveness, such as enforcement 
outcomes, can be tested.   
 The focus of this research is the outcome of enforcement efforts against banks 
that are suspected and penalized for financing terrorism.  This is a basic, yet critical 
question that must be answered if any theory is to develop regarding the determinants of 
success or failure on the part of AML/CTF regulations.  Unlike the actual amount of 
illicit funds in the financial system and true levels of bank compliance, enforcement 
outcomes are observable, and become analyzable once a bank comes under regulatory 
scrutiny for financing terrorism.  Furthermore, as the empirical record of banks facing 
state pressures for financing terrorism illustrates a range of outcomes, theories of 
enforcement outcomes become testable as a result.   
This study tests the role of institutional linkages between a bank and its home 
state’s regime as the determinant of enforcement outcomes against banks for financing 
terrorism. If CTF regulations are widespread at the international level, and have 
supposedly been adopted by most states around the globe, why does such divergent 
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enforcement occur?  Why does a British bank in London face similar enforcement levels 
for financing terrorism as a Jordanian bank in Amman? Why does a bank in a rich tax 
haven like Luxembourg face closure for terrorist financing similar to a bank in the failed 
state of Somalia?   
This research answers these questions by positing an institutional theory of 
linkage between a bank and its home state government as the determining factor in 
enforcement outcomes.  Specifically, I hypothesize that an institutional link is necessary 
to block enforcement.  My theory states that when a bank is institutionally linked to its 
home regime it will escape attempted enforcement through active defenses implemented 
by its home state. 
 This first chapter discusses the emergence of financial regulations as a means of 
security against crime and terrorism, and pays particular attention to existing scholarly 
theories of regulatory compliance and effectiveness in this area in an effort to introduce 
readers to an otherwise obscure area of political economy.  In this first chapter I also 
posit my own theory of CTF enforcement outcomes, and attempt to bridge the existing 
gaps in the literature through drawing upon theories of institutional change to explain this 
phenomenon.  I hypothesize that in cases where banks enjoy an institutional connection 
to their home states, the adoption of an AML/CTF regime will not overtake this existing 
relationship; and by extension, any enforcement efforts deriving these regulations will 
therefore be blocked and misfire due to the overriding ability of the bank’s home state.   
 This theory carries significant implications for the existing understanding of the 
international CTF regulatory regime, and indicates that the success or failure of these 
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rules has less to do with regulatory harmonization, and more to do with the purview of 
the governments that must enforce them and characteristics within national political 
economies.  One possible implication of this research, is that regulatory outcomes may 
not be determined so much by a given regulatory regime’s sophistication so much as they 
are driven by a states pursuing their national interests.  Certainly, if states defend banks 
that are institutionally linked to their ruling regimes, the implication stands that banks are 
a means of states extending and fortifying their own power.   
 Part Two of this of this piece tests my theory utilizing comparative case studies, 
and tests for the causality of institutional linkage in determining the CTF enforcement 
outcomes against banks that finance terrorism.  This selection of cases controls for a 
number of rival explanations, such as the home state’s membership in regulatory bodies, 
levels of authoritarianism, the overall regulatory health of the home state’s economy, and 
rule of law within the given state.  In accounting for institutional linkage, the case studies 
disaggregate this linkage by examining the bank’s importance to the stability of its home 
state regime, as opposed to  the bank’s overall importance to the national economy.  
Within each positive case, or those cases where banks enjoyed blocked 
enforcement, I first trace the origins of the bank in its home economy and establish its 
relationship to its home state regime.  Next, I discuss to what degree the states in these 
positive cases adopted the internationally driven AML/CTF institutions.  In these positive 
cases of blocked enforcement, I demonstrate that these pre-existing relationships between 
bank and state perpetuate despite the adoption of fortified financial institutions.  Last, I 
discuss the scandal phase of these banks coming under regulatory pressure for financing 
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terrorism, and how such enforcement was blocked by defensive measures undertaken by 
the bank’s home state.  Empirically, I examine the positive cases of the Bank of China in 
the PRC, Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, and Turkey’s Halk Bank.  
Each positive case is afforded its own corresponding chapter in Part Two, while 
analysis of two negative cases will serve as the focus of the final empirical chapter.  In 
this chapter on negative cases, I will address potential rival causes such as 
authoritarianism, a state’s status as a tax haven, and the effects of liberalization efforts 
while further disproving the importance of de jure regulatory presence within a country in 
explaining enforcement outcomes.  Each negative case exhibits banks where enforcement 
occurred and remained unblocked.  These negative cases include Arab Bank in Jordan, 
and the Bank of Commerce and Credit International.  Finally, the last chapter provides a 
conclusion that recounts my theory and causal explanation, a brief review of my methods, 
and implications for both policy and future research.   
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Chapter 1: 
Enforcement Outcomes in Counter-Terrorist Financing  
 
 
I. Introduction: The Origins and Efficacy of Threat Finance and the Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Regime 
 
When discussions of either international finance or terrorism arise, few observers 
conceptually connect the two phenomena.  Scholars of terrorism who focus on financing 
have rarely left the metaphorical battlefield while producing a formidable corpus of non-
theoretical descriptive case studies of specific terrorist organizations and their funding.  
Conversely, scholars of international regulations who substantively address issues of 
terrorist financing have focused on institutional issues at the international level, such as 
regulatory harmonization and development.  Despite the financial sector serving as the 
meeting point between CTF regulations and the terrorist groups themselves, little work 
has focused on banks as the unit of analysis, and little theory has developed as a result.  
This research bridges this gap in terrorist financing literature by focusing upon the bank 
as the primary unit of analysis, and by testing the bank’s connection with its home nation-
state as the explanatory variable that explains when CTF enforcement measures are either 
blocked or carried out.  Due to the esotericism of terrorist financing as a subject, this 
section first explains terrorist financing as a phenomenon, the growth of threat finance 
institutions, and the role of banks within them while outlining the existing schism in the 
literature mentioned above.   
 While terrorism has increased over the past several decades, and the AML/CTF 
regime has grown in conjunction with the threat it poses, the increase in depth and scope 
of threat finance regulation has occurred within an environment of overall deregulation 
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and liberalization in international finance during the same era.  It is worth establishing 
this frame of reference for the simple reason that it provides a jumping off point for 
illustrating that state prerogative, rather than institutional harmony, guided the growth of 
the AML/CTF regime worldwide.  In other words, this spread of threat finance regulation 
grew out of states’ concerns for traditional security and power, rather than institutionally 
driven considerations.  Beginning in the 1970s, banks and financial institutions helped the 
US and UK catalyze the deregulation of the international financial sector, and it was 
these same states that simultaneously designed financial regulation to safeguard their 
security interests against the threat of organized crime and terrorism.   
 Since the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, the international financial system 
has undergone a profound transformation in the direction of deregulation.  International 
capital mobility and the banking sectors of major financial centers not only increased in 
magnitude and velocity, but did so in a manner that augmented the importance and role of 
the financial sector in the overall international economy.  This deregulatory shift 
coincided with a steady fortification of the financial sphere in two important respects.  
First, despite the turn to deregulation and liberalization, banks themselves slowly became 
extensions of the state in efforts to monitor and combat the non-state threats of crime and 
terrorism.  Second, both the deregulatory wave and the subsequent fortification of finance 
emerged out of the US and UK, before expanding worldwide in the post-Cold War era.  
Analyzing these trajectories will begin with the latter and then turn to the question of how 
banks became extensions of the state.  Additionally, the concept of money laundering 
will be juxtaposed against terrorist financing.  
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 The liberalization of international finance has often been portrayed as evidence of 
the erosion or ineptitude of state power when faced with the ostensible force of 
globalization and free capital flows. The collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, and 
domestic turns towards neoliberalism in the United States and Britain in the following 
decades fosters this notion.  Since the rescindment of Bretton Woods the international 
economy has followed a trend of overall deregulation in the form of a removal of capital 
controls, privatization of state enterprises, and market liberalization.  Scholars such Susan 
Strange theorized that the global economy essentially outgrew the authority of states, 
such that “markets are the masters of governments”.2  Regarding international finance in 
particular, Strange posited that whatever “international” regulatory system should emerge 
to deal with finance’s incipient instability would have to be “national” in nature, and that 
the United States as the predominant power would have to embrace its “national interest” 
in implementing international institutional controls on the financial system.3  Also writing 
in the 1990s, Benjamin Cohen echoed Strange’s assertion that “states have been thrown 
on the defensive”, and that a “transcendent market” may indicate an “irreversible erosion 
of state authority” in light of such forces.4 What neither Strange nor Cohen envisioned at 
the time was the emerging security dimension of international finance taking place over 
the same timespan.  For purposes here, the emergence of “fortified finance” is defined as 
the institutional and regulatory harnessing of financial institutions by states for the 
enhancement of thwarting threats posed by terrorism, criminal organizations, and other 																																																								
2 Susan Strange, The retreat of the state: The diffusion of power in the world economy. Cambridge 
university press, 1996, 4.  
3 Susan Strange, Casino capitalism. Manchester University Press, 1997. 171.  
4 Benjamin Cohen, “Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance”, World Politics, Vol. 48, No. 2. 
January 1996, pp. 268-296, 293.  
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states.  Ironically in the case of Strange’s assertion, the United States did embrace its 
national interest in promoting a fortification of the financial sector. With the US leading 
the way, other states around the world followed suit. 
Competing Logics of Finance and National Security 
 The first problem with the propositions mentioned above by other scholars stems 
from overlooking the role that states played in fostering the new “globalized” financial 
order, and the contingent national character of the firms within it.  Helleiner notes that 
states, rather than passively accepting a new international financial structure, actually 
fostered the creation of the international neoliberal order through allowing greater 
freedoms to “market actors” and removing capital controls.5  Helleiner notes that the US 
played a particularly important role in the fostering of this “new order” as it sought to 
preserve “policy autonomy” in the economic realm beginning in the 1970s.6  American 
banks would benefit from domestic reforms at the same time, including the Federal 
Reserve’s turn to monetarism under Volcker’s chairmanship from 1979 into the 1980s.7  
Across the Atlantic, Britain underwent a similar shift with the coming to power of 
Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and the abolishment of exchange controls.8  Helleiner 
mentions that London and New York, the premier banking centers, contended in 
liberalizing their regulatory structures to compete with one another.9  Over the course of 
the 1980s, capital control liberalization would sweep the bulk of the industrialized world 																																																								
5 Eric Helleiner, States and the reemergence of global finance: from Bretton Woods to the 1990s. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1996). 
6 Ibid, 112-113.  
7 Greta R Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 116-119.  
8 Helleiner, 150.  
9 Ibid, 151.		
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towards financial neoliberalism and offer “financial market operators” freedoms they had 
not yet seen in the postwar era up to that point.10 
The shift to deregulation and liberalization in international finance spread with the 
push of Western powers, and expanded with the subsequent ending of the Cold War.  
This expanded liberalization has led some commentators to conceptualize international 
finance as nearly ungovernable, particularly in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.  
Other scholarly observations assert that great powers and their firms remain central to the 
international financial sector.  Drezner notes that in the realm of financial regulation, the 
production and dissemination of regulatory governance actually comprises a club good 
that is largely both the product great powers more so than the output of international 
financial institutions.11 Drezner’s “great powers” are those governments who rule over 
large domestic markets, and that a “concert” of such powers is a prerequisite for 
international governance.12 In the case of “multinational firms”, rather than functioning 
as unanchored economic mavericks in the global economy, Doremus et al note that firms’ 
domestic institutional and legal political economies influence their behaviors and 
operations.13  In short, states continue to predominate in importance in international 
financial flows due to the embedding of firms in their national economies.  Furthermore, 
it is the coordination of states to allow liberalized finance to flourish.  
																																																								
10 Helleiner, 166.  
11 Daniel W. Drezner, "All politics is global." Explaining International Regulatory (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007), 147.  
12 Drezner, 5.  
13 Paul N. Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich,The Myth of the Global 
Corporation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
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 Despite the trend towards liberalization of finance both internationally and within 
major domestic financial sectors, security threats from non-state actors drove states to 
push for a fortification of finance through the passage of new laws and regulations.  
Similar to the trajectory of liberalization, these new financial security regulations would 
first form in the US and UK before spreading throughout the industrialized world, and 
then advancing globally after 9/11.  Additionally, as exchange rate liberalization moved 
across states for the economic motivation of financial competitiveness, these fortified 
regulations would spread due to non-economic considerations of security.   
 It would be a mistake to conceive of the intersection between international 
finance, state security, and banking as a new phenomenon.  The relationship between 
financial influence and security has existed since the first organized polities minted their 
own coinage to finance warfare.  Yet, while the connection between the first two 
phenomena is relatively clear, the position of banks in the security matrix is more 
nebulous.  In the lead up to WWI, Herbert Feis notes that “financial force” was often 
deployed as a method of building alliances, and that “political calculation” often guided 
major bank lending between European states, their respective allies, and their imperial 
holdings.14 Indeed, Viner’s account of the pre-WWI era in Europe concurs with Feis’s 
assessment in that financial negotiations comprised a part of “balance of power 
diplomacy”.15  Regarding the role played by bankers in this context, Viner asserts that 
financiers served as “passive” and often “unwilling instruments” of diplomats, given that 																																																								
14 Herbert Feis, Europe: The World’s Banker 1870-1914, Publications of the Council of Foreign Relations, 
Yale University Press, 1930, xv-xvi.  
15 Jacob Viner, “International Finance and Balance of Power Diplomacy, 1880-1914”, The Southwestern 
Political and Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 4. March 1929, pp. 407-451, 447.		
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bankers were primarily driven by profit motives rather than politics.16  This observation 
in the early 20th century on the banker’s role in international politics echoes later findings 
by Kirshner that bankers are often risk averse and supportive of “cautious national 
security strategies”.17  It must be noted that this pre-WWI era and its dynamics stand far 
from apocryphal, particularly as the pre-1914 era levels of capital mobility and 
integration reflects many of the same characteristics of this liberalized period that began 
apace in the 1980s.18  In a similar parallel to the globalization of both eras with banks 
serving as instruments of power politics, the era from the 1970s to the present is one in 
which banks have again become mechanisms for states to advance their security interests.  
Contrary to the urbane conceptions of financial institutions that predominate in the 
subfield of political economy, banks are components of great power politics. 
 The fortified finance regime that crystalized in the 1970s served the political 
purpose of linking states back to the US through financial mechanisms despite the closing 
of the gold window.  The dollar’s primacy as the international reserve currency, and the 
pricing of oil in the dollars virtually tied most of the world to the American financial 
sector despite the end of the Bretton Woods system.  As fortified finance emerged 
beginning with the US Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, American regulations designed to 
forestall tax evasion, money laundering, and eventually terrorism served as a new 
institutional mechanism of injecting power politics into the financial system.   
																																																								
16 Viner, 450.  
17 Johnathan Kirshner, Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War, Princeton University 
Press, 2007, 1.  
18 See, Maurice Obstfeld, and Alan M. Taylor. "Globalization and capital markets." In Globalization in 
historical perspective, pp. 121-188. University of Chicago Press, 2003. 
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Due to the primacy of the dollar in major bank transactions around the world, the 
adoption of the fortified finance regime by other states was virtually assured.  Despite 
this “globalized” realm of international finance with the US as the hub, national security 
concerns took on a new friction in the post-Bretton Woods world.  Unlike in the gold-
based system that predominated until 1971, banks and states in the emerging fortified 
financial system gradually adopted American and Western financial regulations for 
continued access to the US financial sector.  If gold-backed dollars offered a buffer for 
other states economically linked to the US, the new regulations became virtually 
mandatory for continuing connection.  However, financial integration does not guarantee 
that states share mutual security interests.  This incongruity is pronounced in the near-
universal adoption of the fortified finance regime, and the diverging results within it.  
Politics, and states pursuing their own interests, determines how this friction is 
negotiated.  
Terrorist Financing and the Fortified Finance Regulation 
 If banking firms served to aid states in achieving security goals in the past in the 
context of great power competition, they would be called on again to fight organized 
crime and terrorism.  More specifically, states would effectively harness the financial 
sector for the purpose of using AML/CTF regulation to augment the generation of 
criminal evidence and intelligence.  Furthermore, the use of financial regulation by great 
powers to combat these phenomena also corresponds with the evolving threat of terrorism 
and transnational crime as a whole.  
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 Due in part to Hollywood movies and other popular conceptions of terrorist 
groups, many people perceive terrorist financing as existing outside the formal financial 
sector.  However, both terrorist financing and the closely related phenomenon of money 
laundering do involve otherwise ordinary banks and actors within the financial field.  
Since the regulatory institutions designed to curtail both phenomenon are inextricably 
linked, it is worth noting their similarities and where the phenomena diverge.  Contrary to 
popular conceptions of terrorist organizations financing their operations through obscure 
channels separated from the mainstream economy, terrorist financing indeed relies in part 
on the formal banking sector for financial services.  This is not to claim that terrorist 
financing is a straightforward or simple phenomenon.  Rather, terrorist organizations 
operate as normal economic actors as much as they do armed political groups.  Terrorist 
organizations raise funds through multiple means, may include legal and illicit activities, 
and may include the transfer of non-cash instruments along with the formal movement of 
funds through mainstream financial mechanisms.  Timothy Wittig postulates that terrorist 
financing not only encapsulates both the “raising and spending” of money, but also the 
“capacity to move and store required resources” until needed by the terrorist group.19  
Wittig’s definition of terrorist financing expands beyond formal monetary vehicles in that 
he conceptualized it as the “transfer of value”.20   
For the purpose of this research, the concept of terrorist funds will follow the 
definition of money that is derived from licit or illicit sources but is destined for the 
facilitation of violence against civilians perpetrated by a non-state actor for the 																																																								
19 Timothy Wittig. Understanding terrorist finance. Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, 9. 
20 Ibid, 10.		
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achievement of a political purpose.  Defined separately, terrorist financing will be defined 
as the provision, movement, transfer, integration, or obfuscation of the ownership or 
purpose of such funds.  The utility of disaggregating terrorist funds from terrorist 
financing is twofold.   
First, terrorist funds are often procured by terrorists themselves through crime, 
fundraising, or state backing while counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures have been 
enacted to influence the behavior of states and banks in order to prevent and monitor the 
movement of these funds in the international financial sector.  Terrorist funds, whether 
legally obtained or not, are useless unless they can be effectively transferred, banked, and 
invested by actors into vehicles that can facilitate the meeting of an actor’s financial 
needs.  For this research, “terrorist financing” is not treated as the funds themselves.  
Instead, terrorist financing is defined as the handling and movement of such funds by 
banks and other financial actors. 
The second purpose for disaggregating terrorist funds from terrorist financing 
simplifies the empirical reality that both the activity of financing terrorism, and its 
enforcement, often involves a series of actors who are concentric in their efforts.  For 
example, the entirety of terrorist financing often expands beyond the actions of a terrorist 
organization, and may include banks operating under a profit motive, states seeking to 
strengthen their strategic position through backing various groups, corrupt regulators, and 
even international organizations and non-profits.  Similarly, counter-terrorist financing 
can likewise include international organizations, coalitions of states, supranational 
	 18 
entities, private transnational associations, national judiciaries and various law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies.   
Non-cash instruments, both legal and illicit, play a role in financing terrorism.  
Terrorist groups as a whole are remarkable in their ability to diversify their income, as 
funds from legitimate business activity, charitable donations, and state sponsorship often 
mix with revenue from an array of criminal activity ranging from human and drug 
trafficking to theft, blackmail and fraud.21  In theory, such portfolios may seem suspect 
given how inexpensive terrorist acts are to commit; however, the maintenance of a 
terrorist organization’s support operations carry significant costs.  The day-to-day 
expenses of a terrorist organization can include the provision of safe houses, recruitment, 
training, and propaganda operations as well as more mundane activities.22  Indeed, 
instead of solely comprising cloak and dagger organizations driven purely by fanaticism, 
terrorist organizations exhibit a significant degree of banality in their financial operations 
and orientation.  Additionally, a number of organizational, structural, and financial 
incentives exist that serve to drive terrorist groups to utilize the formal financial sector in 
conducting their financial affairs. 
Terrorist groups are like any other organization that exhibits internal divisions 
over resource allocation and finances. Like any organization with limited resources and 
funds, terrorist groups can reap the benefits of the efficiency and availability that banks 																																																								
21 Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas”, in Terrorism Financing and 
State Responses, eds. Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) pp. 
21-38, 24-27.  
22 Rachel Ehrenfeld, “Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and the Nexus of Terrorist and Criminal 
Organizations”, in Terrornomics, eds. Sean S. Costigan and David Gold (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing, 
2007) pp. 27-48, 27-28.  
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can offer.  Work by Jacob Shapiro notes that terrorist organizations face profound 
tradeoffs that position managerial efficiency in the planning of violence and resource 
administration against considerations of operational security.23  In other words, in order 
to ensure effective managerial control of a terrorist organization, terrorists must take 
steps that increase efficiency while necessarily expanding vulnerability to do so. Shapiro 
and Siegel note that for terrorist organizations with a more centralized hierarchy, terrorist 
leaders who seek efficiency will entrust “middlemen” with tasks related to resource 
oversight and that these mid-level managers are often faced with the temptation to 
embezzle funds for private gain.24  Contrary to the more grandiose and dangerous 
activities of terrorist combatants and others within a terrorist organization, financial 
middlemen enjoy greater material payoffs for their role, are seldom killed, and enjoy 
lower conviction rates upon arrest than their more martially-oriented counterparts.25 In 
short, unlike the common misperceptions in the popular imagination, literature on 
terrorism indicates that groups have a number of rational incentives to turn to the formal 
financial system.  
Terrorist groups obtain funds through a number of fronts, ranging from the self-
funding opportunities afforded by outright fundraising through non-profits and the profits 
of legitimate businesses, to the proceeds of drugs trafficking, crime, and the backing of 
state sponsors.  During the Cold War, terrorist funding derived predominantly from 																																																								
23 Jacob N Shapiro. The Terrorist's Dilemma: Managing violent covert organizations. Princeton University 
Press, 2013. 
24 Jacob Shapiro, “Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations”, International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 2, 
June 2007, pp. 405-429. 
25 Jacob N. Shapiro, “Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies”, in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, eds. 
Jeanne Giraldo and Harold Trinkunas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 56-71, 61. 
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states.  During the great power standoff, the Soviet Union aided terrorist and guerilla 
groups in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and Latin America.26  While state-derived 
funding for terrorism has decreased since the 1990s, much of the self-funding techniques 
that terrorist organizations and criminals utilize were learned by such groups at the 
tutelage of the Soviets during this period.  For example, the Soviets actively advocated 
the use of narcotics trafficking by their non-state surrogates as a means of weakening the 
social fabric of the West, and most terrorist groups that arose under Soviet influence have 
made the drug trade a centerpiece of their operations.27  It was largely in response to the 
drug trade that the regulatory enlistment financial firms for security began in the United 
States, and unfolded to combat the laundering of its illicit proceeds.   
At the height of the height of the Cold War in the 1960s, concerns in American 
regulatory circles arose about the production of criminal proceeds within the US and the 
role played by offshore tax havens.28 Indeed, according to the gravity model developed 
by Walker in 1999, and one of the most reliable models used to estimate the illicit 
laundered finance to date, the United States serves as the top destination for such funds.  
The US is followed next by the Cayman Islands and then by a mixed combination of 
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large industrialized economies and offshore financial centers.29   Estimates of illicit funds 
within US jurisdiction are by their nature impossible to quantify, though estimates have 
ranged from $100 billion to half a trillion dollars as of the early 2000s.30  The Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 initiated American efforts to combat the movement of such 
funds, and imposed reporting requirements on US banks to file currency transaction 
reports (CTRs) with the US Treasury Department for the transfer of funds in excess of 
$10,000.31 It was the American BSA that sowed the seeds of future regulatory growth in 
fortified finance. 
Within the US in particular, early fortified financial regulation expanded both the 
obligations imposed upon the private sector as well as the purview of state power related 
to the countering of illicit finance garnered by criminal activity.  American counter-
narcotics efforts in the 1980s included passage of the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986, the Annunzio-Wiley Act of 1992, the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994, 
and the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Act of 1998.32  Two elements from 
these legal and regulatory developments would later prove critical to CTF regulations.  
First, the Annunzio-Wiley Act mandated that banks file “suspicious activity reports” 
(SARs) with the Treasury Department, and stipulated that banks monitor, surveil, and 
report deviant financial behavior from a client’s typical profile while the 1998 law 
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stipulated that both the Justice Department and Treasury improve linkages with the 
financial sector regarding AML efforts.33   
Administratively, these US laws created the blueprint of a pipeline linking the 
government to the financial sector.  Now mandated by law, banks and financial firms 
would collect information and intelligence relevant to criminal activity and channel it to 
the government.  This institutional apparatus would see replication in Europe and in other 
Western countries before being widely adopted around the world after 2001.  The US 
also augmented its fortification of the financial regime by opening violating banks to civil 
penalties.  Under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, US nationals who are victims of 
terrorism enjoy the option to suing banks that financed terrorism.  
By the late 1980s, regulatory anti-money laundering efforts explicitly took on a 
security-related orientation with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 that called for the 
creation of an “International Currency Control Agency” that would institute and 
coordinate the collection of transaction reports from around the world in an effort to 
combat money laundering.34  While this agency never came to fruition, the Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF), the premier AML and CTF institution to pressure states and 
institute rules at the international level, was founded in 1989.35 
That such US-led efforts emerged simultaneously with overall Reagan-era 
deregulation is not unique, particularly as European states began implementing similar 
regulatory measures to counter terrorist threats west of the Iron Curtain.  Italy, West 
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Germany, and Spain, all faced indigenous Leftist threats at the time in the guise of the 
Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhoff Gang, and Basque separatists respectively.  To 
counter these threats, Western European states began instituting AML laws in the mid-
1980s under the auspices of the Council of Europe.36  The United Kingdom implemented 
the Drug Trafficking Offences Act in 1986, the same year as its US equivalent was 
implemented,  effectively criminalizing money laundering in the British banking sector.  
The British focus on developing its own national CTF efforts also arose during this 
period of deregulation, but did so as a result of countering the financing of the Irish 
Republican Army via its Terrorist Financing Unit.37  It is important to note that in the 
British context, such moves coincided with liberalization of the UK economy under 
Margaret Thatcher.  If the 1980s ushered in an era in which Anglo-American banks could 
enjoy a freer reign, it also opened an era in which such banks were deputized as 
extensions of state security through AML and CTF regulations.  
The liberal orientation of the Anglo-American political economic model is worth 
noting here, and is not inconsequential.  If the global AML/CTF regime as it currently 
operates developed in these states under the design to curtail banks from financing 
terrorism, the argument can be made that AML/CTF institutions were designed for banks 
operating in a liberalized financial sector.  
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 The effectiveness of the overall fortified finance regime is uncertain, as it is 
similarly unclear how much illicit finance is within the banking industry at any given 
time.  However, financial regulations designed for banks within a liberal financial context 
are unlikely to work effectively in political economies with heavy state involvement or 
ownership in the banking industry.  Yet, as liberalization has spread to varying degrees 
across the world without fully disrupting peculiarities of national political economies, the 
fortified finance regime is remarkably similar.  This is not only a policy problem for how 
well the fortified finance regime may work in locales far removed from where it 
originated.  This is also an institutional problem of whether or not an imported 
institutional arrangement will effectively displace existing dynamics within a country’s 
political economy.  
 These domestic changes within major financial centers with the aim of countering 
the movement and integration of criminal funds in the financial system were quickly 
followed by regulatory changes at the international level during the same timeframe.  At 
the United Nations, the Vienna Convention of 1988 asserted that signatory states 
criminalize money from drugs trafficking and enforce such measures through the tracking 
and freezing proceeds from the activity.38  At the bank level, the creation of the Financial 
Action Task Force and rules from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision would 
increase the pressure financial firms to participate in the security arena.  Additionally, 
while this participation would begin with AML efforts in the context of a “war on drugs”, 
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it would later prove instrumental in placing banks within counter-terrorism efforts 
following 9/11. 
 At the heart of all AML/CTF institutions is the idea of banks “knowing” their 
customer.  Such “know your customer” (KYC) stipulations mandate that banks have 
knowledge of the beneficial owner of bank accounts, and that banks report suspicious 
activity and cooperate with police agencies in their respective jurisdictions.  The effort to 
spread these customer due diligence mandates was spearheaded by the US in 1986, when 
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker pressed central bankers at the Bank for 
International Settlements.39 Paralleling the findings by Johnathan Kirshner that banks are 
loathed to entertain notions of war, central bankers initially resisted such US efforts to 
fortify the financial sector against criminals and terrorists.40  However, in 1988, the Basel 
Committee put forward mandates that banks certify the legitimacy of their customers’ 
financial activity.41  These international mandates effectively hybridized the Anglo-
American anti-money laundering model, ironically, with that of Switzerland by 
combining the “data gathering” component of the former with the “deep customer 
knowledge” approach of the latter.42  In practice, banks are the mandated actors to surveil 
and discover nefarious activity on the part of criminals and terrorists.  Once reported, the 
state then follows through with further investigations, and potential arrests or 
prosecutions.  In theory, all countries that adopted the fortified finance regime follow this 
model of state-bank cooperation for reasons of security.  																																																								
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 The founding of the FATF in 1989 would prove an international turning point at 
the level of international institutions in fortifying the financial landscape. Founded in 
1989 as a product of American and French pressure, the body put forth a list of “Forty 
Recommendations” outlining expected standards of international cooperation among 
member states.  These recommendations, initially instituted in the context of the war on 
drugs, included the creation or tasking national regulatory bodies as financial intelligence 
units (FIUs) to serve as the go-between between private banks and national police or 
judicial agencies.  Under such mechanisms, private banks (and later insurance firms, 
casinos, gold and diamond dealers, etc.) are tasked with gathering information on 
customers for the purpose of establishing a customer’s “normal” behavior that can then 
be utilized to detect illicit activity.43  Related to French pressures, France at the time 
served as the primary target of Al Qaeda in the 1990s for its involvement in assisting 
North African governments against the terrorist group.44   
Structurally, the FIU is the central link for efforts of international coordination 
against money laundering and terrorist financing, and generally fall into four primary 
types.  While all FIUs serve as a state’s focal point for collecting data from financial 
firms and pursuing investigations of suspicious activity, they differ in terms of their 
national importance depending where body is situated within the state.  According to the 
International Monetary Fund, an FIU can either be administrative, based in law 
enforcement, the judiciary, or a hybrid of the previous three forms.45  The administrative 
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type, often found in ministries of finance or central banks, and is often favored by the 
private sector.46  In contrast, the law enforcement type of FIU is not only a regulator, but 
also a law enforcement agency in its own right.47 As examples, the American Financial 
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) is administrative in nature and embedded in the 
Department of the Treasury, while the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service is a 
law enforcement body.  There are 152 states with FIUs worldwide that coordinate the 
collection and sharing of financial intelligence in order to thwart money laundering and 
terrorist financing.48  
Combined, the implementation of KYC standards for the financial sector and the 
implantation of state agencies to connect the private sector with courts, police and 
intelligence agencies laid the groundwork for the fortification of the financial sector.  
After 2001, these institutions expanded around the world, while also deepening their 
mandate beyond crime to include terrorism.  As state-sponsorship of terrorism around the 
world decreased in its scope, terrorists, in seeking greater levels of independent revenue 
and efficiency, have turned to crime as a means of augmenting funds from donations and 
what state backing remains in the 21st century.49  As a result of this shift, banks became 
an even greater focal point for terrorists seeking to comingle illicit and legally obtained 
funds for the propagation of terrorist attacks and organizational capability.50  This 
enlisting of banks for purposes of security, while seemingly novel, is neither new nor 																																																								
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harmonious in pertaining relationships between states and banks.  While this tension and 
divergence in the interests and outcomes between banks and states will be further 
explored in the theoretical section below, the incorporation of CTF measures into the 
overall institutional effort to combat illicit finance as it relates to terrorism must first be 
explored.  
The phenomena of money laundering and terrorist financing share both an 
empirical and theoretical overlap, despite their crucial differences.  Both terrorist 
financing and non-political criminal proceeds are by their nature intended to be secret and 
withheld from public eye.  In order to achieve such secrecy, terrorist and criminal funds 
share similar trajectories as actors endeavor to obfuscate the true owners of such funds 
while also integrating much of them into the normal economy.  However, terrorist funds 
differ conceptually from criminal funds in two important respects.  First, terrorist funds 
are often legally obtained through donations and charities, and are only then channeled to 
terrorist activity.51  Second, smaller amounts terrorist proceeds obtained illegally through 
crime may never need to enter the financial sector at all if they are immediately directed 
towards terrorism, thereby negating the need to launder in the first place.52 
Conceptually, this movement of non-political criminal funds into the economy 
has been called “money laundering”, while terrorist financing is both money laundering 
and “money dirtying” as terrorist funds may move from a mix of legal and illegal sources 
to an illegal activity.  Anne Clunan conceptualizes terrorist financing as carrying “pre-																																																								
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crime” and “post-crime” components such that the former is often comprised of legally 
derived funds that have no inherent need to be laundered while the funds derived from 
criminal activity and destined for actual operations are more akin to traditional money 
laundering.53  Understanding this difference between the two types of funds is critical to 
understanding the expansion of pre-existing AML efforts into strategies designed to 
counter the funding of terrorism.  While AML goals are prohibitive in their aim to 
deprive criminals from enjoying the financial benefits of crime, preventing terrorist 
activity is necessarily forward looking and often warrants greater political consideration 
and proactivity on the part of states.  
Figure 1.1: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing: The obfuscation, holding, or transfer of things of 
value, or their ownership, in which the value is derived from, or destined for an illicit activity.   
 
 
Prior to 9/11, and partly due to the older predominant trend of terrorist groups 
historically having operated with state backing, most countries utilized economic 
sanctions rather than financial regulation to parry the funding of terrorism.54  Many well-
known cases of economic sanctions, such as those against Iran, Libya, and other states 
were designed to largely to thwart terrorist activity.  It was only when governments began 
adapting to terrorists’ self-funding operations and to the operations of criminal 																																																								
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organizations that financial regulation began to be added to states’ geopolitical arsenals to 
combat threats from non-state actors.  International cooperation to counter terrorist 
financing began increasing in the 1990s, not under the auspices of the FATF, but rather 
under the United Nations and its Convention against Terrorist Finances, and UN Security 
Council Resolution 1267 that specifically targeted Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.55 
The 2001 attacks shifted concern of both international AML institutions and great 
powers from a crime-centric approach to one that fused pre-existing efforts to stop money 
laundering with a new approach designed to counter terrorism.  At the international level, 
both the UN and the FATF extended new stipulations and regulations.  The UN passed 
Security Council Resolution 1373 days after the 9/11 attacks, and created the Counter-
Terrorism Committee that requires states to seize and freeze the assets of terrorist groups 
within their own jurisdictions and share information with other states.56   
For the FATF, the organization added 9 Special Recommendations for states to 
counter terrorist financing, thus adding to its previous 40 Recommendations against 
money laundering.  At the national level, over 100 countries passed laws to counter 
money laundering and terrorist financing, while 154 ratified the 1999 UN Convention on 
the Suppression of Terrorist Financing.57  Even tax havens, largely through “naming and 
shaming” pressures from the FATF, have adopted AML and CTF statutes.58  Switzerland, 
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Luxembourg, and the Channel Islands, all notorious tax havens known for their bank 
secrecy laws, increased their regulatory rigor to combat the laundering of drug 
proceeds.59  Other tax havens such as the Cayman Islands and Jersey complied with 
FATF recommendations by instituting the guidelines into law.60 
With the exception of a few rogue states, if the 2001 terrorist attacks on the 
United States led to a diffusion of fortified financial regulation across with world, why do 
such divergent enforcement outcomes against occur? Furthermore, in the post-2001 era, 
why do some banks enjoy protection from enforcement measures while others do not?  
Despite the nearly universal de jure presence of fortified financial regulation, scholars 
and practitioners alike decry the ineffectiveness of these widespread regulations.  
Observing the ubiquity of the AML/CTF regime around the world gives the impression 
that such regulations are effective by their very presence.   Yet, scholarship of the same 
regulatory regime offers a number of diagnoses as to why they are inefficient at curtailing 
terrorism. 
 At the policy level, scholars such as Ibrahim Warde argue that the overall 
approach that the US has taken to combat threat finance is divorced from the overall 
sociopolitical trends in which terrorist financing takes place.61 More specifically, Warde 
argues that approaching the problem of terrorist financing from the “supply side” of 
terrorist funds, rather than addressing the demand, or support that the terrorist 																																																								
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organization enjoys, is the crux of CTF inefficacy.62 Another issue raised by Warde, and 
echoed by Wittig, is the importance of cultural context in which individuals conduct their 
financial affairs, and the need for CTF efforts to take such economic nuance into 
account.63 While critical scholars focus largely on the US, and within the temporal 
context of the post-2001 era of CTF regulations and policy, the theme of power politics 
and domestic political will arises in other critiques as to why the overall institutional 
regime is ineffective.  
 Warde and Wittig both note formal banks are often not present or active in local 
economies in which terrorism is present. However, former Assistant Secretary to the 
Treasury for Terrorist Financing, Juan Zarate notes that a number of banks were involved 
in facilitating financing for terrorist groups or sanctioned state-sponsors of terrorism.64 
While Zarate places terrorist financing in the context of a state’s acumen and ability to 
wage financial warfare overall, Gurule characterizes CTF efforts as a “dismal failure” in 
the sense of the overall legal regime to being unable combat the phenomenon.65 Gurule 
notes that criminal prosecutions against terrorist financiers in the US have been lacking, 
while asset freezes worldwide declined over the course of the 2000s.66  In short, states are 
not following through on the necessary enforcement measures, despite the widespread de 
jure presence of the threat finance regime across multiple jurisdictions.  Sharman argues 
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that states, even those without financial sectors,67 adopted costly AML/CTF regulations 
from outside not to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, so much as due to 
socially coercive pressures from outside powers.68  
  The literature on terrorist financing clearly indicates that state power matters not 
only in how the international AML/CTF regime emerged and spread, but also in 
explaining why the regulatory institutions are ineffective in the curtailing of financing 
terrorism.  However, as the costly adoption of AML/CTF regulations has taken place 
across the majority of states, enforcement outcomes have nonetheless varied widely 
despite the presence of these regulations.  In short, the international regulations designed 
to curtail threat finance are not only ineffective in precluding the entry of terrorist funds 
into the banking system, but the presence and de jure adoption of the AML/CTF regime 
is not by itself enough to ensure enforcement.  The substantive question then remains as 
to what precludes enforcement from occurring, and why some banks get away with 
financing terrorism while others are forcibly closed or fined as a result.   
II. Theory 
 One of the challenges studies of terrorist financing have faced is the conceptual 
separation of states, banks, and terrorist financiers. Rather than conceiving these three 
types of actors as inhabiting separate environments, my research includes the three types 
of actors not as isolated entities so much as intimately connected actors within the same 
political economic universe.  States often do have close connections to their respective 
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financial sectors or specific banks.  Similarly, terrorist financiers are not simply following 
the Hollywood parody of carrying pallets of cash to and from remote locales so much as 
they are seeking financial efficiency.  In recruiting banks and the finance industry as a 
tool of fighting terrorism, states have effectively made banks the meeting point between 
governments, terrorist groups, and the financial industry.  For this reason, it is critical to 
fill the existing void in the literature and focus on banks as a unit of analysis.  These 
conceptual problems derive from the lack of cohesion  
A second challenge in the literature of terrorist financing is the dearth of 
developed theory about the phenomenon across the fields of comparative politics and 
international relations.  Research on terrorist financing largely falls into three categories.  
The first category is that of descriptive case studies of specific groups with little 
theoretical value outside of specific counterterrorism policies devoted to individual 
groups.  The second category is that of critical studies of American efforts to develop 
legal frameworks devoted to countering terrorism and money laundering.  The third 
category in the literature is comprised of institutional research focused regulatory 
harmonization.  Frustratingly, these literatures not only offer little generalizable theory 
but also do not congeal into a cohesive substantive focus.  My research attempts to rectify 
this paucity and discord.  
Unlike prior studies, my research conceptualizes states, terrorist financiers, and 
banks as co-inhabitants of the same institutional universe at the level of the national 
political economy.  Furthermore, I posit a generalizable theory that transcends the 
	 35 
aforementioned scholarly discord and asserts that institutional linkages between states 
and banks determine the process of enforcement outcomes.  
III. Hypothesis 
I hypothesize that a bank’s institutional linkage to its home state is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for blocked enforcement to occur.  Other factors may block enforcement 
once a bank comes under regulatory scrutiny for terrorist financing, but state-bank 
linkage remains a common structural institutional arrangement in national political 
economies around the world.  Surely, banks may deflect enforcement through their own 
legal channels and without short-circuiting the regulatory regime.  However, states 
ultimately hold the prerogative to acquiesce to import regulatory institutions, determine 
to what degree they are followed, and ultimately decide how to enforce them.  
 Formalized in Figure 1.2 outlined below, I hypothesize that institutional linkage L 
is necessary but not sufficient to block regulatory enforcement E.  If an institutional 
linkage between a state and bank is present, then CTF regulatory enforcement against that 
bank will be blocked.  Conversely, if there is no linkage (~L), then enforcement will not 
be blocked once the bank is targeted (~E).  In other words, enforcement fails.  
Figure 1.2: Necessary condition of institutional linkage to block enforcement.  
(L  ⊃  E)  ≡  (~L  ⊃  ~E) 
Falsifying this conditional hypothesis requires testing that successful enforcement 
occurs in cases where the bank has institutional linkage with its state.  For these cases, a 
chapter examining negative cases is employed drawing upon the same historical tracing 
of the historical independence of the banks in question.  If enforcement ~E takes place in 
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the presence of linkage L, then the state should not take up defensive measures in order to 
protect the bank.  Additionally, it is imperative to demonstrate that institutional linkage L 
leads to blocked enforcement E.  
In order to begin falsifying and proving the necessity of institutional linkage in 
blocking enforcement requires first establishing that an institutional linkage is present, 
followed by demonstrating how the linkage leads to blocked enforcement.  Establishing 
blocked enforcement and existing linkages between the targeted bank and its state 
requires creating a history of the bank and its role in its country’s political economy.  
Establishing these histories warrants tracing the development of the banks in question, 
and their relationships with their home governments up through the country’s importation 
of CTF regulations.  Tracing the relationship between the bank and its state must account 
for any critical junctures that separated the two, and whether the linkage was present at 
the time of the enforcement attempt.   
Causally, I argue that a state’s adoption of the regulatory regime does not 
fundamentally alter existing institutional relationships between states that are linked to its 
banks.  If anything, the architecture of the regulations, and its pipeline of information 
collection and surveillance between financial institutions and the government actually 
strengthen existing linkages between the two actors.  Then, once a bank comes under 
regulatory scrutiny, the home state’s bureaucracies and government will actively negate 
enforcement attempts.  
Regarding the diffusion and adoption of threat finance institutions, previous 
research clearly indicates that state power is critical in guiding the propagation of 
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AML/CTF regulatory institutions around the world.  The security interests of countries 
with major financial centers in the US and Europe cultivated the original basis for the 
CTF institutions.  In turn, these regulations spread around the world and were copied by 
the majority of states at the national level.  These multiple international mechanisms 
facilitate cooperation among states, such as UN conventions and resolutions, as well as 
the moves by the FATF, are extensions of power by influential states.69  Even the ability 
of many offshore tax havens to slither around AML statutes and institute lax enforcement 
is largely the product of many havens enjoying the backing of former colonial powers 
such as France and the UK, who in turn pressure many international bodies from 
attempting coerce their offshore surrogates.70  
 The puzzle then is why certain banks escape enforcement from the states in which 
they are embedded, and escape enforcement when their home states have adopted CTF 
institutions from abroad and integrated them into their national regulatory regime.  This 
question is one of institutional theory as much as it is one of a state’s security concerns 
and power politics.  The findings of Warde, Sharman, and Wittig all portray the image of 
a helpless situation with ever increasing layers of CTF regulations, poorly crafted to 
localized economic realities, piling upon preexisting ones with ever diminishing returns 
in stopping terrorist financing.  However, the mystery why banks sometimes suffer and 
sometimes escape enforcement for terrorist financing has not been explored.  
																																																								
69 See Sharman (2011), and Cortright et al (2007). See Appendix A for a list of states that have adopted the 
global CTF regime. 
70 Palan, Murphy, and Chavagneux, 206-208.  
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In answering this question, I argue that when banks exhibit an institutional 
linkage to their home state, incoming CTF institutions will not supersede these 
preexisting connections.  As a result, once that bank becomes targeted for financing 
terrorism by the CTF regime, the home state will take measures to block the enforcement 
warranted by the CTF institutions, and these institutions will then misfire.  More 
succinctly, when a bank is linked to its home state, enforcement attempts against it will 
be blocked by the state with which it is tied.  
 The development and spreading of CTF institutions around the world over the 
past several decades illustrates profound institutional change in realm of financial 
regulations and fortified finance in general.  Fortified finance developed and emerged 
first in major developed economies with formidable financial centers before being spread 
worldwide.  However, the vast majority of states already had existing financial systems, 
complete with their own unique institutional arrangements within their national political 
economies when CTF regulations emerged and dispersed.  Preexisting relationships 
between banks and their home states, if critical to that nation’s political economy and 
regime stability, are not easily displaced by fortified financial regulations imported from 
abroad.  In determining the outcomes of CTF enforcement, the continuity or change of 
these preexisting institutional arrangements between banks and their states answers this 
question.  If incoming CTF institutions only partially integrate into existing institutional 
arrangements between banks and their home states, rather than transforming them, they 
will not be effective in penalizing banks that finance terrorism.   
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 Literature on CTF regulations has neglected questions of institutional change at 
the domestic level of states where banks finance terror, as well as neglect questions of 
enforcement outcomes.  This neglect stems in large part from the ontological assumptions 
particular to the subfield of international political economy; namely, treating the 
international political economy as a single cohesive system rather than as interactions 
between separate countries with their own unique political economies.  Indeed, the 
institutional matrix of regulations designed to keep banks from financing is “global” in its 
de jure intention.  With the majority of states instituting financial intelligence units to 
monitor and enforce CTF compliance at the national level, coordination of these efforts 
through international organizations like the Egmont Group and the FATF, the formation 
of regional compliance bodies, coordination at the UN level, at the European Union, and 
elsewhere, the international fortified finance regime is indeed global.  However, the 
substantive area of the AML/CTF regime is both one of national security as well as one 
of global institutional diffusion and adoption.  
 In historical terms, the fortified finance regime is new at the international level.  
In contrast, domestic political economies often carry old structural arrangements that pre-
date the arrival of these regulations by many decades.  Such preexisting arrangements are 
not easily displaced once a state’s economy has developed around specific arrangements 
that may originate with the state’s development.  Just as a “global” political economy has 
not dissolved distinct national economic characteristics, it is doubtful that the fortified 
finance regime will dislodge relationships between banks that are vital to their states.  
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 While fortified finance may predominate over the global financial system, the 
usefulness of these regulations is highly suspect.  First, the fortified finance regime 
originated as a means of curtailing the wealth of apolitical criminal organizations.  Unlike 
terrorist groups, the growth of profit-seeking criminal organizations is not often in the 
security interest of any state.  In contrast, terrorism is elementally political, and states 
may support or combat such groups as befitting their security interests.  Yet, the 
“globalization” of the CTF component of the fortified finance regime after 2001 
functions on the assumption that states do not have an interest in supporting terrorist 
groups, similar to the assumption that states will have no inherent interest in supporting 
criminal organizations.  In short, the international CTF regime functions off of the 
assumption that states have a unified interest in curtailing terrorists from raising funds 
and using banks to hold and transmit them.  
 Following the Cold War, international relations research exhibited a newfound 
optimism in the usefulness of institutions and their ability to facilitate cooperation and 
peace.  Contrary to the assertions made by scholars such as Francis Fukuyama,71 the 
“global” world characterized by cooperation, democracy and capitalism did not arise.  
Certainly, the ostensible spread of neoliberalism across the world lends itself to the 
notion of a highly integrated international financial system.  In parallel, the rise and 
spread of the post-2001 CTF regime around the world offers the appearance of states 
acting decisively to make international finance safe from terrorism.  However, states 
pursuing their own security and interests continue to characterize the international system 
																																																								
71 Francis Fukuyama. The end of history and the last man. Simon and Schuster, 2006. 
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into the new millennium, and there is no reason to think that banks or other financial 
institutions are somehow immune to such a pursuit.  
 In international relations, prior research by both scholars and practitioners 
hammers home the notion that state power predominates over cooperative impulses 
among states.  Realist scholars have long cast doubt on the efficacy of international 
institutions, with scholars such as Mearsheimer asserting that institutions have no 
“independent effect” on state action such that institutions only have import “on the 
margins”.72  States have historically at times supported terrorist groups in order to pursue 
their own interests. By extension, there is no reason to believe states will not support 
banks if threatened by regulatory moves from abroad. If a casual glance at the 
international threat finance regime shows a deep and unified regulatory effort to curtail 
terrorist financing, such a view glosses over differing goals of state security.   
 If states have diverging security interests, they also have different political 
economies.  While the threat finance regime has spread de jure across the majority of 
states, and states have gone through implementing FIUs and other mechanisms to curtail 
terrorist financing, the international regime lacks the flexibility to work effectively in 
unique political economic conditions at the national and local levels.  Warde argues that 
in many states, particularly those in rural locales such as Afghanistan, parts of the Middle 
East and Africa, banks and other financial institutions are uniquely enmeshed within 
unique social, religious, and cultural contexts for which “US-style paperwork” is ill-
																																																								
72 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 19, 
No. 3, (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 5-49,7. 
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suited.73  Indeed, Sharman notes that in the rush to jump on board with the international 
fortified finance regime, over 180 states adopted a “standard set” of policies and 
regulations in an effort to comply with dominant states in pursuit of curtailing money 
laundering and terrorist financing.74 In noting the mimetic approach states have taken to 
adopt the fortified finance regime, and that this regime can vary from awkward to alien in 
how it functions within local and national political economies, threat finance scholars 
uncover the second macro level problem facing international CTF institutions.   
 If the first fundamental flaw in the international CTF regime stems from its 
outright rejection of the notion that states pursue their own security interests, and that 
there is no unified global interest in curtailing terrorist financing, the second derives from 
its institutional design.  The current AML/CTF regime originated and developed in states 
with advanced political economies characterized by financial liberalization throughout 
the process in which the regime emerged.  Certainly, states such as Afghanistan, Somalia, 
and others cannot simply import financial regulations designed for banks in the West.  
However, this observation underscores a larger institutional problem in political 
economy; namely, that regulations from advanced liberal-market economies are often ill 
suited to institutional arrangements in political economies elsewhere.  
 If the international AML/CTF regime has been virtually uniform worldwide since 
the aftermath of 9/11, the political economic context in which it was developed was not.  
During the 1990s and into the 2000s, the post-Cold War international economy raised 
debates about whether the distinct political economic models of the postwar era were 																																																								
73 Warde, 178.  
74 Sharman, 1.  
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“converging” towards a dominant model characterized by liberalized financial sectors.  
Questions arose as to whether longstanding institutional frameworks that comprised 
distinct national political economic models would persist in their unique differences.75  
More specifically, scholars questioned whether or not political economies dominated by 
bank-based financing would persist in an era in which capital markets played an 
increasing role.   
Scholarship on comparative political economies indicates that convergence across 
models was elusive.76 Suzanne Berger argues that when institutional convergence does 
not take place, preexisting institutions survive as the result of the state or influential 
interest groups exerting “extramarket reinforcement” to protecting or prolong the tenure 
of unique social and political economic configurations.77 Indeed, in regards to external 
pressures on national political economies to converge, uniqueness will persist such that 
“space for political vision and choice” will remain.78  While research on the persisting 
diversity in national political economies has largely centered upon advanced 
industrialized states, this principle is transferrable to less developed countries and their 
economies.  
The persistence of singular institutional configurations within national political 
economies relates to the question of why certain banks escape enforcement for financing 
terrorism.  In piecing together any puzzle, it is first necessary to find the frame and edges 																																																								
75 See Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck et al, The End of Diversity?: Prospects for German and 
Japanese Capitalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).	
76 See Yamamura and Streeck et al, 2003.  
77 Suzanne Berger, “Introduction”, in National Diversity and Global Capitalism, ed. Suzanne Berger and 
Ronald Dore, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1.  
78 Berger (1996), 25.  
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before revealing images at the center.  We know that banks are often the tools of states in 
pursuing their geopolitical objectives,79 even though it can be divined from Kirshner’s 
research on banks and war that financial institutions are loathed to be such political 
tools.80  As political economies based upon bank financing have retained this 
characteristic despite market pressures to converge, we also know that the CTF regime 
that spread after 9/11 was adopted in a manner ill suited to local conditions,81 and were 
adopted in a mimetic fashion where the regulations were largely copied from existing 
rules pervasive in the developed liberal market economy of the US.82   
If CTF regulations were originally designed for financial sectors with a liberal 
market orientation, and such regulations were adopted into political economies where 
banks are institutionally linked to states and thereby both tools of their states while also 
shielded from market pressures, these banks should likewise be protected by their states 
when they finance terrorism.  My theory is straightforward in that banks that are vitally 
linked to their states will be protected once such banks come under regulatory scrutiny, 
and that CTF regulations will misfire as a result. 
IV. Variables and Conceptualization 
Less common in the West where the fortified finance regime developed, many 
financial institutions elsewhere in the world have long-held relationships with the country 
in which they are embedded. For this research, an institutional linkage between banks and 
their home states is defined as a formal structural relationship between a financial 																																																								
79 See Viner,1929, and Feiss, 1930.  
80 See Kirshner, 2007.		
81 Warde, 2007.  
82 Sharman, 2011.	
	 45 
institution and the national government in whose political economy it is embedded.  The 
reasons for such a linkage may include the bank serving as a coalition binder for the 
ruling regime, the state serving as the predominant stakeholder of the bank in question, or 
deep career linkages between a state and a financial institution.   
If a bank enjoys a relationship with its home state in the form of an institutional 
linkage, certain observable indicators will illustrate its presence.  In the event that a state 
is a primary stakeholder in a given bank, such a bank may exhibit outright state 
ownership or cater to the state as the premier client and account holder.  Similarly, if a 
state is the premier stakeholder in a given bank, that bank may operate as a source of 
primary lending to specific sectors of the economy in which the state is actively involved.  
Certain areas of business such as infrastructure, major corporate lending, energy, or the 
financing of state affairs such as arms deals with foreign states or the dispensing of 
economic aid abroad are liable to institutionally link a bank to its home state. 
Depending upon the intimacy and proximity between a state’s government and 
financial sector, a bank can exhibit institutional linkages to its state in the form of elite 
career ties.  Namely, mid and high-ranking corporate officers from the banking industry 
may spend part of their careers in the financial sector while spending another portion of 
their careers in the regulatory realm.  Professional acumen in the regulatory realm and the 
financial world is often highly transferrable given the ostensive need for banks to follow 
certain regulatory procedures and protocols, while officials in finance ministries and 
other governmental bodies are likely to enjoy greater pay and benefits in the corporate 
sector.  Similarly, financial officers may traverse the bank-state divide through political 
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appointments at higher levels while such elites, regardless of immediate employment, are 
likely to have matriculated from similar schools of higher learning.   
If the bank as a corporate entity displays deep ties with its home state, a bank in 
question may operate as a coalition binder for a ruling party or cadre.  If a country is at 
least semi-democratic, a bank could serve as a primary lender for a political party’s 
electoral constituency.  Similarly, authoritarian regimes reliant upon certain domestic 
interest groups, be they a primary ethnic or religious affiliation, the military, or a specific 
industry, may have key societal supporters reliant upon specific banks in the country’s 
economy.  If a ruling government holds a constituency reliant upon a certain bank, or set 
of financial institutions for purposes of lending or patronage running from the state to 
different parts of the populace, such linkages I conceptualize as coalition binders.  
Figure 1.3: Independent Variable: Institutional Linkage 
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While my causal variable for the misfire is institutional linkage between a bank 
and its home state, my dependent variable is the actual blockage of such enforcement 
efforts.  Conceptually, “blocked enforcement” can manifest in the form of a home state’s 
veto of the enforcement process, or the home state’s active deflection of enforcement 
efforts.  Both a veto and a deflection are defenses undertaken by a state for the purpose of 
defending a bank, although each has a number of potential observable indicators.  A 
state’s veto of the enforcement process is only possible at the national level where a 
regime may engage in activities ranging from bureaucratic reshuffling, judicial 
interference, outright political intimidation of various domestic actors, pardons of 
suspected officials, or undermining external enforcement through state-backed financial 
support to the bank in question.  In contrast, deflection implies action at the international 
level, where a bank’s home regime may utilize organs of state to influence enforcement 
efforts at their source abroad.  If deflection is taking place, a state may rely on diplomatic 
means, intelligence agencies, or threat of sanction as a means to dissuading potential 
enforcers from acting against a given bank.   
Figure 1.4: Dependent Variable: Enforcement Blockage 
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V. Cases and Method 
           The unit of analysis for this study is the bank.  As noted above, banks are where 
regulations, the financial system, and terrorist groups converge.  These are case studies of 
banks placed within the unique political economies of the states in which they are 
embedded, and banks that came under regulatory scrutiny for financing terrorism.  In this 
regard, the unit of analysis incorporates the ensuing banking scandal that emerges once 
this bank is targeted with how the institutional relationship between a state and its 
terrorist bank fares once this occurs.  
            While the true case universe of banks that finance terrorism cannot be known 
empirically, the universe of cases in which banks are caught financing terrorism or have 
been investigated for financing terrorism can be studied and analyzed.  Theoretically, one 
of the main questions that this study seeks to address is why, in the face of ever 
broadening and deepening AML/CTF regulation around the globe, do banks experience 
such divergent outcomes once these regulations are triggered.  Due to this question, the 
universe of potential cases is temporally bound by the scope condition of these 
regulations not only existing, but also spreading and getting adopted by states that have 
banks that finance terror.  Due to the fact that such regulation has only seriously spread 
globally during the several decades, this universe of cases is relatively new.   
            As noted above, the true population of banks that finance terrorism cannot be 
known.  Dishonest banks tend to not profusely advertise their crimes to public scrutiny.  
However, the universe of banks that have come to public scrutiny for financing 
international terrorism is not only known and growing, but also fairly dispersed around 
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the globe.  Fortunate for theoretical purposes, this spatial dispersion of cases ranging 
from rich OECD economies to failed states that span multiple continents offers greater 
leverage for controlling for variables related to economic development, political systems, 
and culture.  
VI. Rival Hypotheses and Case Coding 
  Figure 4 outlines a list of major terrorist financing cases in which banks have 
come under regulatory scrutiny.  As noted in the table, the countries involved include 
industrialized economies, failed states, democracies, authoritarian regimes, and offshore 
tax havens.  A number of rival hypotheses exist, such as poor rule of law, low state 
capacity, tax haven status, membership in a regulatory body, and authoritarianism. These 
rival hypotheses do not explain enforcement outcomes.   
 The first, and most obvious rival hypothesis of blocked enforcement is a state’s 
membership in a regulatory body.  One of the startling aspects of the threat finance 
regulatory regime is the widespread diffusion that the regime has experienced since it 
was conceptualized in the US and Britain, and in a slew of de jure adoptions of the 
regime after 2001. Not only is every country in this universe of cases involved in some 
sort of international regulatory body, enforcement occurred even for Somalia’s Al 
Barakat Bank, despite Somalia’s status as a failed state.  The second obvious rival 
hypothesis of blocked enforcement is authoritarianism.   
While every case of blocked enforcement took place in an authoritarian country, 
authoritarianism did not prevent enforcement against Arab Bank in Jordan.  Both Arab 
Bank and the Saudi banks, Al Rajhi and National Commerce Bank, inhabit similar 
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regulatory and political environments.  Additionally, both Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
illustrate similar levels rule of law and regulatory quality.  Both states are Sunni Arab 
monarchies in the same geographic region and both enjoy alliances with the United 
States.  Yet Arab Bank faced moderate enforcement for financing terrorism, similar to the 
European cases of BN Paribas and Standard Chartered, while Al Rajhi Bank and National 
Commerce Bank escaped enforcement.   
Conversely, both Al Taqwa and BCCI faced severe enforcement and were shut 
down completely in their tax haven home states in Europe.  Al Barakat, a bank in the 
failed state of Somalia experienced an identical regulatory shutdown as the banks in these 
Western tax havens.  Banks surrounded by European of rule of law, dense regulatory 
environments, high levels of state capacity, and liberal democracy effectively suffered 
similar penalization as a bank in a failed state.  A cursory glance at the table below 
indicates that some variable other than rule of law or state capacity is leading to the 
observed enforcement outcomes. 
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Figure 1.5: Table of Potential Cases (Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality Data from World Bank 
Governance Indicators, 2010) 
 
       
 
 
																																																								
83 Source: Financial Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/membersandobservers/ (Accessed 
September 5, 2016). 
84 Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (2010). 
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Standard 
Chartered 
Negative 
No Yes United 
Kingdom 
• FATF Member  Yes (Moderate) • Regulatory 
Quality: 1.73 
• Rule of Law: 1.76  
HSBC 
Negative 
No Yes United 
Kingdom 
• FATF Member  Yes (Moderate) • Regulatory 
Quality: 1.73 
• Rule of Law: 1.76 
Al Rajhi 
Bank 
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Yes No Saudi Arabia • MENAFATF Member 
• FATF Observer 
No (Non-
Enforcement) 
• Regulatory 
Quality: 0.183 
• Rule of Law: 0.25 
Bank of 
China 
Positive 
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Republic of 
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• Eurasian Group 
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• Asia/Pacific Group on 
Money Laundering 
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• Regulatory 
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 -0.217 
• Rule of Law:  
-0.328 
Al Barakat 
Bank  
Negative 
No No Somalia • None Yes (Severe 
Enforcement)-
Innocent 
No Data-Failed State 
Lebanese 
Canadian 
Bank 
Negative 
No No Lebanon • MENAFATF Yes (Severe 
Enforcement) 
• Regulatory 
Quality: 0.076 
• Rule of Law: 
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Arab Bank 
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• Regulatory 
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BCCI  
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No No Luxembourg • FATF Member  Yes  (Severe 
Enforcement)* 
• Regulatory 
Quality: 1.687 
• Rule of Law: 
1.831 
Al Taqwa 
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No No Switzerland • FATF Member Yes (Severe 
Enforcement) 
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Quality: 1.64 
• Rule of Law: 1.76 
National 
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Positive 
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Enforcement) 
• Regulatory 
Quality: 0.183 
• Rule of Law: 0.25 
Halk Bank 
Positive 
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Enforcement) 
• Regulatory 
Quality: 0.38 
• Rule of Law: 
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BN 
Paribas 
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• Observer to FATF 
Latin America 
• Observer to MENA 
FATF 
• Observer to Caribbean 
FATF 
Yes (Moderate 
Enforcement) 
• Regulatory 
Quality: 1.31 
• Rule of Law: 1.41 
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For this study, I examine five case studies in total.  Three of the cases are coded 
as “positive”, and are cases in which a bank escaped enforcement due to defensive 
actions by their home state blocking enforcement efforts.  Two cases are coded as 
“negative”, and exemplify cases in which enforcement efforts were carried out through 
penalization banks that finance terrorism.  The three positive cases include the Halk Bank 
in Turkey, Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, and the Bank of China (BoC).  The negative 
cases include Arab Bank in Jordan, and the Bank of Commerce and Credit International 
(BCCI), now defunct and formerly based in the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg.   
            Every case except the Bank of China and BCCI centers upon Middle East, and all 
involve banks that have been subjected to at least attempted regulatory enforcement for 
financing terrorism.  Among the positive cases, while all three banks are based within 
authoritarian countries, authoritarianism itself does not determine the process of 
regulatory misfire.  Jordan, in which Arab Bank suffered penalties for financing Hamas, 
is based in an authoritarian Sunni Arab monarchy, similar to Saudi Arabia.  However, Al 
Rajhi Bank, a Saudi bank with historical links to Al Qaeda, has suffered no penalization 
to date, despite efforts from regulators and the families of terror victims.  Similarly, 
BCCI, once based in a tax haven with bank secrecy laws, experienced the counter-
intuitive penalty of complete closure for its illicit activity and financing of terrorism.   
            Regarding institutional linkage, it must be stressed that linkage does not 
necessarily connote total state ownership.  Certainly, while both Turkey’s Halk Bank and 
the Bank of China remain predominantly state-owned enterprises (SOEs), Al Rajhi Bank 
in Saudi Arabia has a downright cliquish and private history, centered upon ownership by 
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a predominant Saudi family and traces its activities to the era of the Kingdom’s founding 
and ongoing relationships with the royal family.  In short, state ownership is not 
necessary do derail regulatory enforcement.  This stipulation is also worth noting due to 
the theoretical observations made by previous scholars who decried the application of 
cookie-cutter CTF regulations around the world without taking into account local and 
national political economic circumstances.   
           Other rival causal explanations exist alongside institutional linkage, the most 
obvious two being lack of a regulatory presence and poor rule of law within the states in 
question.  China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all rank low on markers of rule of law.  
However, low rule of law is not sufficient to explain regulatory misfire, particularly as 
Jordan ranks similarly with Saudi Arabia despite the divergent regulatory outcomes for 
their banks.85  Additionally, the very fact that Al Barakat Bank in Somalia, a failed state 
without any official ranking of rule of law suffered the same fate as BCCI in 
Luxembourg indicates that the presence of another variable accounts for allowing 
enforcement to proceed.   
            Regulatory presence, the strongest rival explanation, seems to play no role 
whatsoever in determining regulatory misfire.  While Luxembourg became a FATF 
member in 1990, and BCCI came under massive regulatory pressure in 1991 a year later, 
regulatory membership cannot explain Turkey’s membership since 1991 and Halk Bank’s 
escape from enforcement despite its massive laundering of terrorist funds for Iran in the 
late 2000s.  The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is not the only AML/CTF 
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international body, but does serve as a benchmark for measuring institutionalized 
fortified finance.86  These rival explanations will be explored in Chapter 5 on the negative 
cases of Arab Bank and BCCI. 
VII. Data 
 In first establishing the existence of an institutional linkage between a bank and 
its home state, and then tracing this relationship through the adoption of CTF regulations 
through the scandal phase in which enforcement is blocked or carried out, I employ data 
derived from documentary sources.  As noted in the introduction, every one of these 
cases is public knowledge and experienced coverage including media reports, lengthy 
trials, and legislative hearings.  Along with documentary court data and governmental 
documents, I employ histories, memoirs, and other governmental and bank data to 
construct specific histories of the banks being examined.  Additionally, I utilize 
diplomatic material in the form of emails and cables from various government agencies 
obtained and released by the whistleblower dissemination site Wikileaks.   
From the standpoint of data, few concise bank histories exist.  With the exception 
of the Bank of China, little historical work has been done on the banks mentioned in this 
research.  Aside from accounting records, even banks themselves retain few documents 
of their institution and its relation to the economy in which it is embedded.  Documents 
such as annual reports, other economic research on the country in question, banker 
memoirs, and media statements are used to construct the histories of these banks and their 
relationship to their state.  Documenting the institutional development of the banks also 
																																																								
86 See Sharman, 2011. 
	 55 
draws from previous works on national political economies, as well as from previous 
scholars’ research and data on specific banks in the countries in question from economic 
historians and other political economists.   
 Material from Wikileaks, enforcement bodies, and trial data is critical for analysis  
of the scandal phase in which the enforcement is attempted.  This data provides  
additional background relevant to the suspected terrorist financing, and in some cases  
indicates that terrorist financing did indeed occur.  Additionally, trial data and the manner  
in which it was obtained highlights when a bank’s home state cooperated with the  
regulatory action, and when it assisted its bank in blocking enforcement.  Documentary  
data from Wikileaks offers additional analytical benefits through offering the observer a  
look into diplomatic activity related to enforcement attempts.  
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Chapter 2: Bank of China 
I. Introduction 
 Perhaps the largest question in international politics in the new millennium is 
what role China will play in global affairs in the coming decades.  Undergoing rapid and 
profound economic growth since the early 1980s, the contemporary People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) bears little economic resemblance to its Maoist predecessor. As a result of 
the economic and financial reforms that first catalyzed this growth under Deng Xiaoping, 
Chinese banks comprised four of the top five largest banks in the world as of 2016.1 
China’s banking industry remains the premier domain of the “Big Four” (the Industrial 
Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China, the China Construction Bank, and the 
Agricultural Bank of China) that make up four of the top five largest banks in the world.   
Beginning in 2006, plaintiffs in the United States began filing suits against the 
Bank of China for financing terrorism for Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Iran.  The cases 
against the bank were dismissed in 2015.  First, this chapter will establish the 
longstanding linkages between the Bank of China and the Chinese state in its various 
manifestations since the late Qing Dynasty.  Next, China’s “liberalization” and its 
adoption of fortified finance will be discussed, along with how China’s regulatory 
adoptions mixed with the formation of its own domestic financial surveillance regime.  
Third, this chapter will examine the Bank of China’s involvement in terrorist financing 
and how the adversarial nature of the  American legal was utilized by Israel to counter 
																																																								
1 Tom Farthing, “The Banker Top 1000 World Banks 2016 ranking”, The Banker, June 29, 2015, 
http://www.thebanker.com/Top-1000-World-Banks/The-Banker-Top-1000-World-Banks-2016-ranking-
WORLD-Press-IMMEDIATE-RELEASE (accessed July 18, 2017).  
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China’s financing of terror.  This section also explores how China brought diplomatic 
leverage and a domestic bureaucratic veto to block enforcement actions against the bank.   
II. The Development of the Bank of China  
 
Over the course of the bank’s history, allegations of terrorist financing serve as 
but a relatively minor crisis when compared to the upheavals the bank survived since it 
was founded in 1911.  Despite the cataclysms that mark modern China’s historical epochs 
since the decline of the Qing dynasty, the Bank of China has served as a tool of Chinese 
state policy since it opened.  This institutional linkage between bank and state has not 
only survived critical junctures such as the Republican revolution, the Japanese 
occupation during WWII, and the Communist revolution, but also maintained strong 
linkages to the state through the Beijing’s supposed “liberalization” of the financial sector 
and adoption of CTF regulations.  
Since its genesis in the late Qing period, the Chinese state remained the perennial 
stakeholder in the Bank of China through either government function or outright 
ownership.  While the state’s status as primary stakeholder survived the collapse of the 
Qing, the Republican era on the mainland, Japanese occupation, civil war, and varying 
degrees of Communist and statist rule, the bank took on an additional role as securing 
Beijing’s growth priorities through domestic lending to local government during the 
reforms of the late 1970s and 1980s.  As will be illustrated below, the state’s role as 
primary stakeholder in the bank has deep roots in the bank’s history and continues to the 
present.  While the state has long been a stakeholder in the bank, the bank has served as a 
means of binding the Communist Party’s coalition through domestic lending beginning in 
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the 1980s, and both coalition binding and state stake-holding have survived both China’s 
financial “liberalization” and the importing of the international AML/CTF regime.   
This chapter will first outline the role of state stakeholding in the bank over the 
course of its history, and then discuss the role the bank plays in domestic financing for 
local government.  The bank’s role in the various institutional changes made to the 
Chinese economy through the reform era of the late 20th century will also be discussed, 
and it will be demonstrated that state stake-holding not only survived Beijing’s supposed 
liberalization, but also has served as a means of an economic binding agent for the 
CCCP’s ruling coalition through domestic lending.  The third section of this chapter will 
then discuss the banking scandal in which the Bank of China stood accused in US courts 
for financing terrorism and the subsequent deflection of sanction the bank enjoyed.  Last, 
the Bank of China case will be placed within the theoretical context predicated in the 
preceding chapter.  
 Origins of State Ownership 
 Chinese banks and the role that they play within the country’s modern statecraft 
cannot be understood without placing them within the context of Beijing’s grand strategy.  
Facing rapid decline beginning in the 19th century and continuing through ensuing eras 
and into the present, Chinese political thinkers of varying ideological orientations 
centered upon the notion of fuguo qiangbing, or “enrich the state and strengthen military 
power” as the guiding principle of the state.2  It was in this early era, when the waning 
Qing dynasty struggled to repel European and Japanese encroachment from abroad and 																																																								
2 See, Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China’s Long March to the Twenty-First 
Century, (New York: Random House, 2014).  
	 59 
contain civil unrest at home, the Bank of China originated.  It is worth noting here that 
the Bank of China, and perhaps large Chinese banks overall stand in stark contrast to the 
observations of other scholars that assert banks are loathed to be the instruments of states.  
In China, bank and state, if indeed are distinguishable in management, are 
indistinguishable in their purpose of strengthening China’s position in the world.  The 
state’s involvement in the Bank of China is deep, and the peculiar institutional linkages 
that connect them have survived multiple eras of modern governance in China’s political 
history, spanning the waning days of the monarchy to contemporary China’s position as a 
rising international power.  
 In the late 19th century, banks in China were comprised of three types, the piahao 
or “draft shops”, “native banks”, or qianzhuang, and yinhang “silver shops”, which were 
Western banks operating in the country.3 This early differentiation is critical to 
understanding the first major banks established by the Qing dynasty, particularly as the 
first major commercial banks established indigenously by the Qing bore the title of 
yinhang,4 conceptually emulating major Western banks present in China at the time of 
their founding.  Prominent Chinese thinkers in the late 19th century such as Feng Guifen 
advocated that China “self-strengthen”, or seek to understand copy elements of what 
were seen as Western strengths at the time, including in the area of economic and 
financial development.5 
																																																								
3 James Stent, China’s Banking Transformation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 205-207.  
4 Ibid, 207.  
5 Schell and Delury, 47.  
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Innovators within the Qing administration, while under the influence of the “self-
strengthening” movement, not only grappled with a number of foreign political pressures 
in the form of Western encroachment and a rising Japan, but also economic difficulties 
derived from these pressures.  Gluts of foreign exchange swamped the Chinese currency 
market following the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, and due to foreign currency 
exchanges remaining the exclusive purview of foreign banks since the Opium Wars in 
mid-19th century, Chinese enterprise and the Qing administration began seeking 
mechanisms to promote the use of silver coins and “serve China with Chinese currency”.6 
The founding of the “Treasury Bank” in 1905, to later be renamed as the Da Qing Bank 
in 1908, was the fruit of such efforts.  The purposes to which the Da Qing Bank was 
tasked, was foundational and state centered.  By the dawn of the Republican period in 
1911, the Da Qing Bank comprised 35 branches throughout China,7 oversaw all 
government-related transactions, operated as the state’s treasury and central bank, and 
purveyed the issuing of official banknotes.8  Uprisings that began in the 1890s finally 
culminated with the 1911 Revolution and the establishment of the Republic of China.  
The Da Qing Bank, due in large part to its unique relationship with the state, survived to 
become the Bank of China in 1912 when it forged a new relationship with the incoming 
government while maintaining institutional continuity. Through various arrangements, 
this government oversight and ownership has persisted to the present.  
																																																								
6 “The Republic of China and Bank of China: Keeping Pace with History (1912), official website, Bank of 
China, http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601882.html (accessed July 22, 2017).  
7 Ibid.  
8 Stent, 208.   
	 61 
The Da Qing Bank was founded with hybrid ownership in equal shares held by 
the government and private shareholders within one corporate structure.9 The bank’s 
founders formulated the institution as a stock company, based on China’s 1904 first real 
corporate statute (gongsi lu) that drew from a hybrid of characteristics from British and 
Japanese models at the time.10  Aside from its partial state ownership, the Da Qing bank 
utilized a unique dynamic of corporate governance that combined “government 
supervision with merchant management” that sought to use private business elites and 
their special expertise, often garnered from abroad, with active government support 
through policy and planning.11 This mixture of institutional arrangement would virtually 
entirely translate from the Da Qing entity to the rebranded Bank of China shortly after the 
Nationalist takeover.  
According to a November 14, 1911 report by the bank’s Shareholder’s 
Association which represented the private equity interest in the bank, local 
revolutionaries often mistook Da Qing branches and the bank itself as being “wholly state 
owned”, and as a result took to looting branches and the de facto Chinese treasury.12  In 
reaction, the bank’s private shareholders contacted the incoming Republican government, 
and a “new” relationship between state and bank would be forged.   
 
																																																								
9 Bank of China, official website, http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601882.html 
(accessed July 27, 2017).  
10 Yuanyuan Peng, The Chinese Banking Industry: Lessons from history for today’s challenges, (Newy 
York: Routledge, 2007), 44. See also, W. Goetzmann and E. Koll, “The history of corporate ownership in 
China: state patronage, company legislation, and the issue of control”, NBER, 2004.  
11 Ibid, 45.  
12 Bank of China, official website, http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601882.html 
(accessed July 27, 2017). 
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Ownership in the Republican Period 
Shortly after the Republican government was founded in 1912, the new 
Republican Attorney General nominated the Da Qing’s Managing Director, Chen Jintao, 
to become the new Minister of Finance for the Republic of China.13  It was under Chen 
Jintao’s direction that the Da Qing Bank transitioned into the Bank of China as the 
central bank for the new republic.14  Jintao not only advocated to the Republican 
government for this transition, he remained in the original bank’s head office to oversee 
the transition.  While the Qing government’s equity in the bank was allocated to 
recuperate war-related costs, the Republican government took management of the bank’s 
properties and took an ownership share equivalent to that of the deposed Qing dynasty.  
This new arrangement continued the half-private, half-state ownership structure.  
Meanwhile, the private shareholders obtained equivalent level of equity in the new Bank 
of China, soon to be the new central bank. In late January 1912, the Da Qing’s 
shareholders formed the new bank and chose new board members; by February 14, the 
Bank of China opened and began opening branches at the same locations as the by then 
defunct Da Qing Bank.15  The bank smoothly transitioned, maintaining a dual public-
private between private shareholders and the state as a stakeholder.    
The continuity between the two banks was not limited to the figure of Chen 
Jintao.  The bank remained a stock company with the half-government and half-private 
split in ownership, with most private shareholders continuing to hold respective shares in 																																																								
13 Bank of China, official website, http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601882.html 
(accessed July 27, 2017). 
14 Ibid.  
15 Bank of China, official website, http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601882.html 
(accessed July 27, 2017). 
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the new venture.  Furthermore, the bank’s staff, properties and even the banknotes 
produced remained unchanged.  In the case of the banknotes, the only marked difference 
between those of the Bank of China and its Qing predecessor was the name of the issuing 
bank on the bill.16  For the government’s share, both the Qing government and the 
Nationalists owned and administered the state’s half of the bank through the Ministry of 
Finance.17 The relationship between the Ministry and the bank serve as the structural 
vehicle of government stake holding until Communist takeover when the People’s Bank 
of China (PBC) replaced this mechanism.  
At first glance, to those unfamiliar with the Bank of China’s history, the 
Communist takeover under Mao in 1949 appears as a complete state-led takeover of 
Chinese banks.  In the case of the Bank of China, the Nationalist Koumintang (KMT) had 
already seized control of the bank in the 1920s, making the transition of the bank one of 
continuous state control.  The Nationalist takeover and the bank’s resistance to it is worth 
discussing given the dynamics of private equity interests within the institution and the 
state’s role in commandeering it for its own political insular purposes.  Additionally, it 
was during this period between the Republican revolution and the Communist takeover 
that the Bank of China took on a number of characteristics that would later enable it to 
function as an international bank during the Maoist period and into the later reform era 
under Deng Xiaoping.  The first would consist of expansion and development with the 
building of Western-style professionalization under the guidance of a foreign-educated 
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managerial class.  The second, and more lasting, characteristic was the bank’s premier 
role in China’s foreign exchange business.  
When the new Republican government officially seized control of China just prior 
to WWI, China’s political situation was one of regional and national disarray.  The young 
Nationalist government, in seeking to consolidate rule and secure its position against 
localized warlords, required access to funds for both institution building and containing 
ongoing regional resistance and the local level.  Out of the need for survival, with its 
branches being looted by local warlords, the shareholders of the old Da Qing Bank 
petitioned the incipient Republican leadership under Sun Yat-Sen for the creation of a 
new bank-state relationship in which the bank would recast itself with a new 50-50 
shareholder-state split of bank ownership, and a new purpose for the bank to function as 
the central bank for the new Chinese republic.  However, the Nationalists’ unquenchable 
thirst for funds would stress the relationship between the state and the bank, leading to a 
brief fracture between the private shareholders and the government.   
As noted previously, the Chinese term of “bank”, or yinhang, was originally 
confined only to foreign banks operating in the country.  It was only over time that the 
usage of this term grew to refer to the newer Chinese banks founded in the early 20th 
century.  The Bank of China, in both its structure and management drew from these 
outside influences, and it was the private shareholders and managerial staff that would 
briefly test the bank’s linkage with the state.  This brief period, between 1916 and the 
Nationalist “bank coup” of 1935 would allow the Bank of China to adopt a specific 
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expertise in dealing with foreign exchange that would serve as its benchmark role 
throughout the monobanking Maoist era.  
The new Bank of China’s cozy relationship with the new government hit the 
rocks with the coming to power of the short-lived Yuan Shikai government in 1912.  In 
seeking to secure the title of emperor for himself, Shikai made ever-increasing demands 
for funds from the Bank of China, outstripping the level of bank’s reserve capital.  In 
1916, the government ordered the bank to cease the free convertibility of bank notes to 
silver, and the surrender existing silver holdings to government mandate under the threat 
of force.18  The Bank of China, based out of its Shanghai branch, rejected the order out of 
fear of losing public and investor confidence, and undertook an endogenous restructuring 
to maintain the bank’s financial integrity.19 
The Bank of China’s management first curtailed their own arrests through legal 
action, and then undertook a number of restructuring efforts to weaken the government’s 
hand through the expansion of private ownership and raising the political stakes of 
outright seizure through securing loans from foreign banks and linking the Bank of China 
to other prominent Chinese financial institutions and lending houses.  Ironically, it was 
the bank’s conspiring with the new finance minister, Liang Qichao, who denounced 
Shikai’s move to proclaim himself monarch, that the bank managed to reorganize itself as 
a more privatized institution under new internal corporate regulations.20  Such new 
internal mandates changed the role of the Ministry of Finance within the bank, limiting 
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its ability to appoint senior leadership from among the existing board, and removed the 
formal split between government and private shares that existed since the Qing era.21 This 
influx of private capital to the bank and the government’s ongoing internal war efforts 
and ongoing selling of shares for cash changed the ratio of private-state shares from 42% 
ownership in 1918 to less than 1% in 1924.22  
Two caveats are worth mentioning about this period of privatization in the Bank 
of China’s history and its relationship to the state. First, the bank enjoyed support from 
the Minister of Finance, Ling Qichao, in its efforts of maintaining silver convertibility 
and internal reorganizing.  This support, and the fractured nature of the Chinese state at 
the time, particularly during Shikai’s unpopular fevered play at monarchy, does not 
reduce the argument that the Bank of China has remained virtually constant as a state-
backed institution.  Second, given the chaotic nature of Chinese politics at the time, it is 
arguable that little centralized state functioned to begin with when the bank privatized.  
Regardless, the breathing room that the bank enjoyed from defying Beijing’s silver 
mandate until the state’s outright takeover of the bank by Chiang Kai-Shek a few years 
later allowed the Bank of China to develop a specialty in conducting foreign exchange 
business and adopting a greater role as an international Chinese bank.  
Chinese politics at the time of the Bank of China’s privatization was such that 
political instability prevailed until the Nationalists’ consolidation in the mid-1920s, thus 
restricting most of China’s major banking activity to large cities such as Shanghai and 
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Beijing, or in foreign-controlled enclaves along the coast.23  Along with the new ties 
between the Bank of China and prominent private individuals and other private banks 
similarly based in big cities, the Chinese banking industry enjoyed deepening liquidity 
and lending until the eve of WWII.  
Following Chaing Kai-Shek’s coming to power and the appointment of his 
brother in-law, TV Soong to the position of Finance Minister, the Bank of China received 
license to begin operations as an international exchange bank in late 1928.  Bank of 
China’s general manager, Zheng Jia’ao, then traveled throughout Europe, the United 
States, and elsewhere, establishing correspondent banking relationships, and setting up 
branches abroad.  By 1936, Bank of China’s deposits had more than doubled, and the 
bank’s deposits with the government’s new central bank accounted for 57% of the central 
bank’s total holdings.24 The state’s inability to commandeer the Bank of China, as TV 
Soong originally hoped, and the bank’s recasting as an international exchange bank, 
stemmed largely from the state’s weakness at the time.25  This is worth noting, 
particularly as it demonstrates the state’s ongoing desire to control the Bank of China.  
 Bank of China’s golden age of privatization proved short-lived, as the Chiang 
Kai-Shek regime essentially seized control of the bank in 1935.  Despite the Bank of 
China’s success at establishing a notable presence in international finance through the 
late 1920s and early 1930s, and in spite of the Great Depression, the bank was abruptly 
seized by the government in 1935 through the mandated issuing of new shares to the 																																																								
23 Cheng, 65.  
24 Bank of China, official website. “An Important Turning Point for Bank of China-Restructured as an 
International Exchange Bank (1928)”, 
http://www.boc.cn/en/aboutboc/ab7/200809/t20080926_1601876.html, (accessed Aug. 1, 2017). 
25 Peng, 54.  
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state.  This government control would characterize and dominate the bank’s existence 
until the present.   
If the government’s shareholding of the Bank of China was essentially nil in 
1924, its share rapidly rebounded as the state consolidated in the wake of Chaing Kai-
Shek’s Northern Expedition that quelled warlord resistance throughout much of the 
country.  Perhaps drawing from the time spent in his early career in Japan and the Soviet 
Union, Chaing Kai-Shek set about implementing a number of fiscal and financial reforms 
designed to increase state control of the economy.  In 1928 the government, through 
Chaing Kai-Shek’s Finance Minister and brother-in law, TV Soong, sought to reabsorb 
the Bank of China as the state’s central bank as it originally functioned.26  The bank, due 
to its considerable public credibility, was able to lobby against the move, and instead 
limited the government to increasing its shareholding back to 20% that same year,27 and 
reauthorizing the Ministry of Finance to select chairman of the board.28  
The 1930s would witness the Chinese state’s increasing intervention in the 
financial sector, and with the Bank of China in particular in the lead-up to the 1937 
Japanese invasion.  In 1935, the state issued new bonds and mandated the Bank of China 
to increase its available shares and sell stock to the government.  The proclamation of this 
move came from HH Kung, another brother-in law of Chiang Kai-Shek, and with the new 
funds from the bonds the state increased its percentage of ownership back to 50%.29 On 
the eve of Japanese invasion, the state owned 70% of all assets within the Chinese 																																																								
26 Peng, 54.  
27 Ibid, 60. 
28 Cheng, 96.  
29 Ibid, 99.  
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banking industry and silver convertibility was suspended.30 By 1943, the Chinese state 
would hold a 67% stake in the Bank of China and enjoy the appointment of the majority 
of directors.31  While the Bank of China’s overseas business continued, the Bank of 
China would exist as an extension of the state’s activity against Japanese aggression 
during WWII, and later after Communist takeover in 1949.  
The notion that banks are loathed to take part in war is one theoretical gleaning by 
Kirshner’s work on bankers and national security.32  The Bank of China’s operations 
during WWII pose serious challenges to this theory, particularly as the bank proved 
especially aggressive in its financial efforts to undermine the Japanese presence in 
country and maintain business ties with friendly states.  Perhaps in large part due to the 
bank’s outright state control, the Bank of China managed to play a role in supporting the 
war effort.  Despite the Japanese military presence, the Bank of China worked with allied 
banks and embassies to smuggle silver holdings, maintain republic’s currency, even 
engaged in espionage activity against the Japanese-backed Central Reserve Bank of 
China that was established by the front regime of Wang Jingwei.33 
As mentioned above, it is a misconception to see the state’s takeover of Chinese 
banks in 1949 as a uniquely Maoist phenomenon.  The process of state control came to 
fruition just over a decade prior to the end of the Chinese civil war and just before 
Japanese incursion.  Under Mao, rather than seek government control through 																																																								
30 Cheng, 100.  
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shareholding, the state would cement itself as stakeholder of the Bank of China through 
the mechanisms of the People’s Bank of China (PBC).  If the state maintained its 
stakeholder status from the prior era, it would also continue its role as the purveyor of 
foreign exchange and overseas finance during the era of monobanking that would define 
the Chinese banking industry until economic reforms several decades later.  Largely due 
to its overseas focus and its role in acting as China’s financial presence abroad, the Bank 
of China in the postwar period must also be considered within the context of the PRC’s 
foreign policy.  
The Monobank Era 
 From 1949 until Deng Xiaoping’s reforms that unwound China’s banking sector, 
the PBC served as the only true bank operating within China and held all responsibilities 
of both central and commercial banking.  The Bank of China continued to exist, largely 
as the world’s financial window to the outside world, and did so as an extension of the 
PBC.  In 1953, the Bank of China regained its authorized status as a foreign exchange 
bank, and served Chinese interests abroad.  Prior to the Communist takeover, when the 
Ministry of Finance served as the state’s tool to control the bank. Under the Maoist 
monobank model, the Bank of China operated as a foreign exchange specialty bureau 
under the PBC, the central bank.  
 Within the PRC’s monobank structure between 1949 and 1979, the PBC directly 
sat beneath the State Council, which in turn oversaw both the Bank of China and the 
Agricultural Bank of China.  Urban development was funded through either the Bank of 
China, or the People’s Construction Bank, overseen by the Ministry of Finance.  For its 
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part, the Bank of China serviced local PBC branches, which in turn performed financial 
duties for the local economy.34 Standing between the State Council and both the Ministry 
of Finance and PBC, operated the State Planning Commission, which enjoyed all 
planning responsibilities for the centrally planned economy.35  While the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) controlled state funds and the PBC, along with the MOF, oversaw the 
entirety of Beijing’s “banking sector” at the time, the institutional power of decision-
making lay in the hands of the State Planning Commission. It is also worth noting that the 
relationship between local PBC branches and the state was replicated at the local level, 
with local state planning bodies overseeing their operations and the local governments 
taking their guidance from the central government via the State Council.36 Nonetheless, 
despite total state control, the Bank of China maintained an overseas presence, effectively 
operating as Beijing’s commercial window and presence to the outside world.    
Despite the bank’s function as an organ of the Communist state, the institution 
retained at least a veneer of its professionalism that it began to garner as an international 
bank prior to its prewar seizure.  From its early years, the Bank of China boasted an elite 
managerial staff replete with Chinese elites educated abroad who leveraged their 
multilingual business talents for the bank’s overseas operations.37 The Maoist revolution, 
with its base in the peasantry, lacked the human capital within its base to effectively 
replace these elites.  Indeed, for much of the Maoist period, the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) continued to rely upon experienced bureaucrats left over from KMT rule 																																																								
34 See, Stephen Bell and Hui Feng, The Rise of the People’s Bank of China, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 56.  
35 Ibid, 57.  
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since those with peasant backgrounds often lacked urban-based economic expertise.38  
What is notable in the case of the Bank of China is that foreign-educated multilingual 
bankers affiliated with the institution are mentioned meeting with representatives from 
international banks and foreign dignitaries at its overseas branches during the pre-reform 
era.  With these elites operating the Bank of China abroad, the PRC used the institution as 
an economic window to the outside.  
The London Times vividly describes the Bank of China’s operations within the 
then-British enclave of Hong Kong in 1971, noting that branch manager, Li Chao-chih, 
held the position of “vice-minister” and operated the bank with a cadre of personnel 
“trained as economists in the West, and impressively at home in both English and the 
manners of the outside world”.39  It is also worth noting that despite the bank’s small 
scale as a segment within the PRC’s monobank of that era, the bank facilitated an 
inordinate amount of foreign exchange dealings for the state, uncorrelated with its size.40 
Based out of its Hong Kong branch, the Bank of China served as the “foreign 
department” of the state’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China.41 In acting as the 
state’s “financing agent”, the bank would buy convertible foreign currencies that could 
then be sent to major banking centers overseas.42 The bank’s unique institutional position 
placed it as the state’s negotiating agency with foreign banks seeking to finance trade 
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with the PRC, and included settling foreign transactions in currencies other than the US 
dollar, largely out of Beijing’s animus towards the US.43 
 The Bank of China’s unwinding from the monobank arrangement of the Maoist 
era to its current configuration began with the reforms instituted by Deng Xiaoping in the 
late 1970s.  The state would remain a stakeholder in the institution, but the institution 
would take on a new function within China’s domestic economy that added to its 
importance as a foreign currency window between the PRC and the outside.  This new 
role in China’s domestic economic development would cement the bank as a coalition 
binder for Beijing’s efforts to renew political legitimacy.   
 At the time of Mao’s death in 1976, the PRC faced a triad of domestic crises, 
including domestic economic rot, a crisis of legitimacy, and a struggle of succession.  
Economically, the PRC’s potential remained bottled due an overemphasis of pure 
industrialization without a resulting increase in consumer demand, in part due to overly 
high prices on goods deemed “luxurious”, and in part due to lagging levels of new 
employment.44 Compounded with low levels of labor absorption in new industries,45 and 
a system of managerial promotion that favored party loyalty over competence,46 the PRC 
faced increasing pressures at the time of Deng Xiaoping’s assuming power in 1978.   
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Reform and Continual State Control 
 At the microeconomic level, Deng’s reforms mitigated the Maoist era problem of 
labor absorption through the active encouragement of private business ventures,47 along 
with allowing for competition for bank financing at the local level.48  The PRC’s 
monobank, through which all local funds were dispersed in the form of grants prior to 
reform, was unwound to allow for the state’s major banks to compete in making loans to 
localities and enterprises by the early 1980s.49 The four state banks involved in this 
devolution of lending power comprise contemporary China’s “Big Four”, including the 
Bank of China. 
 The reorganization of the monobank model into separate state banks out from 
under the PBC proceeded according to sector.  The Bank of China, while unwound and 
turned into a separate state entity, retained the specialty it held since the 1920s as a bank 
devoted to foreign exchange and international finance.50 For its part, the PBC, China’s 
central bank, was institutionally separated from the Ministry of Finance in 1978 when it 
was designated as its own ministry.51  The PBC would later house the PRC’s Financial 
Intelligence Unit in the 1990s. 
 The financial sector’s reform, and the separation of state banks into multiple 
entities did not in any way reduce the state’s role as a stakeholder, which continues to the 
present.  Ironically, the massive financial reforms instituted under the guidance of Zhu 
Rongji returned the Bank of China’s form of state stakeholding into one of control by 																																																								
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shareholding that predominated during the Nationalist era.  In 1998 when George HW 
Bush asked Zhu about the progress of privatization in the PRC, he responded bluntly that 
China was not privatizing so much as changing the form of state ownership.52 Zhu’s 
comments are telling in that they succinctly capture the nature of contemporary China’s 
move to state control through an adoption and tailoring of international business models 
to Chinese needs.  
 The separation of the “Big Four” from the PBC functionally divided China’s 
financial sector into distinctive realms of commercial banking in, which would be the 
domain of the Big Four state banks, while the PBC would serve solely as the state’s 
central banking apparatus.53 This separation in 1983 partially brought the banking sector 
closer to international institutional norms.  By the mid-1990s, the PBC had joined the 
Bank of International Settlements and committed itself to the adoption of the Basel 
Accords (1996), cleaned the balance sheets of the Big Four through the removal of bad 
loans, and began seeking large foreign investors for private equity infusion into otherwise 
state-owned banks.54 
 A number of factors in the late 1990s and early 2000s afford the PRC an 
appearance of moving towards normalcy in international finance.  Joining the Bank of 
International Settlements in 1996, the possession of Hong Kong as a financial center in 
1997, and PRC’s membership in the World Trade Organization in 2001 portray an image 
of China coming into line with international best practices and liberalization.  However, 																																																								
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in preparing for issue of shares in its major banks for private ownership, China created 
institutional mechanisms to retain state control and oversight of the Bank of China, and 
create a regulatory structure that would survive the adoption of the fortified finance 
regime.   
 First, China’s central bank, while now functionally separated from the PRC’s 
commercial banking sector, remains politically tied to the State Council and senior 
leadership.55  Unlike the international norm of central banks enjoying ostensible 
independence from political forces for the sake of financial stability, China’s central bank 
remains a considerable outlier.  This raises the question of how important the “norm” of 
central bank independence truly is, given that most of the largest banks in the world are 
supervised by central bank tied firmly to Beijing’s leadership.  For the AML/CTF regime, 
this arrangement creates the problem of state-controlled central bank effectively having 
to police banks owned by the state itself.  
 Second, in preparing the Bank of China for initial public offering (IPO) and return 
the state’s control to the shareholding model of the Nationalist era, the government 
created two ownership vehicles: the Huijin Corporation in 2003, and the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) in 2007.  The CIC, while created four years after Huijin, 
houses the Huijin Corporation as a subsidiary, which in turn owns over 60% of the Bank 
of China. 
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The Huijin Corporation, formally known as Central Huijin Investment Ltd, was 
founded in December 2003, the same month and year as Bank of China’s IPO.56 Huijin 
describes sole purpose as to “perform obligations as an investor on behalf of the 
State…with the goal of preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned financial 
assets”.57 In corporate governance, the State Council appoints all of Huijin’s directors for 
three-year terms.58 In the early 2000s, the PBC continually infused funds into Huijin, 
which in turn, invested in the Bank of China.59  With an initial investment of $22.5 
billion, the state held a controlling share of the Bank of China at 67.6%.60 Huijin’s staff 
largely derives from the PBC.61 
 With the Bank of China’s shares held by state-owned investment corporations, the 
bank has largely returned to the stakeholder dynamic that preceded the PRC’s 
establishment in 1949.  Interestingly, the bank’s institutional arrangement has not 																																																								
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modernized so much as returned to a previous model of state stakeholding, though 
government control of the bank’s operations has remained virtually unchanged over the 
course of a century.  Succinctly stated, the linkage between the Bank of China and its 
home state has proven both deep and resilient.  If this linkage has survived multiple wars, 
decades of turmoil, and massive regulatory reforms, it is doubtful that the adoption of 
AML/CTF rules would dislodge such arrangements.  The next sections address this 
regulatory adoption.  
III. China’s Fortified Finance Regime 
 As the Bank of China retained the state as its premier stakeholder throughout 
China’s financial reforms, the PRC’s banking industry did undertake a significant 
adoption of the international AML/CTF regime.  In fact, most of these adoptions took 
place in the 1990s and in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, prior to the Bank of China’s 
IPO and subsequent exposure to international investors.  Ranging from de jure adoptions 
fortified finance regulations to active prosecution, China has made considerable efforts to 
implement changes to its banking sector to curtail crime and terrorism.  Figure 2.1 
outlines the steps China has taken to implement fortified finance, both in internal 
adoption of AML laws and membership in multilateral bodies. 
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Adoption in China 
Adoption Year Type 
Article 191 of Penal Code 
Introduced-criminalizing 
laundering from drugs, organized 
crime, terrorism (FATF) 
1997 Domestic Law 
Member and Founder of Asia-
Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering (APG) 
1997 International Membership 
PBC Becomes China’s FIU and 
mandates monitoring of 
suspicious activity 
2003 Domestic Regulatory Adoption 
Member and Founder of Eurasian 
Group (EAG) 
2004 International Membership 
PBC Issues New AML/CTF  
regulation expanding supervision 
and reporting mandates 
2007 Domestic Regulatory Expansion  
Member of Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF) 
2007 (Observer since 2005) International Membership 
 
 Two trends become noticeable upon close analysis of China’s regulatory and legal 
changes as they pertain to fortified finance.  First, China was not purely reacting to the 
global pushes for spreading the AML/CTF regime after 2001.  Domestically, China had 
made money laundering and terrorist financing a criminal offense in the late 1990s, and 
significantly expanded its penal code to do so.  Passed in 1997, Article 191 of the PRC’s 
penal code effectively criminalized the laundering of criminally obtained funds from 
drugs and organized crime; notably, terrorism was included in the statute and specifically 
deemed the obfuscation or transfer of such funds as criminal.62 In April 2001, prior to 
9/11 and the subsequent wave of regulation it brought, Beijing began implementing 
“know your customer” (KYC) requirements for depositors throughout the financial 
sector, mandating new account holders offer identification during the on-boarding 																																																								
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process.63 These KYC regulations were modeled on those in the US.  These domestic 
legal changes to the PRC’s criminal code place it in line with overall international AML 
regulatory trends at the time, and given the restructuring of Beijing’s banking industry 
over the 1990s, indicates the country’s proactivity in this arena.  In June 2001, again prior 
to 9/11, the Bank of China formed its own internal anti-money laundering bureau,64 thus 
raising the possibility that the Bank of China itself served as a test-run for Beijing 
establishing its national FIU two years later. 
 The second trend that stands out from China’s adoption of threat finance 
regulation stands in the timing and context of the PBC’s taking on the role of Beijing’s 
financial intelligence unit (FIU).  Working under the mandate of the State Council in 
2003, the PBC put forth mandates for the Chinese banking sector stipulating the 
gathering of financial information and establishing reporting requirements for suspicious 
transactions.  That same year the State Council also shifted the Ministry of Public 
Security’s AML mandate to the central bank.65  With these new mandates and 
capabilities, the PBC established coordination mechanisms to facilitate the production 
and sharing of financial intelligence related to crime and terrorism throughout the 
Chinese financial system.66 In 2004, one of these tools came in the form of the PBC’s 
AML Monitoring and Analysis Center (CAMLMAC), charged with operating as the 
FIU’s monitoring center within the central bank. 																																																								
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 As noted in the previous section, the Bank of China remains a state bank, as it has 
nearly since its inception with the government holding either outright control or a lion’s 
share of ownership in the institution.  Now owned by the state as a majority investor 
through sovereign investment funds, which are in turn financed, overseen, and staffed by 
the PBC, the state as effectively turned the Bank of China into an extension of its 
financial intelligence apparatus as of the early 2000s.  While such regulatory adoptions 
and legal changes have occurred de jure, the question remains as to how Beijing has 
implemented such regulations in practice.  This consideration must first be addressed 
before moving to consider the accusations and blocked enforcement against the Bank of 
China for financing terrorism.  
 Following the adoption of the fortified finance regime, China began centralizing 
monitoring of its financial system.  Following the creation of CAMLMAC within the 
PBC in 2004, Beijing implemented a computer network that linked its banks; within a 
year, over 90% of Chinese banks were linked to this system.67 Shortly after implementing 
these institutional capabilities and technical arrangements, reports of suspicious activity 
began to deluge the PBC’s FIU.  Between 2004-2008, CAMLMAC took in 93.62 million 
suspicious activity reports, with an additional 585 million large-volume transaction 
reports in the same period.68 According to analysts within the PBC, 1,859 reports were 
sent to Chinese judicial and law enforcement from this glut of reports.69  This resulting 
flow of financial intelligence moves in three directions, depending upon the nature of the 																																																								
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suspicious transaction in question.   Under normal circumstances, a Chinese bank first 
reports the activity to its corporate headquarters, which in turn sends bulked reports to the 
PBC’s FIU on a weekly basis.70 If a bank branch suspects the activity pertains to a crime, 
it is mandated by law to send reports both horizontally and vertically by informing the 
nearest local branch of the PBC, local law enforcement, and its corporate headquarters.71 
For its part, and as a byproduct of China’s totalitarian composition, the PBC in 2004 
began anti-money laundering propaganda campaigns in consort with AML trainings in 
order to discourage bribery while fomenting greater levels of customer due diligence.72 
Local bank branches are also subject to inspection by PBC personnel from the central 
bank’s nearby branches.73 In 2004 alone, the PBC shuttered 155 underground banking 
operations and froze 460 accounts in conjunction with 274 arrests being made.74  By the 
mid-2000s, the Chinese state had begun utilizing its coercive capacity in accordance with 
the international AML/CTF regime.  It was during these years that the Bank of China 
became accused of harboring and transacting funds for terrorism.  
 In the realm of China’s domestic AML/CTF financial regulations, the PBC 
significantly expanded its reporting requirements and best practices during the same 
period in which the Bank of China came under suspicion for terrorist financing.  While 
the 2003 regulations established by the PBC mandated that banks operating in the PRC 
follow reporting requirements and stipulated penalties for executives found to be 
operating in contradiction to these regulations, the regulations taking effect in 2007 added 																																																								
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confidentiality clauses designed to maintain secrecy in the event of a bank violating the 
law.  Based on Article 7 of the new regulations, PBC mandated that its own personnel 
“shall keep all information obtained in fulfilling its anti-money laundering 
responsibilities confidential, and must not disclose to outsiders in violation of 
regulations”.75 The new regulations also mandated that the PBC’s FIU keep confidential 
the identities of account holders conducting large and suspicious transactions, and warned 
against the sharing of these identities with “any other organization or individual”.76 The 
timing of these regulatory expansions possibly relates to foreign suspicions against the 
Bank of China beginning in 2006.  
 China’s adoption and development of fortified financial regulations has largely 
kept pace with the outside world.  In fact, it can even be argued that Beijing’s regulatory 
development in this area would have continued even if 9/11 and the subsequent wave of 
regulatory advancement had not occurred.  China’s banking sector was already 
undergoing massive reform to increase its efficiency and attractiveness when these 
regulations were adopted.  For Beijing to create sovereign investment vehicles to allow 
for its banks to sell limited levels of private equity would have been contraindicated if its 
state banks did not conform to come level of regulatory safeguarding that was becoming 
the norm in the global financial sector.  Additionally, it is questionable that an 
authoritarian state such as China would forego the opportunity to utilize its banks as a 
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partial extension of its intelligence apparatus, particularly given the size and scope of its 
major banks.  
IV. The Bank of China and Blocked Enforcement 
 In the mid-2000s, allegations began to arise that the Bank of China had financed 
terrorism for Palestinian terrorist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  The banking scandal 
played out as a court case between plaintiffs seeking damages against the bank in 
American courts for terrorist acts carried out in Israel during this period.  The regulations, 
based in the US, became a terrain for international power politics between Israel and 
China.  Unfolding over the course of a decade, the Bank of China, with Beijing’s 
backing, evaded enforcement through a combination of home-state veto through 
bureaucratic stalling and diplomatic deflection through external pressure on a third-party 
state.   
 The increasing intensity of great power competition between China and the US is 
well known.  What is lesser known is the role China has played in the area of terrorism 
and terrorist financing since the current era of international terrorism began in 2001, and 
the relations between Beijing and Jerusalem in this context.  In Middle East politics, 
relations between the PRC and terrorist groups have a deep history in international 
affairs, and one that often pitted Israel (and the US) against Chinese designs in the region.  
 The PRC’s foreign policy orientation of antagonism towards the US has its roots 
in Mao’s conception of the US as the ultimate “imperialist” power after WWII; while 
holding at its core the Leninist notion of “imperialism as the highest form of 
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capitalism”.77 After its break with the Soviet Union, Beijing’s strategy in the Middle East 
sought to drive a wedge between the newly independent Arab states in the region and 
away from a dominant reliance on Moscow in the case of those ideologically sympathetic 
to the PRC, as well as from the US.78 Beijing’s stance on Israel during the Maoist era 
placed the two states on opposing sides of covert war, with terrorist financing serving as a 
main source of strategic antagonism.  
 During the height of the Cold War when African states were gaining their 
independence, Israeli covert activity in the continent followed a strategy thwarting the 
Chinese Secret Intelligence Service from providing money-laundering services to 
terrorist organizations trying to strike Israel.79 Using Hong Kong as a base of money 
laundering operations in the 1960s and 1970s, the PRC used profits from drug dealing in 
the West, often working through Chinese gangs abroad, to finance covert operations in 
the developing world.80 China’s activities in Africa included the active transport and 
training of students from the continent to Beijing, where they were taught practical skills 
relevant to conducting terrorist attacks.81 Centered in North Africa and based in Cairo, 
China’s covert activities in Africa actively supported insurgent groups in the continent, 
and provided political and logistical support to Nasser regime’s activities against Israel.82  
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With drug money going to support Beijing’s proxies in Africa and the Middle East, the 
Israelis and Chinese fought each other through their respective intelligence services in 
Africa, which served as the corridor through which Beijing funded its sponsored groups.  
What is worth noting is that the Bank of China was the only financial institution 
connecting Beijing to the outside world at this time.  
 This antagonism between China and Israel resurfaced in the early 2000s, when 
suicide bombers began using explosives manufactured in China.83  China’s role in 
supporting a number of terrorist organizations came to light in 2001 with the defection of 
a People’s Liberation Army Colonel, Xu Junping to the United States.  The intelligence 
gained by the US through Xu’s defection included networks of Chinese support to rogue 
states such as Iran and North Korea, terrorist groups throughout Latin America, and 
China’s hosting of Osama bin Laden on three occasions prior to 9/11.84  The link between 
regional terrorist groups operating in the Palestinian territories and Beijing was not 
limited to the procurement of explosives, but also services provided by the Bank of China 
to a PIJ operation of trade-based money laundering linking the group to its backers in 
Iran; and which subsequently empowered the group to carry out terrorist attacks in Israel.  
 In 2006, the Wultz family was the victim of a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.  
Under stipulations provided by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, the family sued the Bank 
of China, alleging that the bank funneled money to the terrorist group, Palestinian Islamic 
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Jihad between 2003 and 2006.85 The case, relying on affidavits from Israeli intelligence 
officials, alleged that the Bank of China knowingly conducted business on behalf a PIJ 
and Hamas account holder, Said al-Shurafa, at its Guangzho branch in China.  More 
specifically, the plaintiffs in the case asserted that the Bank of China knowingly 
conducted this business for PIJ after multiple meetings between delegations of Israeli 
intelligence officials alerting them to the activities of their account holder and others, and 
organs of the Chinese government that included the Ministry of State Security, the 
People’s Bank of China, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others.86  Far from an 
isolated meeting, the Chinese-Israeli meetings spanned a course of two years between 
2005-2007.87 
 According to a declaration of one of the intelligence officials, Shlomo Matalon, 
which was filed with the US District Court in Washington DC in 2009, PIJ and Hamas 
leaders transferred millions of dollars in funds to terrorist operations in West Bank and 
Gaza through Bank of China account numbers 4750401-0188-150882-6 and 4762307-
0188-034456-6.  Both accounts were held by al-Shurafa between July 2003 and early 
2008.88 The funds themselves are not inconsequential, and most are large-volume by the 
nature of their size and therefore would have been subjected to reporting requirements.  
																																																								
85 Shira Scheindlin, Opinion and Order, Wultz v Bank of China Ltd., 865 F. Supp. 2d 425 (SDNY, 2012), 
No. 11 Civ 1266(SAS), US District Court, New York, May 25, 2012.  
86 Respondents’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to the Petitioner’s Motion to Quash, Miscellaneous 
No. 13-1282 (RBW), Sheryl Wultz et al v. The State of Israel, US District Court for the District of 
Columbia, Dec. 17, 2013, p. 8.  
87 Ibid. 8.  
88 Declaration of Shlomo Matalon, Sheryl Wultz et al v. The Islamic Republic of Iran et al. Civ. No. 08-
01460, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, May 16, 2009. 
(http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2014/10/bankofchina-plaintiffsoncantor.pdf), accessed July 
10, 2018.  
	 88 
Figure 2.2 outlines some of the sums involved.  According to Matalon, the Bank of China 
continued to service the transactions despite the Israeli notification of the activity.  
Figure 2.2: PIJ/Hamas transfers conducted by Bank of China (Source: Declaration by Shlomo Matalon) 
Date of Transfer Amount 
Dec. 5, 2003 $99,970 
Jan. 9, 2004 $99,960 
Feb. 18, 2004 $99,990 
March 15, 2004 $99,970 
March 19, 2004 $99,970 
April 15, 2004 $100,000 
Oct. 9, 2004 $200,000 
Oct. 24, 2004 $199,965 
Dec. 7, 2004 $8,000 
Dec. 8, 2004 $8,000 
Dec. 17, 2004 $8,000 
Jan. 28, 2005 $100,000 
 
 The terrorist financing in which Bank of China was involved consisted of a trade-
based money laundering operation.  Funds from the Syrian and Iranian regimes were sent 
to al-Shurafa’s accounts at the Bank of China branch in Guangzhou.  Monies from these 
accounts were then used by al-Shurafa to purchase innocent items such as clothing and 
toys that would then be sent to Gaza and the West Bank, whereupon they were 
subsequently sold.  Last, the proceeds from the sale of these goods would be used to 
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facilitate terrorist operations like the one that killed and injured members of the Wultz 
family in 2006.89 The damage claim made by the plaintiffs totaled $750 million.90 
 The case against the Bank of China was not isolated, nor was it even entirely the 
independent civil actions by the plaintiffs alone.91  Rather, the lawsuit served as an 
element of an Israeli strategy to use American civil law to counter the terrorist financing 
and  blunt terrorist operations against the Jewish state.  Along with the interdiction of 
shipping containers of Chinese origin en route to Gaza, Israel incorporated the use of 
lawsuits as part of a “National Policy” to counter terrorism through supporting lawsuits 
against banks that finance terrorism. 
 During the tenure of Meir Dagan as the director of Mossad (2002-2010), Israel’s 
foreign intelligence service and the Israeli National Security Council authorized the 
Terrorist Financing Task Force to begin providing information from intelligence sources 
on terrorist financing to lawyers and plaintiffs seeking to sue banks for funding terror.92 
Knowing that the Bank of China held branches in the US and conducted dollar 
transactions, Jerusalem assured the plaintiffs that both documentary and testimonial 
evidence would be offered in support of the lawsuit.  This testimony was meant to 
include that from Israeli intelligence officers present at the meetings between Israel and 																																																								
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China regarding the Bank of China.93  The Israelis would later retract this offer due to 
diplomatic pressure from Beijing.  
 Over the course of the suit, the Bank of China engaged in two tracks of defense in 
order to protect the bank.  First, the bank deployed its own bureaucratic countermeasures 
designed to thwart discovery efforts and prevent the court from accessing valuable 
documentary evidence.  Second, Beijing used diplomatic pressure on Jerusalem to 
prevent Israel from allowing its intelligence officials from providing testimony.  
Combined, the Bank of China managed to block enforcement. 
 In 2011, the plaintiffs requested that the Bank of China proffer documents related 
to al-Shurafa’s accounts, along with documents pertaining to investigations into the bank 
and its dealings as they related to sanctions related to money laundering and terrorism.94 
The bank immediately turned to the PBC for guidance.  Subsequently, the bank then 
asked the court to send discovery requests to the PBC, which the court did.  Over a year 
passed without the court receiving a response from the Chinese FIU.  Eventually, in 
August 2012, the court received documents, consisting largely of copies of Chinese 
regulation manuals.95 
 On October 29, 2012 the New York district court ordered the Bank of China to 
produce documents related to AML/CTF investigations. The bank initially refused, 
stipulating that the production of such material would violate Chinese bank secrecy 																																																								
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laws.96 Based on Chinese bank regulations that were mentioned above and instituted in 
2007, the bank’s arguments carried some validity. The bank refused to comply with this 
first order to compel the production of evidence.  Initially, the court remained hesitant to 
grant the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery, with the presiding judge noting that for 
the “production of confidential documents created by the Chinese government” would 
“infringe on the sovereignty of the foreign state and violate principles of international 
comity”.97  
 In May 2013, two years prior to the dismissal of the case, the court again ordered 
the Bank of China to produce documentary evidence pertaining to four elements aspects 
of the suit against it.  First, the motion to compel the production of evidence sought to 
gain documentation of communication between the Bank of China and the state regarding 
the al-Shurafa accounts.  Second, the court sought access to reports and other information 
on “deficiencies” in the AML/CTF infrastructure at the Guangzhou branch and corporate 
headquarters.  Last, the court wanted to procure evidence relating to visits between 
“foreign officials” and Chinese authorities related to al-Shurafa’s financial activity.98  
This May 2013 order resulted in the production of a deluge of documents, 5,751 in 
number, totaling over 200,000 pages of material.99 However, the plaintiffs asserted that 
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the corpus of documents consisted of “filler”, including publicly available material such 
as compliance manuals, and information already produced by the bank.100 
 Malnourished in documentary evidence, the plaintiffs eventually turned to Israel, 
which first empowered the suit and others like it to progress in the first place.  Among the 
Israeli intelligence officers who met with the Chinese government was a Mossad officer 
named Uzi Shaya.  In February 2012, the plaintiffs wrote to Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu, requesting that Shaya be allowed to testify under oath about 
matters related to the case.  In response to the letter by the Wultzes, which was hand 
delivered by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a US Congresswoman; the Prime Minister’s notified 
the Wultzes several months later that Shaya’s testimony could proceed.101 
 Two years prior, in 2010, the Bank of China and Beijing came to an agreement 
that neither the Chinese government, nor the bank would not be needed to communicate 
with Jerusalem, under the umbrella of “mutual trust” that the Israelis would not offer the 
courts any information on the meetings between the intelligence officials and the 
Chinese.102 On March 20, 2013, Shaya wrote to the plaintiffs’ attorneys that he was 
willing to testify, though under certain stipulations do to the nature of his official status 
and the sensitivity of the subject matter.103 Fearing the ramifications of Shaya’s 
testimony, Beijing immediately began exerting diplomatic pressure on Israel.  
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 In April 2013, the Chinese summoned the Israeli ambassador in Beijing, Matan 
Vilnai, threatening to cancel Netanyahu’s May 2013 trip to China.104 Between the Shaya 
letter and Netanyahu’s visit, the Israelis assured Beijing that the Israeli intelligence 
officers privy to information in terrorist financing meetings would not testify in the 
United States.105 Netanyahu did travel to China in May that year.  Meeting with the 
Chinese in order to increase trade from $8 billion to $10 billion in three years, pen free 
trade negotiations, and cement new ties with Xi Jinping.106  It is worth noting that the 
diplomatic stakes for Israel were high during this time. Cooling relations between the 
Netanyahu government and the US Obama administration, and ongoing negotiations with 
Iran over its nuclear program, to which China was one permanent negotiating party, 
provide some context for Israel’s decision to retract the offer to allow Shaya to testify.  
 In reaction to the Israeli reversal, both the plaintiffs and US officials pressured 
Israel to recommit to its promise to allow testimony.  A month after Netanyahu’s China 
trip, Wultz, one of the plaintiffs, spoke with Israeli General Yaacov Amidror about the 
Bank of China case.  Amidror did mention to Wultz that the Bank of China had promised 
to cease financing terrorism in the future, though it did so willingly in the period up to the 
suicide bombings in the mid-2000s.  Furthermore, Amidror urged the plaintiff to 
recognize that the bank to reversed its policy as a result of legal assault waged against it 
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in court.107  With China increasing its financial status, and the Bank of China in particular 
growing in stature in the banking industry, such a change in course as easily could have 
resulted from adopting regulatory institutions organically as it could be the result of legal 
warfare.  Despite additional pressure from US Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, the 
Netanyahu government refused to allow Shaya’s testimony.  In late 2013, the Israeli 
government moved to quash.  In August 2015, the case was dismissed.  
V. Analysis 
 The Bank of China developed and maintained deep institutional linkages with the 
Chinese state throughout its history.  Since it opened at the turn of the 20th century, the 
bank has held the same relationship with the state, with the latter remaining the premier 
stakeholder in bank ownership over the course of multiple state regime types.  This state 
ownership began during the Qing era, and expanded drastically under the Nationalist 
government, well before the Communist takeover in 1949.  Serving as a financial 
extension of Beijing, the bank allowed the PRC to maintain a foreign exchange window 
to the outside world.  Under subsequent restructuring beginning with Deng Xiaoping, the 
bank maintained this same status, with the state conserving its premier stakeholder status 
while absorbing private capital and increasing the scope of its operations.  
 Such institutional linkage between bank and state not only survived political 
turmoil in China, it also survived the regulatory adoption of the international threat 
finance regime.  China began adopting the international AML/CTF regulations prior to 
9/11 and the subsequent flood of regulatory adoptions around the world.  Even in the 																																																								
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midst of enforcement attempts, the threat finance regime continued to mature, with the 
PRC joining the FATF in 2007.  However, the Bank of China’s deep relationship with the 
state was not altered when the fortified finance regime was adopted.  Rather, the 
AML/CTF regime simply grew around this preceding structural configuration. 
 The Bank of China case encapsulates the moral hazard risk posed by a state 
seeking to effectively regulate a bank it itself owns.  The PRC had a vested interest in 
defending the Bank of China from regulatory sanction throughout the course of the 
lawsuit filed against it.  Not only did the Bank of China and its overseer the PBC 
bureaucratically choke off the production of evidence in the course of discovery, the PRC 
government also employed diplomatic pressure to coerce Israel into withholding 
testimony vital to the enforcement attempt carried out in US courts.  This combination of 
diplomatic deflection and bureaucratic foot-dragging was sufficient to block enforcement 
against the bank.  
 This particular case not only offers an example of blocked enforcement, but also 
underscores how the financial system comprises a strategic terrain in its own right.  In the 
case of the Bank of China, Israel and the PRC engaged in a legal fight over regulatory 
malfeasance in a third country’s legal system.  Furthermore, the entire encounter was the 
result of a state using the adversarial legal system of the US to pursue geopolitical goals 
against a terrorist group.  Of all of the positive cases, the Bank of China arguably 
comprises the “easiest” case, as the bank itself was essentially a longstanding possession 
of the state. The Bank of China case also highlights the centricity of the American 
financial and legal system to the regulatory system of fortified finance.  Not only did 
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Israel consciously approach the American legal system as a strategic terrain through 
which to pursue its security policy goals, but China leveraged its own status as a rising 
great power against Israel to dissuade it from using this American legal arena for this 
purpose.  							
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Chapter 3: Al Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia 
 
I. Introduction 
Saudi Arabia’s volte-face relationship with Sunni jihadist groups comprises an 
open secret in international affairs.  Fifteen of the nineteen hijackers in the 2001 attack on 
New York and the Washington DC were from Saudi Arabia, and significant amounts of 
terrorist financing have flowed through the kingdom despite Riyadh’s close relationship 
with the West.  The 9/11 hijackers received funds from an Al Qaeda financier in Europe 
named Muhammad Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi.1   Zouaydi transferred funds to the terrorists 
from an account at the Saudi financial institution, Al Rajhi Bank.2  Al Rajhi Bank has yet 
to face regulatory or judicial penalty for financing terrorism, despite facing multiple 
attempts by plaintiffs in civil suits and American regulatory action.   
First, this chapter traces the deep roots of the Al Rajhi Bank, and its close 
institutional intertwining with the Saudi monarchy and royal family.  In addition to this 
connection, the bank’s relationship to the Saudi regulatory regime will be explored prior 
to the importation of the fortified finance regime.  Next, the bank’s suspected 
involvement in terrorism will be outlined, along with Riyadh’s adoption of greater 
regulatory capacity.  Last, the blocked enforcement phase will be discussed.  
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II. Al Rajhi Bank, Legitimacy, and Regime Binding 
The bank’s institutional position within the kingdom dates deep into Saudi 
Arabia’s past, with the Al Rajhi family to whom the bank belongs enjoying close 
relations with the monarchy.  The Al Rajhi history illustrates a relationship in which the 
monarchy has proven incapable of regulating a financial institution due the bank’s 
position as a coalition binder for the ruling family.  The Al Rajhi family’s supposedly 
close ties with jihadist elements in the kingdom, and the monarchy’s reliance on both the 
banking family and its relationship to religious authorities effectively render the bank 
institutionally untouchable by the Saudi authorities due to the banking family’s 
importance to the Saudi regime’s stability.   
In order to understand the nature of the relationship between the Saudi monarchy 
and the Al Rajhi Bank, it is necessary to understand the bank’s unique history and its role 
in the Saudi economy.  Unlike modern Western banks, or banks elsewhere that follow a 
Western business model, the Al Rajhi Bank’s origins lay in Saudi Arabia’s deep past as a 
money dealing network that only emerged in its first incarnation as a modern bank in 
1957.  The monarchy, the bank and the money network that preceded it, and religious 
radicalism lie deeply intertwined with the origins of the Saudi state and the state’s 
composition as a tribal monarchy that relies heavily upon religious legitimacy.   
The Saudi monarchy’s reliance on religious influence dates to the mid-18th 
century.  Unlike other areas of the Middle East, the interior of the Arabian Peninsula in 
which the monarchy originates never experienced colonization.  Both regional and global 
powers never fully penetrated into the peninsula’s harsh interior.  Effectively isolated 
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from much of the outside world, today’s ruling Saudi monarchy developed a unique 
relationship with religious authority that would shape its banking and governing 
institutions. 
The fusion of the Saudi royal family’s temporal authority with the religious zeal 
of the Hanbali Islamic juridical tradition traces to the 1740s, when the sheikh of the 
Rwala tribe, Muhammad Ibn Saud brokered a marriage between his son and the daughter 
of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab.3  The Hanbali tradition of Islamic jurisprudence, 
with its offshoots of Salafism and Wahhabism, serves as the religious basis for Sunni 
terrorist jihadist movements around the world.  In foreign relations, the binding of the 
Saudi monarchy with Wahhabism allows the kingdom to leverage considerable soft 
power in the Sunni world as a result of oil revenue and the presence of Mecca and 
Medina within its borders.  Domestically, Wahhabism directly contributed to the 
consolidation of Saudi power within the Arabian Peninsula while also serving as a threat 
to the monarchy’s security over the course of its modern history.  Wahhabist groups’ 
activity within the kingdom has intermittently threatened the monarchy’s overthrow, 
while Wahhabist jihadist groups have undermined the kingdom’s relationships with 
outside powers. 
Wahhabi influence played a significant role in the kingdom’s legal and 
institutional development, often leading to tensions between religiously motivated 
traditionalists and ambitious modernizers.  The contemporary Saudi state only came into 
being in 1932, after nearly a century of fluctuating Saudi tribal rule based in the Nejd, in 																																																								
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the heart of the peninsula.  The Ikhwan, the Wahhabi militia that helped the Saudi family 
consolidate its rule during the 1920s, had to be defeated by forces led by Abdul Aziz Ibn 
Saud in 1930 before the monarchy could effectively exert royal authority over the 
religious elements in its midst.4 Since 1932, the monarchy has engaged in uneasy 
political balancing with Wahhabi radicals in the kingdom.  As the state matured in the 
1940s and 1950s, schisms over the establishment of economic institutions would become 
a focal point of tension between the forward-looking monarchy and religious 
traditionalists.  
Economically, Saudi Arabia relied upon localized agriculture, pastoralism, and 
small commerce into the 1940s.5 From the death of Abdul Aziz in 1953 until the oil 
boom twenty years later, the Saudi political economy witnessed an enmeshing of 
relationships between the monarchy and the banking industry that would later shape the 
kingdom’s inability to effectively regulate the lion’s share of its financial sector.  During 
the 1950s and 1960s, regional dynamics driven by political events elsewhere in the Arab 
world shook the Saudi socio-political landscape.  Saudi workers trained in Egypt and 
Lebanon brought secular political mores back to the kingdom, while the proliferation of 
print periodicals and the introduction of radio and television prompted a backlash by 
conservative Wahhabis.6 
Threatened by secularizing influences brought from Arab Nationalist Egypt via 
modern media, and engaged in a proxy war with Cairo in Yemen, Wahhabi clerics during 																																																								
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this era pushed for the development of institutions that would provide modern 
mechanisms for the propagation and preservation of Wahhabi power.  Such institutional 
developments would include the formation of religious universities, the establishment of 
the World Muslim League, and a parallel and often contentious relationship between 
religious and state-based authority in the kingdom’s legal system.7  This legal double 
helix within Saudi Arabia led to Wahhabi considerations taking precedent in matters of 
commercial law.  In business, legal developments took place in a competitive growth 
between secular administrative bodies and religious authorities in the court system.  
Until the foundation of the modern state, the west coast of the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Hejaz, remained outwardly oriented and cosmopolitan due to its access to foreign 
trade along the Red Sea and exposure to outside influences during annual Hajj 
pilgrimage.  The cosmopolitanism of the Hejaz stood in stark contrast with the 
ultraconservative Nejd in the center of the country, and in which the Saudi-Wahhabi 
alliance originated.  From 1926 until 1955, the Hejaz enjoyed a commercial legal domain 
largely beyond the purview of religious authorities. However, in the mid-1950s, religious 
jurists succeeded in gaining control of commercial adjudication in the region, until a 
decade later when the monarchy re-established secular oversight in the form of the 
Ministry of Commerce.8  Within the commercial courts of the ministry, three secular 
judges oversaw the adjudication of business disputes.  By the late 1960s, Wahhabi clerics 
reasserted institutional control by placing two religious judges to one secular regulator in 
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each panel.9  Al Rajhi Bank’s origins in the Hejazi city of Jeddah date to this period of 
competition between royal technocrats and Wahhabi religious authorities during Saudi 
modernization in the mid-20th century.  
While the Al Rajhi family’s parent holding firm, Al Rajhi Holding Group was 
founded in 1936, the first modern Al Rajhi Bank began in the 1960s as a money changing 
business in the traditional street market in Jeddah, with the founder, Suleiman Al Rajhi 
supplying paper cash to other money dealers in the city from a suitcase.10 Unlike the 
cosmopolitan business class of the Hejaz, the Al Rajhi family traces its origins to the 
Nejd in the conservative interior of the country.  The Al Rajhi family enjoyed a close 
relationship with the founding monarch of the modern state, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud.  This 
interpersonal relationship between the king and the Al Rajhi family was reinforced by 
land grants offered to the family and Al Rajhi’s oversight of much of the king’s personal 
business dealings.11 The relationship between bank and monarchy within the kingdom’s 
political economy was already in place by the time the Saudi economy began to grow the 
institutions necessary for modern economic development.  Additionally, due to the 
personal ties between the ruling family and the Al Rajhis, as well as the position of the 
latter within the financial sector later on, the monarchy has held little institutional 
leverage over the bank’s alleged involvement in financing terrorism.  
Tribal wars during the 1920s, during which the Wahhabi Ikhwan routinely raided 
commercial centers on the coast, left a mutual suspicion between the new Saudi state and 
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Hejazi merchants.  Both Ibn Saud and his Wahhabi base of support were openly hostile to 
the Hejazi moneychangers and foreign banks around Mecca.12  This hostility lay rooted 
not only in the tribal conflict that lingered in the kingdom’s political memory, but also 
due to many traditional money changing houses and foreign banks engaging in practices 
related to riba, or the charging of interest and participating in other business practices 
forbidden by Islamic law.  Due to its traditional financial practices grounded in religious 
consideration, Ibn Saud favored the Al Rajhi network.13 Indeed, despite the centuries-old 
financial position of Hejazi commercial families, the wealthiest families of today’s Gulf 
States do not originate on the Red Sea coast, but from the conservative desert region of 
the Nejd.14 
Distrust of foreign banks and a steadily increasing supply of foreign currency 
from the 1940s onwards pressured Ibn Saud to look for alternatives to relying on 
Egyptian and British banking interests seeking to establish a greater presence in the 
kingdom.  In the early 1950s, Finance Minister, Sheikh Abd Allah Suleiman turned to 
American financial expertise to formulate a solution to the kingdom’s currency 
convertibility crisis. This solution encompassed the creation of the kingdom’s central 
bank, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) that opened in 1952 a year before 
Ibn Saud’s death.15   
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III. Al Rajhi Bank and the Saudi Regulatory System 
Suleiman arranged the creation of the regulatory agency to avoid business 
practices based on interest, and Article 3.7 of the agency’s charter stipulates the 
prohibition of interest of interest payments in the kingdom’s financial sector.16  The 
timing of SAMA’s founding and its initial institutional tasks had implications for the 
royals’ relationship with the Al Rajhi family, particularly as SAMA embodied potential 
competition to the Al Rajhi network for the handling of kingdom’s royal funds.17 Unlike 
Al Rajhi’s traditional orientation, SAMA embodied technocratic modernity.  With its 
revenues based upon charging the state fees for its activities, SAMA enjoyed 
considerable autonomy through operating beyond the purview of the Ministry of Finance 
and by employing its own recruitment programs outside of the civil service.18 
Additionally, the agency’s early years instilled a professionalism through early careerists 
consisting of American and Lebanese financial experts and a board of governors subject 
to royal decree.19 
Al Rajhi Bank, the largest Islamic bank in the world by the mid-2000s,20 was 
founded first as a money dealer in the traditional souk of Jeddah in 1957, and then as a 
modern sharia compliant bank in 1987.  The bank’s growth from a street-based money 
dealing operation to a multinational bank can only be understood through examining the 
organization’s role in the Saudi economy.  Unlike banks following a Western business 																																																								
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model, traditional moneylenders in the Gulf remain tied to specific industries and often 
directly participate in the non-banking operations of these industries themselves.21 
Additionally, lending is often predicated upon the requirement that the debtor spends the 
loaned cash with businesses affiliated with the bank through family and personal ties.22 
As a moneychanger, Al Rajhi Bank enjoyed a comfortable position through close social 
proximity to the royal family and serving as the preferred financial institution facilitating 
remittances for foreign workers in Saudi Arabia from across the Muslim world.  Even as 
its financial status grew, the bank maintained traditional business practices to the point 
that individual cash couriers frequently traveled to Europe to exchange notes for gold and 
other currencies in order to replenish their individual Saudi branches.23 Al Rajhi Bank’s 
status as a sharia-compliant financial institution eventually clashed with the kingdom’s 
own regulatory stance in the 1980s, when the bank’s lobbying ability allowed it override 
SAMA’s opposition to the religious nature of the bank’s business practices.   
As noted above, the kingdom’s political economy historically balanced a fine line 
between establishing regulatory institutions oriented based upon modern technocratic 
expertise and religious considerations.  While SAMA was prohibited from conducting 
business in interest, thereby avoiding violations of Islamic business practices, the agency 
itself largely opposed the promotion of Islamic banking in the kingdom and instead 
focused on regulating banks’ levels of reserve capital and providing financial advice to 
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the state.24 Even as oil revenues flushed the kingdom with capital in the 1970s, the 
increased need for financial institutions was met through an increased presence of foreign 
banks, regulated by SAMA.25 Traditional banking remained the domain of the informal 
sector, based in the street market.  
The fact that Al Rajhi Bank managed to lobby the Saudi state into allowing it to 
become a modern sharia-compliant bank is noteworthy for two reasons.  The first is due 
to the institutional status of SAMA within the kingdom Al Rajhi’s ability to lobbying and 
overcome the central bank’s opposition to its modernization.  Unlike other countries in 
the Middle East, SAMA has kept an institutional distance between itself and the members 
of the royal family by never having royals on its board.26 The second is the fact that 
SAMA also operates as the manager of the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund.  Yet, 
despite SAMA’s technocratic acumen and institutional distance, Al Rajhi managed to 
override the agency’s opposition to its modernization.  Al Rajhi’s prominence in the 
kingdom has only increased after its modernization, and this prominence came to the 
forefront of a 2010 IMF assessment that noted the kingdom’s highly concentrated 
banking sector.27 As of 2016, Al Rajhi alone held 16% of the kingdom’s banking industry 
market share.28 
While the early 1970s and the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War catapulted 
capital into the Persian Gulf in the form of oil revenue, 1979 marked another geopolitical 																																																								
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turning point for Sunni monarchies in the region, and for Saudi Arabia in particular.  The 
Iranian Revolution brought to power a regime openly hostile to Riyadh, and one that 
could rival Saudi Arabia’s position as a geopolitical representative for Islam; meanwhile, 
that same year the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  Domestically the Saudis 
experienced their most dire security threat since eradicating the Ikhwan decades before, 
when Mecca’s Grand Mosque was seized by terrorist led by Juhayman al-Otaybi, the 
grandson of one of the Ikhwan’s commanders.  The need to harness Islamic legitimacy in 
order to maintain security at home and project power abroad to counter Iranian and 
Soviet threats would impact the Saudi banking sector through the official introduction of 
Islamic banking.   
The institutional changes brought about by the 1970s in the kingdom cannot be 
overstated. While the Gulf was flooded with oil wealth, the technocratic elements within 
Saudi bureaucracy began to lose ground to religious-minded traditionalists.  The 
assassination of King Faisal in 1975 at the hands of Faisal bin Musaid had led to a new 
era of caution on the part of the monarchy regarding religious elements in the kingdom.  
Many believe Faisal’s assassin acted out of revenge for the 1965 police killing of the 
traditionalist prince, Khalid bin Musaid, over his opposition to the modernization of 
Saudi life.29 Following Faisal’s death, King Fahd allowed greater concessions to 
Wahhabism in the form of allocating greater funds to religious schools and universities, 
despite declining state budgets through the early 1980s.30  The SAMA, with the 
monarchy following greater caution over religious affairs and facing pushback from other 																																																								
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ministries over the resolution of commercial disputes, began to lose institutional 
predictability on issues in its purview.31 
 In the early 1980s the Al Rajhi family operated Saudi Arabia’s largest money 
dealing and remittance service. However, after one branch of the family’s banking 
network nearly collapsed as a result of silver bullion speculation in 1982, the SAMA 
stepped in to regulate the informal banking sector by mandating registration and 
conversion of traditional moneylending operations into modern commercial banks.32  
Traditional money dealers were mandated to convert their institutions by the end of 1983 
if they were to stay in business. 
While Al Rajhi sought to morph into a commercial bank, its traditional religious 
mores stipulated that the bank would be Islamic in nature and follow sharia-compliant 
business practices.  SAMA was not only hostile to the notion, but did not acquiesce to the 
Al Rajhi’s pleas until 1988.33  SAMA’s director at the time, Hamad Al Sayari, proved a 
strict regulator in keeping with the professionalism of the agency’s institutional legacy; 
however, monarchic mandates determined final decisions regarding regulatory 
outcomes.34 After an aggressive campaign to convince the state to allow it a banking 
license, the Al Rajhi Banking and Investment Corporation came into being.35 The bank 
was allowed to provide Islamic financial services, provided that “Islamic” did not appear 
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in the bank’s name.36 While the SAMA’s stance opposed the introduction of overt 
Islamic banking within the kingdom, Riyadh has openly supported the spread of Islamic 
financial institutions elsewhere in the world.37 In Saudi Arabia itself, Al Rajhi stands as 
the only bank of a primarily Islamic orientation; other banks in the kingdom largely focus 
on conventional financial services.38 As for why the state forbade Al Rajhi from holding 
an overtly Islamic moniker, the bank was barred from carrying the title over concerns that 
having an outwardly “Islamic” bank would implicate other financial institutions as 
somehow un-Islamic in their business practices.39 As the bank grew, the Al Rajhi 
conglomerate expanded its non-banking activities into the fields of construction and 
philanthropic activities.  This combination supposedly placed it at the social nexus for 
working with Al Qaeda over the course of the 1980s and 1990s.  SAMA, one of the 
regulatory bodies that would serve to thwart money laundering and terrorist financing 
began collecting suspicious activity reports (SARs) in the 1970s.  SAMA’s weakness in 
the face of Al Rajhi’s influence in the kingdom would serve as a lasting institutional 
condition. 
As for how the bank survived transitioning from a traditional money dealing 
network to a modern bank, the bank itself operated as but one of many ventures overseen 
by the Al Rajhi family. These ventures spanned from banking and construction, to the 
poultry business and non-profit sectors.  In 1978 these ventures formally melded together 
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into the Al Rajhi Trading and Exchange Company.40 After its full conversion to a modern 
joint-stock banking venture in 1987, majority shareholders remained with the Al Rajhi 
family.  As the bank and its affiliated businesses expanded, its connections with the Saudi 
state expanded in the form of contracts for infrastructure projects.41 Al Rajhi wealth was 
prominent enough warrant mention in a US diplomatic cable in 1996, which noted the 
family’s wealth dwarfed that of most of the members of the Saudi royal family.42 
 At the time of its transition from traditional money dealer into modern bank, the 
Al Rajhi Company for Currency Exchange and Commerce was already worth $7 billion; 
while its founder Suleiman Abdul-Aziz Al Rajhi was the richest man in the kingdom 
outside of the royal family.43 Yet, despite its wealth, the Al Rajhi’s religious mores 
continued to guide its business. Unlike other burgeoning Saudi billionaires who began 
utilizing private jets and buying holiday homes in Europe and elsewhere in the 1980s, the 
Al Rajhis maintained austere business premises and remained close to their traditional 
Bedouin roots.44 Socially embedded within the religious segments of Saudi society, Al 
Rajhi Bank patronized numerous religious charitable causes in the kingdom.  Taking 
place in a domestic environment where emboldened Wahhabism began to enjoy greater 
leeway given by the Saudi state, some of Al Rajhi bank’s charitable causes allegedly 
financed terrorism.  
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IV. Counter-Terrorist Financing and Al Rajhi Bank 
If Saudi Arabia comprises a strong state, it also lacks institutional standardization.  
Laws and major bureaucratic decisions rest on royal decree and the monarchy’s 
negotiation of power dynamics between the ulema, factions within the royal family, and 
changes in the Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape.  While monarchic mandate remains 
the ultimate arbiter of state decisions in the kingdom, the legal realm relies on traditional 
sharia law.  The ultraconservative Hanbali tradition of Islamic jurisprudence, from which 
Wahhabism derives, is the official juridical orientation of the kingdom.  In order to 
understand the Saudi legal approaches to terrorism and terrorist financing, the tensions 
between royal decree and Hanbali legal code must be taken into account.  Additionally, 
while Western de jure notions of CTF regulation are relatively new and date to the early 
2000s, Saudi surveillance of the financial system dates to the mid-1970s. 
Characteristics of the Saudi legal system place the monarchy in a precarious 
position in relation to religious authorities in the ulema.  The kingdom’s legal system 
consists of sharia, with the king serving as the final point of appeal for legal decisions.  
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, during the same period in which Al Rajhi 
reinvented itself as a modern bank, religious authorities and business groups began 
advocating for a reassertion of Islamic religious mores in the kingdom.45 Elements of this 
reassertion included King Fahd’s issuance of decrees explicitly stating that royal 
authority drew legitimacy from the Quran and Prophetic tradition.46 In the legal realm, 
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judges were still to be appointed by royal fiat.47 However, with the sharia judicial system 
overseeing all aspects of both civil and criminal law, this would place any royal override 
of legal decisions potentially at odds with religious bases of power in the kingdom. 
Understanding this balancing act is key to comprehending how the Saudi state, with its 
collection of SARs since the 1970s, could overlook the suspected funding of terrorism by 
Al Rajhi Bank.   
The early 1990s reforms enacted by Fahd’s decrees culminated in the Basic 
Ordinance of Saudi Arabia in 1992.  While the king is considered above the ostensibly 
separate legislative and judicial powers within the kingdom, Article 67 stipulates that the 
monarchy has regulatory purview in areas in which sharia law has no specific answer.48 
Despite the supposed urbanity of commerce, to which this royal prerogative is most 
applicable, the monarchy’s actions are curtailed by theories from sharia law.49 Royal 
oversight of regulatory mandates is bound by legal theory from the medieval scholar Ibn 
Taymiyya, whose theories stipulate that the regulations issued cannot fly in the face of 
sharia dictates.50  In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is not inconsequential that Ibn 
Taymiyya’s theories outline the range of the monarchy’s royal authority in the regulatory 
sphere.  Ibn Taymiyya’s interpretation of sharia law is the legal justification drawn upon 
by Sunni terrorist groups such as the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.  
 The intellectual founders of Sunni jihadist groups, Abd al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb, 
and Ibn Taymiyya were all Hanbali juridical thinkers.  For the Saudi monarchy, it is 																																																								
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ironic that during the 1990s, Sunni jihadists would draw upon Ibn Taymiyya’s 
philosophy and juridical decisions to advocate for the overthrow of the royal family.51 In 
the regulatory realm, the kingdom is institutionally at an impasse with its own religious 
legitimacy.  Within Saudi law, both terrorism and terrorist financing fall under the same 
category of crime, which draws from sharia law.  Specifically, both terrorism and terrorist 
financing are considered hiraba, or the “killing and terrorization of innocent people, 
spreading evil on the earth, theft, looting, and highway robbery”.52  
Regarding the prevention of terrorism and terrorist financing, both legal 
frameworks were present by the time the modern Al Rajhi bank is suspected to have 
begun serious involvement in funding groups such as Al Qaeda. The presence of sharia 
law since the beginning of the kingdom indicates that whatever action or inaction taken 
by the Saudi state regarding terrorism had a legal basis upon which to draw in order to 
counter terrorism.  In terms of banking supervision, SAMA began operating a 
surveillance system in the mid-1970s.  In 1975, Saudi Arabia began mandating the 
collection of suspicious activity reports (SARs).   
SAMA was the prime agency concerned with collecting financial surveillance in 
the kingdom.  SARs were to be collected by financial institutions and then reported to 
law enforcement and the central bank. The original purpose for such collection of 																																																								
51 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: the Trail of Political Islam, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 72. See 
also, Jessica Stern and JM Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 265-269.		
52 Report of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Submitted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Security Council 
Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism, at 5, UN Doc. S/2001/1294 (Dec. 26, 2001), 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/1373. See also, Report of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Response 
to the Comments Contained in the Letter Dated 18 April 2002 from the Chairman of the Security Council 
Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-terrorism, at 4, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/869 (July 10, 2002), http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/ 1373.html.  
	 114 
financial intelligence was the crackdown on illegal remittance systems in the kingdom, 
and underground banking overall.53 Institutionally, the original design of such financial 
organization was intended to monitor and sanction financial services precisely like Al 
Rajhi Bank prior to its modern reinvention as an Islamic bank in the 1980s.  It must be 
noted that these regulatory arrangements began well before 1979 when kingdom faced an 
international motivation to turn a blind eye to terrorist activity abroad.  Instead, such 
surveillance was domestically motivated in order to help modernize the Saudi financial 
system and increase its efficiency.  This surveillance began prior to the lobbying by Al 
Rajhi to pressure the kingdom into letting it become a modern bank.  In other words, the 
Saudi regulatory apparatus for financial surveillance was partly in place by the time Al 
Rajhi supposedly began supporting terrorism in the 1990s.  
The beginnings of Saudi efforts to surveil their financial system in the 1970s 
coincided with a marked increase in the kingdom’s efforts to use the soft power of 
religion and promote Sunni Islam around the world. One loophole in the Saudi financial 
intelligence system consisted of limiting royal regulatory purview to legal areas in which 
sharia law is uncertain, the second is linked to the kingdom’s approach to regulating 
zakat, or Islamic charity.  Unlike in the West, where taxes and charity are conceptually 
separate types of financial activity, Islamic thought holds little differentiation between the 
two.  The regulation of Saudi taxes and charity are inextricably linked for Saudi citizens 
and enterprises, since zakat taxes are levied on all Saudi interests, and both are regulated 
by the Department of Zakat and Income Taxes (DZIT).  In order to meet these 																																																								
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requirements, regulated by DZIT since 1950, Saudi entities often have special 
committees to facilitate paying such fees.54 Despite regulatory attempts to increase the 
transparency as to where such charity funds were destined, the chief regulator of SAMA 
lamented that many payments go abroad for unknown uses.55 One primary function of 
Islamic banking institutions is the facilitation and oversight of zakat for its clients.56 In 
the case of Al Rajhi Bank and other suspected terrorist financiers, it was through 
charitable foundations that finance moved from the bank to terrorism. 
In Western states, most governments developed aspects of welfare institutions 
beginning in the late 19th century.  In the West, private charity and government-backed 
social assistance are separate economic phenomena that both contribute to social causes.  
In Islamic economic thought charity, whether from private actors or from the state, is the 
same.  Charitable foundations provide the lion’s share of social welfare, and the state has 
historically supported such foundations in Islamic countries through the form of zakat 
taxation.  In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is charities that have served as the conduit for 
terrorist funds to transmit from backers to fighters.   
Al Rajhi Bank was one of several banks that supposedly transmitted such funds.  
The 9/11 hijackers from the Hamburg Al Qaeda cell received money through Al Rajhi 
accounts held by Mahmoud Darkazanli and Abdul Fattah Zammar, who provided the cell 
with logistical support.57 Muhamma Galeb Kalaje Zouaydi transferred funds directly 
from Al Rajhi Bank to terrorists involved with 9/11, the Bali bombing in 2002 that killed 																																																								
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204 people, and the 2004 Madrid attack that killed 192.58 In addition to holding an 
account of a premier Al Qaeda financier, Al Rajhi Bank provided extensive financial 
support for the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, and the SAAR Foundation.59 Each non-
profit provided financial support for Al Qaeda.  In 1999, US representatives from 
National Security Council and the Office of Foreign Asset Control went to Saudi Arabia 
to warn both Al Rajhi Bank and SAMA about the financial institution’s ties to jihadist 
groups, and Al Qaeda in particular.60 Securing Riyadh’s cooperation in counter-terrorist 
financing efforts would prove a perennial struggle for the US until the kingdom’s own 
security interests aligned with those of Washington. 
The Al Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF) came into being during the late 
1980s, with the purpose of supporting Wahhabi social action around the world. In 1997, 
the AHIF opened its own headquarters in Ashland, Oregon.  At its height, AHIF had 
operations in 50 countries, and disbursed between $30-80 million in its charitable work 
until its closure in 2004.61  US intelligence sources discovered that Al Haramain 
supported the Makhtab al-Khidemat (MAK) in Afghanistan, and even opened its own 
presence in Albania with the backing of Osama bin Laden.62 During the 1980s and 1990s, 
Al Qaeda’s financial apparatus lay intertwined with MAK, or the Afghan Services 																																																								
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Bureau, that actively recruited Al Qaeda members, published propaganda, and boasted 
over thirty offices in the United States alone.63 A 2003 cable by then Secretary of State, 
Colin Powell notes that AHIF’s support was so widespread that Al Qaeda received 
support from roughly 20 of the NGO’s branches, including those within Saudi Arabia.64 
In 1999, AHIF’s involvement with Al Qaeda was shown to be even more direct.  
That year, an Al Haramain representative deployed a Bangladeshi terrorist to scout 
American consulates in India.65 Upon his arrest by Indian authorities, where he was 
found with bomb-making material, he confessed that the planning of the foiled attacks on 
US targets in India was conducted on AHIF premises in Bangladesh.66 AHIF also assisted 
Al Qaeda conduct attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.67   
The US had advanced warning of Al Qaeda’s presence in Kenya before the 1998 
Nairobi attack. In 1997, Kenyan police raided the Nairobi home of Wadih el-Hage, a 
Lebanese-American who served as Osama bin Laden’s secretary.68 Due to evidence 
produced by the raid, officials suspected that the banker, Saleh Abdul-Aziz Al-Rajhi, had 
been supporting Al Qaeda.69  El-Hage’s personal affiliation with bin Laden began in 
1986, while working in a MAK office in Quetta, Pakistan.70 In the early 1990s, El-Hage’s 
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tenure in Nairobi included involvement in the illicit diamond trade,71 and forging 
documents for Al Qaeda members involved in the Nairobi attack.72 In 2002, the US and 
Saudi Arabia jointly began designating AHIF branches as supporters of terrorism, while 
the UN listed the foundation as a supporter of terrorism in 2004. El Hage was tried in the 
US and sentenced to life without parole in 2001. 
Former Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, Juan Zarate notes that Al Rajhi’s 
suspected involvement in Al Qaeda surfaced again in 2002, when Bosnian officials 
raided an Al Qaeda property in Sarajevo.  Among the seized evidence were documents 
linking Al Qaeda to another Saudi charity, the Benevolence International Society.  After 
the FBI raided the charity’s Chicago offices, Treasury discovered a list of major backers 
who were allegedly involved in supporting Al Qaeda; this list included the founder of Al 
Rajhi Bank, Suleiman Al-Rajhi.73 In a 2003 CIA report that became public knowledge in 
2007, Suleiman Al-Rajhi was a member of prominent financiers known as the “Golden 
Chain”.  Al-Rajhi was allegedly not only a financier, but played an additional role in 
helping Al Qaeda front charities disguise their financial activity and avoid arousing a 
regulatory crackdown by Riyadh.74 Concurrent to the Bosnian raid, US authorities began 
Operation Green Quest. Operation Green Quest would focus in part on the SAAR 
Foundation and the Safa Group. Both entities were supposedly intertwined with Al Rajhi 
Bank.  
																																																								
71 Douglas Farrah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror, (New York: Broadway 
Books, 2004), Chapter 4.  
72 Burr and Collins, 98.  
73 Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War, (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 80.  
74 Matt Taibbi, “Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail”, Rolling Stone, Feb. 22, 2013, 3.  
	 119 
One of the first responses the US took after 9/11 was to undertake renewed 
regulatory action against terrorist financing. Beginning in October 2001 and running 
through June 2003, a basket of US intelligence and regulatory agencies conducted 
“Operation Green Quest” in order to uncover and rectify terrorist financing 
vulnerabilities in the American financial system. By the time of its completion, Green 
Quest had frozen $33 million and issued 70 indictments.75 Much of the operation focused 
on an Al Rajhi-backed front for terrorist financing called the SAAR Foundation.  
Yaqub Mirza founded the SAAR Foundation in 1984 with financial infusions 
from Suleiman Al Rajhi.  Named after Suleiman Abdul-Aziz Al Rajhi,76 the organization 
sought to expand Islam through the founding of over one hundred branch offices and 
non-profits based in Herndon, Virginia.77 While SAAR itself closed in December 2000, it 
was replaced by Safa Group and operated with the same individuals.  While tasked with 
promoting Islam, the foundation actually did little to win converts, but instead invested in 
Virginia real estate and agricultural businesses in the US and South America.78 Virtually 
all of the organization’s 130 subsidiary groups functioned out of the same 555 Grove 
Street address in Herndon, and managed to avoid outright intervention from the US 
government due to the close relationship that Suleiman Al Rajhi enjoyed with the Saudi 
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royal family.79 Over the course of the late 1990s, it enjoyed significant donations, raking 
in $1.7 billion alone in 1998.80 
A 2002 investigative piece by the Washington Post, citing both American and 
European investigators, noted that SAAR transferred $20 million in funds to both 
Youssef Nada and Ahmed Idris Nasreddin.81 Authorities raided the bank used by Nada, 
Al Taqwa Bank, based in Switzerland and the Bahamas, in 2001.  Al Taqwa boasted 
shareholders that included two members of the bin Laden family, and counted Nasreddin 
and Nada on its board.82 The bank was only able to establish itself in Switzerland due to 
the presence of Albert FA Huber, an outspoken Nazi, on its board of directors.83 Al 
Taqwa Bank, Nada, and Huber were designated as supporting terrorism by the US 
Treasury Department in November 2001.84 According to the investigative piece by the 
Washington Post, Nada and Suleiman Al Rajhi met through their mutual involvement 
with the Muslim Brotherhood.85 The FBI met with SAAR representatives multiple times 
prior to 2001.86  
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V. Blocked Enforcement 
            While Al Rajhi came under massive scrutiny from a number of sources, ranging 
from damning media reports to investigative journalism, and governmental agencies from 
several countries, the bank has enjoyed blocked regulatory enforcement from its home 
state.  Indeed, this blockage has come in the form of Saudi-US diplomatic action and the 
shielding of the bank from civil lawsuits originating in American courts.  First, the 
diplomatic activity will be analyzed, after which the civil suits will be examined.  While 
the kingdom and Al Rajhi Bank have endeavored to build regulatory capacity to counter 
terrorist financing, the bank has yet to face penalization for its alleged prior activities.  
Instead, Saudi Arabia’s development of increased regulatory capacity included Al Rajhi 
in its development and included bureaucratic reshuffling in the arenas of banking and 
charitable organizations.   
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the United States began pushing for greater 
Saudi action against terrorist financing in the kingdom.  Suspicion about Saudi 
knowledge and involvement ran high in the US, and led to strains in diplomatic ties 
between the two countries over issues related to terrorist financing.  However, due to the 
precarious situation of the Saudi monarchy regarding the religious radicalism in its 
borders, the US opted for a cautious strategy in working with Riyadh to curtail terrorist 
financing.  On September 24, 2001, President Bush, along with Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, and Secretary of the Treasury, Paul O’Neill complimented the Saudis on their 
cooperation with curtailing terrorist financing.87 Yet, according to current and former 
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intelligence and foreign policy officials at the time, the Saudis were mostly reluctant to 
cooperate too intensely on security issues related to terrorism.88 
In 2002, the Council on Foreign Relations singled out Saudi Arabia and its 
charities as conduits for terrorist funds.  According the Council, not only was Saudi 
Arabia dragging its feet through slow cooperation with the US, but also that the Bush 
administration was defending Riyadh by claiming cooperation on the part of the 
kingdom.89 Additionally, the National Security Council advised the administration to 
push the Saudis to “punish” terrorist financiers within three-month period by ultimatum, 
or the US would take unilateral action against the financiers.90 Prince Bandar, Saudi 
ambassador to the US at the time, noted that the kingdom would have to change carefully 
and slowly due to the religious conservatism of the Saudi population.91 In other words, a 
poorly planned monarchy-led crackdown on the kingdom’s socio-religious institutions, 
many of which relied on Al Rajhi Bank for financial support, could trigger a potentially 
destabilizing backlash.  
From 2001 through 2005, Saudi Arabia implemented changes in an effort to 
cleanse its financial system of terrorist funds.  However, it was only with an ongoing 
discreet US push and an increased terror threat within the kingdom that allowed these to 
take place. These measures were largely de jure in nature, and included the kingdom’s 
entering into greater involvement with the Financial Action Task Force, adopting UN 																																																								
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resolutions, and developing domestic fortified finance capability.  In October 2001, Saudi 
Arabia took initial action by adopting UN Security Council Resolution 1373 that 
mandates the freezing and seizing of terrorist assets in the financial system.92 
Additionally, the kingdom established a full-fledged FIU in 2005.  Al Rajhi Bank was 
present and involved in the development of the domestic regulations.  
In March 2002, an American delegation from the Department of the Treasury 
traveled to Saudi Arabia to secure the kingdom’s cooperation against Al Qaeda and its 
financial network.  One of the goals of the meeting consisted of fostering joint action 
against the Al Haramain Foundation, and both the US and the kingdom jointly designated 
the organization as a financier of terrorism on March 11, 2002.93 According to then-
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Juan Zarate, the Saudis stepped up their crackdown 
on Al Qaeda’s financial network in May 2003 after the outbreak of a number of terrorist 
attacks in the kingdom.94 This critical juncture for Saudi domestic security vis-à-vis Al 
Qaeda, may have led Al Rajhi even closer to the monarchy and the organs of the Saudi 
state.  However, despite increased cooperation, the financing of terrorism from within the 
kingdom led to ongoing aggravation for the Saudis due to the reticence of captured Al 
Qaeda members and skepticism within intelligence circles as to whether or not wealthy 
donors, such as those mentioned in the “Golden Chain”, were actual contributors.95 In 
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total, the combined wealth of those individuals involved in the Golden Chain amounted 
to over $85 billion, or 42% of Saudi Arabia’s gross national product.96 
It must be noted that the relationship between the Saudi state and Al Rajhi Bank is 
not necessarily simpatico, nor simple.  The Al Rajhi affiliation with the kingdom’s 
conservative base, upon which the monarchy relies for its legitimacy is what drives Saudi 
caution in dealing with issues related to terrorist financing.  According to an investigative 
piece by The Wall Street Journal, American intelligence agencies contemplated 
implementing covert action in order to sabotage and infiltrate Al Rajhi Bank.97 Another 
strategy would have been to pressure other countries to more heavily regulate Al Rajhi’s 
activities within their own jurisdictions; however, the Bush administration opted for a 
plan of action centered on closely and quietly lobbying the Saudi government.98 Indeed, 
due to SAMA’s technocratic acumen and surveillance apparatus being in place since 
1975, the Saudi state may have proven incapable of curtailing the bank’s activities due to 
its societal position in the kingdom’s economy.  
Diplomatic cables from 2004 indicate that there was particular concern over Al 
Rajhi Bank’s involvement in funding terrorism. According to correspondence to the US 
Secretary of State, Zarate met with Ali Al Gaith, then Director of Banking Inspection, 
Insurance and Financial Leasing at SAMA.  During the meeting, Al Gaith argued that 
public suspicion of Al Rajhi Bank was unfounded, and that the bank had received a clean 
bill of health following an August 2003 audit conducted by Ernst & Young.  Zarate 																																																								
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mentioned “particular accounts of concern” to Al Gaith that were connected to Al Rajhi 
Bank, and that the institution’s regulatory capacity warranted a review in addition to the 
conduct of an investigation regarding particular accounts.  What is notable in the cable is 
that Al Gaith was “fed up” with American suspicion into Al Rajhi’s purported terrorist 
financing.99 
The regulatory and diplomatic tension extended into late 2004 when both 
American and Saudi officials conducted a joint on site examination into Al Rajhi Bank’s 
CTF capabilities.  In a November 2004 diplomatic cable, Colin Powell notes that the 
Saudi CTF regime was robust in its ability to prevent its financial system from being used 
for terrorist financing.  Pertaining to Al Rajhi Bank in particular, Powell mentions that 
the US provided Riyadh with evidence regarding a number of terrorist affiliated accounts, 
and that “the US and Saudi governments have agreed to work together to meet a mutual 
goal of ensuring Al Rajhi Bank is fully equipped to monitor and note suspicious patterns 
and trends in account activity, so as to create a preventative system within the 
institution”.100 Powell notes that the reason for a joint review of the bank was to “work 
collectively with Al Rajhi Bank” in implementing measures designed to prevent future 
malfeasance.101 During the review, SAMA personnel would be present at “all meetings” 
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with the bank’s personnel, and the review would include meetings with specific managers 
who oversaw the relevant accounts.102  
While it is not publicly known if bank officials faced any arrest or other penalties 
in Saudi Arabia, the bank’s relationship to terrorism is not one-dimensional.  Not only did 
the bank have accounts used by terrorists directly, the bank’s founder and head 
supposedly contributed to terrorist groups through charitable foundations, who in turn 
supposedly supported terrorist groups on an logistical level.  The bank’s relationship to 
the Saudi state would remain close as Riyadh engaged in bureaucratic reshuffling later in 
the decade in order to regulate charities and develop its FIU.  
In the mid-late 2000s, the British bank, HSBC came under increasing scrutiny for 
nefarious financial practices ranging from aiding in tax evasion to laundering money for 
drug cartels and financing terrorism.  Investigations into the bank from across multiple 
countries exacted a number of penalties against the institution, including a 2012 fine for 
$1.92 billion, the largest financial penalty ever levied against a bank.103 HSBC also had 
ties to Al Rajhi Bank.  A 2012 report by the US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations details a number of HSBC’s internal emails debating the value of 
maintaining ties with Al Rajhi over the latter’s financial relationships.104  
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Senator Carl Levin notes that 2005 marked a year of confusion for HSBC 
regarding Al Rajhi, and that the British bank instructed its affiliated branches to cut all 
ties with Al Rajhi Bank outside of the Middle East over concerns related to terrorism.  
Yet, later that year, HSBC retracted its instructions to its affiliates and allowed every 
country branch to determine its own interactions with Al Rajhi.  That following year, 
following threats by Al Rajhi Bank, HSBC relinquished and supplied the Saudi bank with 
$1 billion in US currency.105 HSBC’s financial confusion regarding Al Rajhi and its 
financial ties is not solely due to overall mismanagement on its part, particularly as the 
Saudi bank worked closely with the Riyadh and the US in order to develop the kingdom’s 
financial surveillance apparatus.  
HSBC’s confusion is notable, since 2005 marked a turning point in US-Saudi 
relations as President Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah met in April of that year to 
rebuild ties.  Facing ongoing threats from Al Qaeda within its own borders, the Saudi 
state began to take a more overt stance against terrorism alongside the US.106 While 
heads of state schmoozed diplomatically, the two countries were involved in further 
developing the Saudi regime of fortified finance.  
Between 2005-2006, the kingdom was developing its FIU system in order to 
secure membership in the Egmont Group.  Egmont Group, the international organization 
of states’ respective FIUs, officially recognized the year of kingdom’s founding of an 
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FIU despite the SAMA’s beginning SAR collection in the 1970s.107 The Saudi FIU was 
only officially admitted in May 2009.  Al Rajhi Bank’s position in the late 2000s was one 
of a gray area, but one in which it enjoyed a comfortable relationship with its home state.  
Officially, the Saudi FIU began operations the day before the fourth anniversary 
of 9/11 on Sept. 10, 2005, and took place with the assistance from the United States and 
the involvement of Al Rajhi Bank.  Indeed, between 9/11 and 2005, the Saudis froze 41 
bank accounts at a total of $5,697,400, or a paltry 4% of estimated global terrorist funds 
at the time.108 Diplomatic cables from 2006 describe meetings in Riyadh between US 
Treasury officials and Saudi representatives from SAMA and its FIU, along with 
representatives from Al Rajhi Bank in order to help facilitate the kingdom’s entry into the 
Egmont Group as a full member.109 While the Saudis made institutional improvements in 
the areas of reporting and regulating charities, the cable describes bank officials as 
reluctant to discuss their relationships with the Saudi FIU or to talk about their 
monitoring practices.110 
 In 2009 a diplomatic cable disseminated through the American intelligence 
community describes US efforts to assist Saudi Arabia develop its fortified finance 
regime.  In mid-May 2009, coinciding with the official Saudi membership date of the 
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Egmont Group, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Daniel Glaser traveled to Riyadh to 
enhance cooperation with Saudi Arabia in the area of threat finance.111  The meeting 
itself is noteworthy due to its attendees. Aside from Glaser, the only Saudi attendees were 
governmental officials and the heads of two banks, Riyad Bank chairman Rashed Al 
Rashed, and Al Rajhi Bank CEO Suleiman Al Rajhi.  Al Rajhi Bank was the only private 
bank in attendance, as Riyad Bank is state-owned.  The fact that Al Rajhi was the only 
non-state commercial bank present highlights the unique relationship between the Saudi 
government and Al Rajhi.  
During the meeting, which covered CTF issues and financial strategies to isolate 
Iran over its nuclear program, Suleiman Al Rajhi discussed his bank’s efforts to increase 
CTF reporting.  Al Rajhi himself claimed, “Things are better now as the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia had suffered from terrorism so institutions know that these systems are for 
the good”.112 Al Rajhi described that his bank had augmented compliance training and 
reporting suspicious activity.  As for charities, Al Rajhi described how Saudi banks were 
barred from transferring charitable funds unless the charity in question held the requisite 
state license.  When certain charities endeavored to circumvent the ban, Al Rajhi worked 
with SAMA to track or curtail the transfer of the funds.113  Uncertainty over the legality 
of the bank’s dealings and its standing was strong enough to cause confusion over its 
commercial partners such as HSBC.  																																																								
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While Al Rajhi Bank enjoyed the luxury of assisting the US and Saudi Arabia 
regulate its own activities, US officials assisted the bank by helping shield it from 
lawsuits and investigations originating in the United States.  Throughout the 2000s, 
survivors of the 9/11 attacks sought to bring lawsuits under the 1992 Anti-Terrorism Act 
against entities that supported Al Qaeda.  Defendants attacked in the suits included Saudi 
royals and banking interests, including Al Rajhi Bank that in turn, accused the US 
seeking to “extort Saudi money” and “meddle in the region”.114 However, these efforts 
were stymied due to the diplomatic connection between Saudi Arabia and the US.  
Repeated attempts to sue Al Rajhi Bank by survivors, insurance companies and others 
have been summarily dismissed in US courts.  
VI. Analysis 
While it cannot fully be known if Al Rajhi Bank knowingly and actively 
supported terrorism, its relationship to the Saudi state is certain. The bank developed in 
the same sociopolitical circles as the royal family, with both families deriving from the 
hyper-conservative Wahhabi interior of the Nejd, in the Arabian Peninsula.  Indeed, 
during the founding period of the Saudi monarchy, the early royal family relied on the Al 
Rajhi financial network for assisting in caretaking its financial affairs.  Due to the split 
between the new Nejdi rulers and the established Hejazi banks at the time, this social 
affinity between the Al Rajhi Bank and the monarchy persisted into the contemporary 
era, strained as it might be due to diverging interests.  
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It is highly possible that the Al Rajhi Bank financed terrorist activity, particularly 
due to its position in the kingdom as the only bank operating openly as an Islamic bank in 
the country. The particularities of the Saudi tax system, with both the state and private 
corporations developing a deep institutional network of Islamic charities through zakat 
provided ample potential sources of logistical and economic support for groups such as 
Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups reliant on donations from within the kingdom.  
Data indicates that Al Rajhi Bank had multiple ties with charitable organizations 
suspected of links to Al Qaeda, beginning shortly after the bank’s evolution into a 
modern commercial bank in the 1980s.  This period, during which the Saudis were 
engaged on two fronts against Soviet encroachment and a revolutionary Iranian regime 
provided an additional motive to promote Sunni jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda.  
Furthermore, there is little likelihood of the bank being ignorant of the activities of its 
account holders.  Not only was the Saudi state capable of knowing the financial dealings 
taking place within its territory through its central bank, SAMA, but Al Rajhi held 
suspected ties to extremist groups at multiple levels that coincided with its close social 
proximity to the Saudi state.  These levels included the personal charitable work of its 
founder, Suleiman Al Rajhi, the charities it helped establish, and the multiple accounts 
held by individual terrorists and terror-connected banking affiliates.  
While the proximity and importance of Al Rajhi Bank to the Saudi monarchy is 
fairly straight forward, what is less certain is the motivation behind the bank’s suspected 
activities.  It can easily be argued that the bank held greater loyalty to the monarchy than 
to causes such as that held by Al Qaeda.  The bank came under intense scrutiny from the 
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US, both in the court system, the media, and from American law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies.  Additionally, the bank appeared to have been intimately and 
elaborately connected to financial networks connected to jihadist groups.  However, the 
blockage of enforcement against the bank and the way it occurred raises several 
possibilities as to the bank’s close relationship to the state.  The first possibility is that the 
bank was simply too politically important for the Saudi state to crack down directly on its 
activities.  The more likely possibility is that the bank’s activities were guided by a notion 
of supporting Wahhabi terrorist groups under the assumption that it was helping the 
monarchy’s interests. Promoting its religious agenda through its charitable work parallels 
both motivations.   
Regardless, the bank’s close involvement in Saudi Arabia’s building regulatory 
capacity after 9/11 indicates that the bank enjoys a privileged position in Saudi politics.  
The bank was present at multiple meetings between US financial officials and those of 
Saudi Arabia; indeed, it was often the only private banking institution heavily involved.  
Furthermore, while it is unclear if the monarchy turned to the Al Rajhi Bank for help in 
developing its financial surveillance capability, or if involving the bank was an emulation 
of the adage to keep one’s enemies closer than one’s friends, Al Rajhi’s involvement in 
assisting develop the apparatus that would police its activities is thoroughly documented. 
The most striking aspect of the Al Rajhi Bank case is the nature in which it was 
included in its own enforcement efforts.  As the US investigated Saudi financial networks 
and their ties through charities to terrorism, it actively assisted both the Saudi state and Al 
Rajhi Bank despite the role that the latter purportedly played in financing terrorism.  
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While the bank was involved in Saudi Arabia’s regulatory reshuffling, it also has also 
never been successfully sued, nor faced fines for its activities.  On a deeper theoretical 
level, the case of Al Rajhi Bank indicates that security interests supersede those of 
regulatory harmonization or elegance.  Indeed, these regulations designed to fortify 
finance are a product of states seeking their own security, and any efforts to build 
regulatory capacity in this arena derives from such a goal.  				
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Chapter 4: Halk Bank of Turkey 
 
I. Introduction 
In the mid-2000s, Halk Bank, one of Turkey’s remaining state-owned banks came 
under international scrutiny for assisting Iran with circumventing economic sanctions in 
what comprised one of the largest money-laundering and terrorist financing schemes in 
history.  The scandal over the bank’s activities placed increasing strain on Ankara’s long-
time relationship with the West, and heralded a renewal of Turkish interest in influencing 
Middle Eastern geopolitics.  This chapter first examines Halk Bank’s history of 
development and ownership by the state in the wider Turkish political economy.  
Specifically, the bank’s role as an instrument of foreign policy and domestic political 
coalition binding will be explored.  Next, this chapter discusses Ankara’s adoption of 
fortified financial regulations and the development of Turkey’s secret laundering activity 
with Iran.  Last, the chapter will discuss efforts by the Turkish state to defend Halk Bank 
and the leading regime under Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) after it 
came under enforcement pressures for violating international sanctions. 
Turkish politics encompass a cluster of contradictions.  Aside from serving as a 
bridge between Europe and the Middle East since ancient times, modern Turkey has 
oscillated between varying degrees of authoritarian and democratic rule.  One near-
constant characteristic of Turkey’s political institutions is statism in its political economy 
and high concentration of ownership in its financial industry.  Since becoming a modern 
republic in 1923, the Turkish economy has retained this characteristic despite engaging in 
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liberalization efforts in 1980s in an effort to prepare for economic integration into 
Europe.  State-owned banks, including Halk Bank, remain an integral institutional 
component of the Turkish political economy.  This institutional binding, along with its 
tight managerial proximity to the government, places it at the service of both domestic 
economic policy and foreign policy initiatives.  Combined, this close proximity provides 
a ready environment for political corruption while positioning the state to insulate the 
bank from regulatory penalty.  
II. Halk Bank and Statist Legacies 
 The modern Turkish republic emerged out of the remnants of the Ottoman Empire 
in the aftermath of WWI.  Forming in 1923 after Turkish nationalists repelled European 
attempts at colonization, the early Turkish state was birthed in regional and international 
environments rife with statist approaches to economic affairs.  This environment, and 
early ideological currents in the Turkish nationalist movement influenced the 
circumstances into which Halk Bank was founded in 1938.  In the spring of 1923, in the 
midst of the proto-republic’s negotiations with European powers over Ottoman-era 
capitulations, foreign debts, and national boundaries, the Economic Congress in Izmir 
laid a nationalist groundwork for the modern Turkish economy. 
 Reminiscent of statist thinking in Republican China and popular in European 
states at the time, Turkish nationalists placed economic prowess at the forefront of 
securing political independence and national security.  At the 1923 Economic 
Conference, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk stated that, “national sovereignty should be 
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supported by financial sovereignty”.1 The rest of the 1920s witnessed a holdover of 
Ottoman-era institutional arrangements characterized by foreign capital remaining 
dominant in a number of industries in what remained a heavily agricultural political 
economy. After six years of laying institutional groundwork, the economic downturn of 
1929 ironically pushed Turkey into the early stages of creating its own modern 
indigenous banking sector.   
 In 1926, the new republic adopted a number of legal institutions from Europe.  
That year, Ankara adopted a largely Swiss legal system in conjunction with a mixture of 
Italian and German commercial codes.2 Due to its wariness from late Ottoman-era 
economic privileges extended to European interests, the new republic sought ways to 
limit foreign competition in its financial sector.  It is worth noting here that Turkey, 
neutral through WWII, imported institutional economic influences from Fascist Italy, 
Germany, and the Soviet Union throughout the 1920s and 1930s.  Germany’s banking 
industry under Nazi rule shifted abruptly between the early and late 1930s, with 
nationalization predominating in the early parts of the decade and increased privatization 
predominating later on.3 Turkey’s creation of Halk Bank in 1933 reflected the 
nationalization in Nazi Germany’s banking sector in the early 1930s.  
 The early 1930s saw the crystallization of statism as a basis of Turkish economic 
orientation.  In 1931, Ataturk formally declared, “Our people are certainly statist because 																																																								
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they naturally demand that their needs be satisfied by the state. Considering that point, 
there is complete conformity between the program of our party and the nature of our 
people”.4 While such statist orientation was also designed to help withstand the effects of 
the Great Depression, it would also play a role in the establishing of state-owned banks.  
Halk Bank, with its focus on the financing of small and medium enterprises serving as its 
specialty, was uniquely placed in within the political economy.  This focus on small and 
medium enterprises would not only make the bank elemental in helping Turkish political 
parties maintain constituencies, it also created political liabilities in the event that serious 
privatization was ever considered.  Functioning as a state bank devoted to small 
businesses and what would constitute the Turkish middle class, the domestic positioning 
of the bank would serve as a pillar for regime binding and political clientelism.  
Additionally, Halk Bank’s focus on small and medium-sized enterprises, as opposed to a 
specific industry, placed it in a durable position in Turkey’s political economy.   
 In 1933, Halk Bank was incorporated with a specific focus of fostering “favorable 
conditions to tradesmen, artisans and small business owners and triggering capital 
accumulation; for both long-lasting economic development and for preserving social 
equilibrium”.5 Unlike the Soviet Union, Turkey’s Kemalist-era state-owned banks were 
not solely focused on state-owned enterprises.  Rather, Ankara opened state-owned banks 
with the purpose of supporting critical sectors of the capitalist economy and to support 
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Turkish nationalism.6 Indeed, Ataturk highlighted and condoned individual 
entrepreneurship and profit-seeking when it came to Halk Bank’s client base, “You 
artisans, when the day comes that I witness great factories being built in the place of your 
small shops, I’ll be elated to the highest degree”.7 
 After it began open operations in 1938, Halk Bank expanded over the course of 
decades through opening branches and serving as a conduit of state funds to its small 
business client base.  From 1938 until 1950, Halk Bank provided capital to small and 
medium enterprises through public funds directly from the state.  In 1950, this “People’s 
Fund” took on bureaucratic and institutional characteristics more reminiscent of a 
conventional bank when it opened branches and offering business loans to small 
businesses.8 Coming to power in 1950, Turkey’s Democratic Party broke with the 
hardline statist policy legacies of Republican People’s Party (CHP) and instituted a 
number of modest reforms to privatize state-owned enterprises.  While Halk Bank 
remained state-owned, its operations were reformed from functioning as a direct activity 
of the state to that of a bank owned by the state.  During this era, Halk Bank remained 
part of an overall economic strategy by Ankara to insulate the Turkish economy from 
external market forces and foreign competition.  Until the 1980s, when Turkey undertook 
aggressive liberalization reforms, Halk Bank steadily expanded its presence throughout 
the country through opening additional branches and increasing its lending capacity.  																																																								
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While its organizational infrastructure matured and expanded, it remained a state-owned 
bank.  
 If Halk Bank’s history can be summarized into a single characteristic it is that of 
ongoing institutional linkage with the state despite phases of attempted liberalization of 
the Turkish economy.  Under Democratic Party rule in the 1950s, Ankara relied on access 
to capital through the Marshall Plan in its attempt to liberalize trade and allow free capital 
flows while trying to sell state-owned enterprises. These efforts were cut short due to 
inflationary pressures and a rising trade deficit.9 Through periods of intermittent military 
and civilian rule from the 1960 coup until the 1983 election of Turgut Özal, Turkey’s 
economy remained introspectively oriented and reliant on import substitution and 
protectionism. It was under Özal that Halk Bank not only bypassed planned  
“privatization” while remaining a state-owned bank, but also when the bank morphed 
into its current incarnation.  
III. Partial Liberalization and Domestic Coalition-Binding 
 The 1980s witnessed a move towards neoliberalism in economies around the 
world.  Turkey, along with other countries with statist economic legacies, undertook 
structural reforms in order to check rising inflation and high unemployment resulting 
from increasing oil prices.  As a political figure, Özal is notable in that his career spanned 
involvement in both military and civilian governments.  Under military rule, Özal held 
the post of Deputy Prime Minister of Economic Affairs prior to his taking power as prime 
minister in 1983.  As a power broker, Özal was uniquely pedigreed, combining liberal 																																																								
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technocratic economic institutional experience with Islamist credentials and comfort 
around Turkey’s authoritarian military elite.10 Notably, the manner in which he carried 
out liberalization and privatization followed a trajectory of neoliberal populism that 
combined these contradictory characteristics.   It was neoliberal populism that not only 
created the institutional environment that Halk Bank currently inhabits, but also links the 
economic orientation of Özal’s legacy with that of the current authoritarian government 
under the Justice and Development Party (AKP).  
 Common under hybrid regimes of semi-democracies, neoliberal populism seeks to 
install policies designed to facilitate economic efficiency and disincentivize rent seeking 
in concert with intervention by the state.11  Neoliberal populist policy is also often 
affiliated with a charismatic leader and a “shallow” democratic environment.12 Despite 
Özal’s admiration for Thatcherism and privatization, the process of privatizing state-
owned banks and other enterprises that began in the mid-1980s was slow moving and 
never fully matured.13 Indeed, for many state-owned enterprises, Halk Bank included, the 
process was never completed. 
 After taking power as prime minister in 1983, Özal initiated privatization policies 
aimed at liberalizing sectors of the Turkish economy in 1985.  Two goals of state-owned 
bank privatization centered upon the desire to expand share ownership and to increase 																																																								
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revenues for the state through the sale of state shares.14 Specifically, 32 state-owned 
companies were targeted for privatization through block sales, public sales and direct 
sales of assets and subsidiaries.15 Instituted by Privatization Law No. 4046, the 
Privatization High Council in concert with the Privatization Administration oversees the 
privatization of state enterprises.  The Prime Minister sits on the Privatization High 
Council and recommends entities for privatization while also overseeing the Privatization 
Administration.16 The legal positioning of the Prime Minister in the privatization process 
combined with the failed privatization of Halk Bank would uniquely position the bank as 
a means of kleptocracy and money laundering.   
 Turkey’s domestic politics of the Özal era marked an ideological shift in Turkish 
politics that laid the foundations for later Islamist movements under Erbakan and 
Erdoğan.  Unlike the secularist military rulers that preceded Özal’s rise to power, Özal’s 
ideological orientation combined aspects of Islamism and Turkish nationalism with a 
highly technocratic Western liberalism.  Breaking from Turkey’s staunchly secular 
Kemalist orientation, Özal drew domestic support from small business interests in the 
Anatolian interior of the country, and from social and religious conservatives.17 Despite 
his drives for economic liberalization, Özal’s domestic orientation was that of soft neo-
Ottoman outlook.  At his funeral, mourners even walked through Istanbul shouting 
Islamist slogans.18  As noted at the beginning of this chapter, it was small businesses and 																																																								
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the lower middle class that served as Halk Bank’s prescribed primary customer base.  It 
was this same consumer demographic to which Özal appealed.  Not coincidentally, later 
Islamists Erbakan, and Erdoğan would appeal for political support from this same 
constituency.  
 The number of Turkish state-owned banks and the scope of state ownership did 
contract under privatization reforms in the 1990s.  Özal’s reform attempts remained 
uncompleted, but privatization of the banking sector advanced under later prime ministers 
Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz in the late 1990s.  Four state banks: Etibank, Sumerbank, 
Anadolubank, and Denizbank were all fully privatized through the total block sale of the 
banks’ shares to single buyers.19 Halk Bank had not previously been a premier state-
owned bank, but did take on greater importance while the state maintained ownership 
despite privatization of other banks.  Its capital increased as a result of private investment 
infusions through the sale of minority shares while also growing in size as a result of 
absorbing other banks.  Through the 1990s, Halk Bank absorbed Töbank, a bank owned 
by Turkish schoolteachers, Sumerbank, and all assets and liabilities of Etibank.20  In 
2001, Halk Bank absorbed the branches of the state-owned Emlakbank.  All three of 
Turkey’s remaining state-owned banks are among the top seven Turkish banks ranked by 
total assets.21  
 Ownership within Turkey’s banking sector is not only highly concentrated, but is 
also politicized and prone to corruption.  With its failed privatization through the sale of 																																																								
19 Ökten, 234.  
20 Halk Bank Official Website, https://www.halkbank.com.tr/en/international-banking/97/history, (accessed 
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minority shares to private investors, Halk Bank’s position in Turkey’s political economy 
became uniquely reconfigured in a manner conducive to political cronyism and money 
laundering.  It was this positioning that would enable the bank to be used in laundering 
Iranian money under sanction for terrorism.  
 As a result of financial crises in 1994 and 2001, Turkey’s banking sector 
reoriented in favor of state-owned banks. Turkey passed a law by decree in 1994 
designed to clarify previously incoherent and contradictory laws pertaining to the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises.22 This 1994 law allowed the government to levy 
privatization laws by fiat, and was overturned by Turkey’s Constitutional Court in the 
aftermath of 1994 Turkish currency crisis. Turkish elites committed to the country’s 
legacy of statism drove the effort to strike down the privatization law, which was 
replaced with Privatization Law no. 4046.23 This statist legacy, combined with the unique 
legal positioning of the Prime Minister in matters of privatization contributed to the 
politicization of state-owned banks like Halk Bank.  A politically driven financial crisis 
in 2001 would result in solidifying state-owned banks in an advantaged position vis-à-vis 
their private counterparts.  
 State-owned Turkish banks hold a number of institutional advantages over private 
banks in the country.  State bank operations are highly politicized and offer a means of 
political elites to distribute rents to important constituencies and allies.24 This dynamic 
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creates a moral hazard by which state-banks can provision loans based on political 
connection rather than potential profitability or the ability of debtors to service the debt.  
Halk Bank, along with Ankara’s other banks, issues more loans than their private 
counterparts as a result.  Indeed, the opacity of this politicized lending scheme leads to an 
inability to accurately gauge the efficiency of Turkish state-owned banks.25 When this 
politicized lending dynamic is put into context with Turkey’s structure for privatization, 
it becomes clearer as to why Halk Bank failed to fully privatize.  
 In efforts to raise revenues and stabilize the financial system through the wake of 
the 1994 crisis, Turkey sold minority shares to their state banks. However, through 
consolidation, Halk Bank grew in size throughout the 2000s. After absorbing Emlakbank 
in 2001, Halk Bank acquired Pamukbank in 2004.  This growth occurred during a critical 
juncture of Halk Bank’s history, as in November 2001, the state planned to sell the 
entirety of the bank under Privatization Law No. 4603.  Article 16 of law places all of 
Halk Bank’s operations under the auspices of the General Manager, who in turn is 
appointed by the Prime Minister.  This structural arrangement was intended as temporary 
until privatization; however, the government scrapped the planned sale of the bank in 
2006.  This new arrangement placed the bank’s operations effectively under the oversight 
of the Prime Minister through the mechanism of the General Manager.  As noted in 
Figure 4.1, Halk Bank’s politicized lending was enabled through this institutional 
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mechanism and placed the bank in a position uniquely conducive to a cycle of corruption 
and financing politically motivated activity.  
 While the Turkish government under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan cancelled plans to 
fully privatize Halk Bank in 2006, the government did offer the sale of minority shares in 
the late 2000s.  In 2007 the bank offered 25% its shares in an initial public offering, 
followed by a second offering of 23.92% on Nov. 16, 2012.26  In sum, the Turkish state 
retains ownership of 51.1% of the bank.  As of 2016, Ankara owns Halk Bank through its 
sovereign wealth fund, the Turkey Wealth Fund. 
Figure 4.1: Turkish Prime Minister’s Relationship to Halk Bank and its Operations  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
Since the turn of the millennium, Turkish politics has followed an increasingly 
authoritarian trajectory under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep 
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other small borrowers significantly overlaps with the AKP’s constituency.  While Halk 
Bank was founded with the intent of serving entrepreneurial clients from Turkey’s lower 
middle class and small businesses, the bank retains this orientation into the 21st century.  
Halk Bank explicitly maintains a financial strategy focused upon Turkey’s small-scale 
borrowers and artisans.  In a 2014 prospectus memo aimed at luring limited private 
shareholders, the bank stated a strategy calling for increasing and deepening the 
institution’s penetration of the small and medium enterprise market.27 This focus upon 
local artisans, small business groups, and local unions of independent tradespeople 
remains the focus of Halk Bank’s plans for long-term growth and profitability.28 This 
segment of Turkey’s political economy is also one of the bedrocks of AKP’s voter base. 
The 2002 Turkish election demarcates a profound shift in the country’s political 
landscape in that over half of the Turkish electorate voted for an alternative party than 
who they voted for in 1999.29  Drawn by the AKP’s combination of conservatism and its 
economic performance at the local level, the party founded by Erdoğan absorbed 
disillusioned voters from other parties.  The Motherland Party (ANAP) that brought 
Turgut Özal to power with his combination of neoliberal economics and Islamist 
sentiments in the 1980s served as a main source of AKP’s voters in 2002.  Erdoğan’s 
AKP absorbed half of ANAP’s voters, along virtually absorbing the Islamist Virtue 
Party.30 Indeed, Özbudun notes that the nascent AKP in 2002 managed to recreate Özal’s 																																																								
27 Halk Bank Offering Memorandum, May 29, 2014, http://www.ise.ie/debt_documents/Prospectus%20-
%20Standalone_bf28fe49-51f6-4fcf-ac89-7a803aede994.PDF (accessed April 29, 2018), 82. 
28 Halk Bank Offering Memorandum, May 29, 2014, 4-5.  
29 Cem Baslevent and Akarca, Ali, Micro Evidence on Inter-Party Vote Movements in Turkey: Who Voted 
for AKP in 2002? (November 20, 2008), 2. 
30 Baslevent and Akarca, 10. 
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voting coalition of urban tradesmen and artisans in concert with rural conservatives.31       
Halk Bank’s most important customer base proved to be the same base of support 
for Erdoğan’s AKP.  The AKP’s middle class voters, characterized as socially 
conservative and neoliberal, consisted of the “small and midrange enterprisers” of 
Turkey’s cities who were alienated from traditional Republicanism.32 Additionally, the 
AKP’s platform placed small and medium-sized enterprises at the center of its strategy 
for Turkey’s economic growth.33 It is not coincidental that Halk Bank’s long-term 
strategic plan for deepening its market penetration of small and medium enterprises 
overlaps with that of the AKP.  Rather, the bank is in part a useful tool for the AKP to 
assist in maintaining its electoral coalition.  Furthermore, given the position of the Prime 
Minister in overseeing the bank’s organizational structure, it becomes clear how the 
financial institution serves as a coalition binder for Erdoğan’s party.  Ankara’s adoption 
of the fortified finance regime has done little to displace this institutional linkage between 
state, bank, and the ruling party’s primary economic voting base.  
IV.  Fortified Finance in Turkey 
 Turkey’s perennial geopolitical goal has historically centered upon joining the 
West despite its position as a regional Middle Eastern power.  Since the early Cold War, 
the modern Turkish republic’s unique geographic location placed it as a major player in 
																																																								
31 Ergun Özbudun, “From Political Islam to Conservative Democracy: The Case of the Justice and 
Development Party in Turkey”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 11, nos. 3-4, pp. 543-557, 547.  
32 Ahmet Insel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey”, South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, no. 
2-3, pp. 293-308, 298-299.	
33 Ibid, 298.  
	 148 
Western security planning through its membership in NATO.  Economically, Ankara has 
spent years seeking inclusion into Europe since 1999 when Turkey was mentioned as 
potential member of the European Union.34  Economic melding with Europe has thus far 
proven elusive, in part due to the qualitative regulatory challenges posed by its financial 
system.  Concerns over corruption and the banking system’s integrity are one area that 
Ankara has sought to rectify through the adoption of fortified financial regulations.  
Despite proving an early adopter of fortified finance regulations and institutions, none of 
these adoptions managed to disrupt the deepening connections between Halk Bank and 
the Turkish state over the same period.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, the internationalization of the fortified financial 
regime to counter money laundering and terrorist financing began with the founding of 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989.  Turkey joined the FATF in 1991, only 
a year after most Western states joined the organization after beginning its functions in 
1990.  Indeed, Turkey’s joining the AML/CTF regime coincided with Ankara’s efforts to 
adopt overall neoliberal reforms initiated under the Özal administration.  Domestically, 
Turkey outlawed money laundering in November 1996 under Law no. 4208, and 
established MASAK, its own financial intelligence unit (FIU) a few months later in 
February 1997. In 1998, Ankara joined the Egmont Group of FIUs.   
 Despite having a long experience with terrorism, much of it related to the threat 
posed by Kurdish separatists in the country’s southeast, Turkey’s terrorism laws originate 
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in parallel with the beginning of its adoption of the AML/CTF regime.  Turkey’s 1991 
anti-terrorism law, Act No. 3713, is profoundly broad and defines terrorism as any act 
“with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic”, “seizing the authority of 
the state”, or altering its sociopolitical order.35  Notably, as Turkey’s AML/CTF regime 
expanded, Ankara’s Anti-Terrorism Law underwent five amendments between 1995 and 
2010.  It was also over this period that Turkey began moving towards authoritarianism 
under the AKP where the law would prove useful in neutralizing political opposition. 
 The central component of any country’s regulatory apparatus to counter terrorist 
financing is the FIU.  Turkey’s FIU, Mali Suçları Araştırma Kurulu (MASAK) was 
instituted in 1997 and was placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.  
MASAK’s responsibilities under law no. 5549 include the collection of suspicious 
activity reports (SARs) from banks and report suspicions of financial malfeasance to the 
Public Prosecutor for potential prosecution.36 Article 2 of law no. 5549 passed in 2006 
stipulates mandatory reporting of suspicious activities on the part of banks, pension 
funds, jewelers, money dealers and most businesses affiliated with high-end 
transactions.37 Chapter 4, Article 19 of the law includes the tracking and collection of 
data related to terrorist financing as one MASAK’s tasks.  Even prior to the 
implementation of the 2006 law, the filing of SARs increased over 300% in the early 
2000s from the 1990s.38 																																																								
35 Article 1: Anti-Terror Law Act No. 3713: Law to Fight Terrorism, Official Gazette, April 12, 1991.  
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 Over the course of the 2000s, Turkey deepened its involvement in the 
international AML/CTF regime though the joining of treaties designed to counter 
corruption, terrorist financing, and organized crime.  In December 2000, Turkey became 
a signatory to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime and would 
ratify it in 2006. Regarding terrorist financing, Turkey joined the UN Convention for the 
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in September 2001. By 2006, Ankara 
implemented its own law, the Prevention of Laundering Proceeds of Crime Law No. 
5549, and signed the Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering the Proceeds of 
Crime and Financing of Terrorism in 2007.39 Given Turkey’s desire to join the European 
Union and Eurozone, Ankara’s regulatory adoptions do comprise more than simple 
juridical theater.  Rather, they represent part of a greater yet haphazard Turkish economic 
effort to join Europe during the 1990s and 2000s. Furthermore, this regulatory adoption 
of the fortified finance regime coincided with overall Turkish efforts to liberalize and 
privatize sectors of the country’s economy.  Notably, the growth of Turkey’s CTF 
regulations grew alongside its terrorism laws.   
The turn of the millennium provided a turning point for Turkey in seeking to 
adhere to international standards of financial regulation.  While Turkey initiated its 
adoption of the fortified finance regime by joining of the FATF in 1991 and establishing 
MASAK in 1997, it was the involvement of the EU and the IMF in the aftermath of 
Turkey’s 2001 financial crisis that helped promote Ankara’s regulatory adoption of 
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international standards in the 2000s.40 However, despite Turkey’s formidable de jure 
adoption of threat finance laws and regulations, the FATF issued a number of reports of 
concern pertaining to actual enforcement despite Turkey’s high legal and regulatory 
capability.  
In the mid-2000s, FATF issued a number of evaluations of Turkey’s adherence to 
the FATF’s forty-one recommendations pertaining to countering money laundering and 
terrorist financing.  In 2007, the FATF noted that Turkey’s banks served as the primary 
means of laundering and financing terrorism within the country’s financial system.41 
Despite the low ratio of SARs filed given the size of the Turkish financial sector, 
Turkey’s banks provided a steadily increasing number of reports.42  In terms of funds 
related to terrorism outside of Turkey, a number of FATF’s recommendations remained 
unimplemented in 2007.  Throughout the decade, Turkey implemented significant 
improvements in its threat finance regime over issues related to terrorism.   
The 2007 FATF report noted that Ankara was noncompliant or only partially 
compliant in areas of customer due diligence, politically exposed clients, transactions to 
and from high-risk jurisdictions, and in mandates to file SARs related to terrorist 
financing.  In 2014, the FATF noted that multiple improvements in the state’s capacity to 
counter terrorist financing.  Legally, Turkey’s National Assembly implemented Terrorist 
Financing Law No. 6415 in 2013.  The law effectively harmonized Turkey with the 1999 																																																								
40 See Ziya Öniş and Caner Bakır, “Turkey’s Political Economy in the Age of Financial Globalization: The 
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UN Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism.  Notably, Article 3 of the 
law defines terrorism along mainstream international standards, declaring terrorism to be 
“acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury for the purpose of intimidating or 
suppressing a population or compelling a government or an international organization to 
do or abstain from doing any act”.43 In terms of terrorist financing, the law stipulates in 
Article 4 that terrorist financing includes the “collection of funds for a terrorist or terrorist 
organizations”.  
Turkey’s de jure declaration of international cooperation also improved.  
Importantly, the law mandates that Turkey would freeze the funds of organizations 
designated under the UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 1988, and 1989 “without 
delay”.44 Additionally, the law mandates that that Turkey attempt to comply with asset 
seizure requests made by foreign states under a principle of reciprocity.45 The law 
stipulates that the foreign power make requests either to the Foreign Ministry, MASAK, 
or directly to the Ministry of Justice.46  In the case that a foreign country makes a request 
for Turkey to freeze or seize criminal or terrorist assets, the ultimate decision to follow 
through falls under the authority of the Council of Ministers.47 The Council of Ministers, 
or Turkey’s cabinet, is filled with presidential appointees under the guidance of the Prime 
Minister. 
The Financial Action Task Force conducted a follow-up evaluation of Turkey’s 
CTF regime in 2014.  The FATF noted multiple improvements in terms of Ankara’s 																																																								
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compliance with international standards.  However, the FATF recorded lacking 
compliance in the key areas of politically exposed clients, dealing with risky 
jurisdictions, and in the full vetting of “unusual large transactions”.48 Additionally, the 
FATF discovered that Turkey lacked a cohesive mechanism for seizing and freezing 
terrorist funds.49 All three of these key areas of concern are highlighted in case of Halk 
Bank’s gold-based scheme for laundering money for Iran and in Ankara’s assisting 
Tehran avoid sanctions.  
The international CTF regime takes into account the potential risks that politically 
exposed persons (PEPs) and risky jurisdictions pose for the threat of money laundering.  
The FATF defines PEPs as either foreign or domestic individuals who are “entrusted with 
prominent public functions”.50 The primary fear of PEPs in relation to money laundering 
and terrorist financing is that such foreign individuals may have the luxury of diplomatic 
immunity that can enable them to avoid prosecution.51  Similarly, key figures of domestic 
political stature may enjoy the ability to circumvent prosecution or arrest due to the abuse 
of their positions.  Indeed, a key FATF concern regarding PEPs is that such individuals 
may “capture” financial institutions through shareholding, management or other means 
that can allow them to launder money or finance terrorism.52 The capturing of a financial 
institution about which the FATF is concerned effectively enables politically powerful 
persons to manipulate banks for their own corrupt or criminal enterprises. Coincidentally, 																																																								
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once Halk Bank came under international scrutiny over its accused laundering of terrorist 
funds for Iran, it centered upon key personalities of Turkish and Iranian governments.  
A number of countries around the world are considered problematic jurisdictions 
for money laundering and terrorist financing by major economic centers and the FATF.  
The FATF considers only two states, Iran and North Korea, as being wholly non-
compliant and extremely high-risk jurisdictions.53 Other jurisdictions are considered 
potential risks due to their conditions as war zones or other failed states.  FATF’s 
designation of high-risk jurisdictions relies upon a number of sources, ranging from 
countries listed under international sanctions from bodies such as the UN and the lack or 
level of involvement in AML/CTF institutions, to information provided by member 
states.   
Given Turkey’s neighboring Iran, and Turkey serving as the logical transit 
country between Iran and most of its potential export destinations, Turkey would 
naturally have a difficult time coming into full compliance with FATF’s threat finance 
mandates.  In terms of Halk Bank’s suspected laundering of terrorist funds for Iran 
throughout the 2000s, the ensuing banking scandal involved all three of Turkey’s 
compliance deficiencies: politically exposed persons, business involving high risk 
jurisdictions, and large suspicious sums.  Combined, these weak links in Ankara’s 
fortified finance regime would facilitate one of the largest money laundering operations 
in history.  Halk Bank’s unique institutional linkage with the state would also assist in 
helping the bank escape regulatory enforcement.  Not only was the state the majority 																																																								
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shareholder in the bank at the time of the accused laundering, but the Prime Minister also 
constituted a politically exposed person who assisted in overseeing the regulatory escape.  
V. Halk Bank, Iran, and Blocked Enforcement 
The end of the Cold War substantially expanded Turkey’s geopolitical influence.  
The expansion of the European Union and Eurozone brought with it the enticing prospect 
of Ankara’s ascension as a member state.  To its east and south, the Middle East and 
Central Asia offered new possibilities for Turkish interests.  Former Soviet republics in 
Central Asia offered Turkey to expand its influence to Turkic speakers across Eurasia.  
Economically, the collapse of the Soviet Union also afforded Ankara the possibility of 
accessing the region’s lucrative natural gas and oil deposits, and to leverage its own 
geographic location as a transit country between Central Asia’s energy production and 
European markets.  
 Domestically, Turkey has evolved into an increasingly authoritarian regime since 
the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) into power in 2002.  
Coincidentally over the same period, Halk Bank underwent partial privatization while 
Ankara progressively adopted increasing amounts of the international fortified finance 
regime.  In 2012, allegations emerged that Halk Bank assisted Iran in laundering $20 
billion of oil and natural gas for its equivalent amount in gold.54 Institutionally, the 
linkage of Halk Bank to the Turkish state and the position of Prime Minister created a 
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perfect storm in which the bank’s ownership and management by the state effectively 
insulated it from regulatory enforcement. 
 Turkey’s relationship with Iran must be understood in light of its centuries’ old 
legacy of competition, rather than amicability or outright animosity.  While the Middle 
East reeled with the implications and aftermath the Iranian revolution of 1979, Turkey 
avoided an outright alliance with Sunni states against Tehran.  Indeed, Turkey was one of 
the first states to recognize the post-revolution Iranian government.55 After the transition 
to civilian rule, the Turkish government under Turgut Özal opted for a stance of “positive 
neutrality” towards both Baghdad and Tehran during the Iran-Iraq war.56 Özal’s strategy 
was diplomatically successful, as evidenced by both Iran and Iraq utilizing Ankara as an 
intermediary.  Aside from direct security concerns, Özal leveraged Turkey’s position for 
purposes of economic statecraft.  
 Structurally, Özal consolidated foreign policymaking power through weakening 
the Foreign Ministry through tasking foreign trade relations away from the ministry and 
placing such functions directly under that of the Prime Minister.57 Özal sought to move 
beyond Turkey’s Kemalist legacy in foreign policy and rekindle relations with the Middle 
East.  Prior to his taking office, Özal stated that Turkey’s neighbors afforded potential 
“natural trading partners” and that Turkey should resume its “proper place” as the 
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historical link between the Middle East and Europe.58 Indeed, it was Turkey that brought 
Iran together with itself and Pakistan in the creation of the Economic Cooperation 
Organization in 1988.59 
 Özal pursued a path of liberalization and privatization throughout the 1980s in 
order to make Turkey more competitive.  However, Özal also followed an economic 
foreign policy of seeking to increase Iraqi and Iranian dependence on Turkey.60 Iran’s 
position being surrounded by mostly hostile Arab states placed Ankara in the 
advantageous position of offering Tehran an outlet to the wider economic world.  Turkey 
would emerge in the 1980s as a key market for Iranian exports.61 In the area of oil and 
gas, Turkey’s longtime skepticism of Russian encroachment in the Middle East makes 
Iran an attractive source of for Ankara’s energy imports.  Because of international 
sanctions against Iran, Turkey enjoys the position of serving as one of Tehran’s only 
outlets for exporting oil and gas.  Today, Turkey remains dependent on energy imports.62  
 Despite its proximity to the energy riches of the Middle East and Eurasia, Turkey 
is naturally impoverished in terms of its own energy sources.  Additionally, Turkey has 
little ability to store what natural gas it needs, thereby making it dependent upon a 
constant flow of imported energy63 Given that a Turkish reduction of Iranian energy 
imports would increase Ankara’s reliance upon Russian oil and gas, and such reliance 
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upon Russia would jeopardize Turkey’s position among Central Asian republics, a stable 
Iranian flow of energy is a paramount security and economic concern for the country.  
Indeed, over 90% of Iranian gas exports are destined for Turkey.64 Iran’s unique position 
with Turkey brought Tehran roughly $10.5 million per day from natural gas alone.65  
With Tehran under sanctions for issues pertaining to both terrorism and its nuclear 
program, much of Iran’s Turkey-borne energy revenue mandates some form of 
laundering.  
 With Turkey dependent upon Iranian energy, and Turkey offering Iran an 
economic export market, a symbiosis developed under Özal that would characterize 
foreign economic policy between the two states under future administrations. Turkey’s 
strategy of economically leveraging Iran would continue in the 1990s and mature in the 
2000s as increasing Islamism in Turkey’s political landscape warmed relations between 
the two countries in an otherwise turbulent region.  Halk Bank’s laundering of Iranian 
funds under thus follows a longstanding Turkish strategy of using economic statecraft on 
its Persian neighbor for purposes of resource acquisition and securing influence.  
Since the Iranian revolution in 1979, Tehran has pursued a path towards 
becoming a regional power.  Religiously Shi’a and ideologically revisionist in areas of 
the Middle East with significant Shi’a populations, post-revolution Iran holds 
longstanding animosity towards secular Arab regimes, Israel, and conservative Sunni 
monarchies in the Persian Gulf.  Iran’s pursuit of regional influence has long included 
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support of Shi’a militias and terrorist groups and rebel proxies in the both the Middle 
East and beyond.  Since taking power in 1979, Iran’s support of terrorism and in pursuing 
its nuclear program led to levying of multiple sanctions against Tehran.  It was precisely 
when such Iran was the most isolated due to mobilized threat finance regulations that 
Ankara laundered money for Tehran.  
Iranian financial support for terrorism in the Middle East and elsewhere 
comprises a longstanding facet of Tehran’s geopolitical strategy.  In 1982, during the 
height of both the Iran-Iraq War the Lebanese civil war, a contingent of 1,500 soldiers 
from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps set up training camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa 
Valley with the stated purpose of exporting the Iranian revolution across the Arab 
world.66 Three years later, Hezbollah stated its own ideological platform that effectively 
placed it directly under the guidance of the Iran and declared the Tehran government as 
“the vanguard and new nucleus of the leading Islamic State in the world”.67 Logistically, 
the Shi’a group required all Hezbollah members to go through Iran’s Bekaa Valley 
training camps and enjoys between $200-$350 million per year in Iranian largesse.68  Iran 
retains a permanent contingent of roughly 500 personnel in Lebanon for purposes of 
training Hezbollah, and provides funding for Hezbollah-affiliated social services.69 It is 
worth mentioning that no organizational separation exists between the group’s social 
services wing and Hezbollah’s terrorist activity. In 2000, Hezbollah’s deputy secretary 																																																								
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general, Maim Qassem noted that the group’s secretary general oversees both sides of the 
group’s operations.70  While Hezbollah’s self-funding activities have matured since the 
1980s, the group still receives Iranian support estimated around $100 million in value per 
year.71 
Iranian support of Hezbollah is not limited to the Middle East, nor do its attacks 
avoid civilian targets.  After its 1983 attacks on the US embassy and Marine Corps 
barracks in Beirut, Hezbollah expanded its reach and scope with the help of Iranian 
support.  In 1994, Hezbollah bombed the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association, a 
Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.  The attack left 85 dead and hundreds injured.  
The Iranian embassy in Argentina provided a base of support for the attack, and for a 
previous bombing at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992.72 In 2003 an Argentine 
judge issued arrest four warrants for four Iranian officials for assisting in carrying out the 
attack.  Prosecutors in the case recommended twelve warrants for prominent Iranian 
officials, including Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.73 Ali Fallahian, Iranian former minister of 
security and intelligence, was included in the arrest warrants.74  
Tehran’s support of terrorism includes reliance on Hezbollah for the assassination 
of Iranian dissidents abroad, the setting up of banking institutions abroad to support 
Islamist recruitment, and the establishment of money laundering fronts in form of local 
businesses in multiple countries.  Throughout the 1990s, Iran assisted proxies around the 																																																								
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world establish a presence for purposes of advancing Tehran’s interests.  In the 1997, Iran 
established bank branches in Albania as a means of promoting militant networks in 
Europe.75 In expanding its influence in Europe, Iranian Central Bank governor, Mohsen 
Nurbakan, oversaw investment operations in the region to promote Iranian-backed 
Islamist groups in the Balkans.76 In 2013, Bulgarian Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov 
attributed a bus bombing to Hezbollah that occurred in the coastal city of Burgas a year 
prior.  The attack killed 7 and wounded 32 people.77 
Iranian support for the group also extends to Africa, where Tehran actively 
supports Islamist militant activity on the continent.  In seeking to compete with more 
successful Saudi-backed Sunni networks, Iran established a number of mosques and 
schools in sub-Saharan Africa aimed at expanding the number of Shia adherents beyond 
Lebanese expatriate communities.78 Financed out of Iranian embassies in the region, Iran 
has established a number of cultural centers for the means of recruiting for Hezbollah-
affiliated activity related to intelligence gathering for potential attacks on Western 
targets.79 
At varying levels of intensity, tensions between Tehran and the West remain a 
constant factor of Middle East politics since 1979.  US-led international sanctions against 
Iran parallel Tehran’s support of terrorism and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.  While the 
US is the epicenter for the sanctions levied against the Iranian regime, these sanctions 																																																								
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became nearly all encompassing for the Iranian economy.  By the late 2000s, Iran’s 
economy was nearly strangled through a combined focus of sanctions on key members of 
the Iranian government, the country’s energy sector, and its currency.  While Tehran 
would suffer multiple sanctions from the UN, European Union, and would remain on the 
FATF blacklist, the multilateral economic efforts to curtail Iran’s terrorist activity and its 
nuclear program originated in the United States. 
In the mid-1980s, US-led sanctions on Iran focused on curtailing Tehran’s ability 
to access arms from abroad.  In 1984, Iran was designated a state sponsor of terrorism, 
which economically severed Iran from most of the American economy.  In 1987, the US 
outlawed the import of Iranian goods.  The Clinton administration expanded the sanctions 
regime by increasing its multilateral reach through using diplomatic and economic 
leverage against Iran through blocking bank loans and by penalizing companies doing 
business with the Iranian energy sector.80 The 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act not 
only limited potential investment in Iranian oil resources, and effectively placed 
companies from US allies on notice for potential sanction should they do business with 
Tehran.81  
 Even prior to the post-9/11 expansion of the international fortified finance regime, 
US pressure on Iran was successful in curtailing international lending to Tehran.  The US 
effectively thwarted loans to the Iranian government from both the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank over the course of the 1990s.82 In the 2000s, 
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American economic statecraft nearly crippled the Iranian economy through entirely 
financial means.  
 In the 2000s, while Turkey progressively and haphazardly adopted the fortified 
finance regime into its domestic political economy, Iran came under economic increasing 
pressure over its support for terrorism and its nuclear weapons program.  In 2005, the 
Bush administration cut Iran off from most of the world’s financial markets through 
banning Iranian banks from the American financial system.83 Through penalizing third 
parties doing business with Iran, most Iranian financial assets essentially froze.84 In 2010, 
the US Senate passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions and Divestment Act that 
mandated the sanctioning of any foreign bank that conducted transactions with Iran.85 In 
2012, the US pressured Iran through threatening to sever foreign banks from the ability to 
conduct dollar transactions if they also conducted business with the Central Bank of 
Iran.86   
 Shortly after 9/11, US Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill and General 
Counsel to the Treasury David Aufhauser traveled to Brussels to pressure the Belgian-
based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) for 
access to financial intelligence.87 SWIFT, overseen by the National Bank of Belgium and 
governed by the top executives of the world’s major banks, serves as the international 
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clearinghouse for all financial transactions of formal high finance.88  While the US-
SWIFT intelligence relationship remained uneasy after 9/11, it offered Washington an 
alternative mechanism to pressure Iran aside from pure intelligence collection.  In early 
2012, the US effectively pressured SWIFT into excluding Iran from conducting dollar 
transactions.  Furthermore, American pressure succeeded in dissuading SWIFT from 
conducting Iranian transactions related to its energy sector.89 
With the US dollar serving as the premier reserve currency around the world, the 
US threat to bar banks from conducting any business with Iranian currency decisively 
lowered its value.  As a result, bank runs ensued in Iran as the value of the Iranian rial fell 
by 40% and consumer prices nearly doubled.90 Without an ability to access hard 
currency, Iran had to discover a way to launder revenues from its oil and gas exports, and 
change hydrocarbons into cash.  Turkey’s Halk Bank assisted in providing this service.  
As mentioned in the introduction, money laundering at its core comprises the 
“transfer of value” from one asset to another.91 In order to obfuscate the laundered from 
its nefarious origins or destination, the transfer of value must occur in a way that evades 
detection from interested authorities.  Gold, due to its widely accepted value around the 
world, provides an optimal vehicle to transfer value.  Halk Bank and Iran would exploit 
this golden loophole to exchange gas for gold, so that Iran could then access hard 
currencies in exchange.  
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 In December 2013, Turkish police stormed apartments across Istanbul as part of a 
crackdown on suspected financial corruption.  Halk Bank’s General Manager, Suleyman 
Aslan, was arrested along with Reza Zarrab, a businessman and former associate of 
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Also arrested were the sons of Turkey’s 
economy, urban development and interior ministers along with an AKP affiliated 
mayor.92  Aslan began his financial career at Ziraat Bank, Turkey’s oldest state-owned 
bank in the early 1990s, and became General Manager of Halk Bank in 2011.93 As the 
scandal unfolded, Halk Bank emerged as the centerpiece to a massive money-laundering 
scheme between Iran and Turkey. 
 As early as 2008, concerns emerged over Halk Bank’s role in Iranian business 
dealings.  On January 28 of that year, US Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey met with 
the Turkish Foreign Ministry in concert with the Turkish Ministry of Finance, Treasury 
and officials from Halk Bank to address international concerns over the bank’s dealings 
with Iran.94 Halk Bank General Manager at the time, Halil Celik, along with the bank’s 
chief compliance officer declared that their institution closely followed the best practices 
of the fortified finance regime, such as monitoring transactions and keeping close 
familiarity with the nature of their clients.95 In terms of its Iranian clients, Halk Bank 
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officials noted that their institution held “long-dormant correspondent accounts” acquired 
via Halk Bank’s acquisition of Pamukbank in 2004.96  
Duran Uğur, Halk Bank’s designated compliance officer issued an official 
statement regarding the bank’s commitment to implementing fortified finance practices 
within the bank.  Halk Bank declared that its internal policies reflected not only Turkish 
counter-terrorism laws, but also FATF recommendations through its cooperation with 
MASAK and Turkey’s Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA).97  Notably, 
the bank stipulated that it mandated anti-money laundering, terrorist financing and know-
your-customer training to all of its employees in order to comply with best practices from 
the FATF and to comply with US-led sanctions.98 As mentioned in the previous section, 
Turkey became a FATF member in 1991.   
According to Wikileaks, in 2009 US Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist 
Financing and Financial Crimes David Cohen, met with both Halk Bank and Turkey’s 
BRSA. In the meeting, the BRSA assured Cohen that the agency collected all relevant 
financial intelligence from Turkey’s banks. Halk Bank declared that “no deals are 
financed on a cash-for-goods basis” in the bank’s dealings with Iran.99  Despite this 
assertion, this is precisely the business that Halk Bank conducted. 
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 At the arrest of Halk Bank’s CEO and other suspects, police discovered caches of 
cash valued in the millions stashed at their various Istanbul apartments.  The cash 
functioned as part of laundering plan developed by Reza Zarrab in which Turkish lira 
would be converted to gold, shipped to Dubai, and then sent to Iran as payment for 
Turkey’s importation of Iranian oil and gas. The laundering was massive, and amounted 
to 36 metric tons of gold shipped from Turkey to Iran in August 2012 alone.100 Zarrab, 
the Iranian middleman allegedly paid millions of dollars to Halk Bank’s CEO along with 
payments to Turkey’s economic minister.101 From 2012-2013, as Iran struggled to obtain 
hard currencies due to sanctions, Turkey sent roughly $13 billion in gold to Tehran; this 
gold exportation dropped to nothing by January 2014 following the arrest of Halk Bank’s 
CEO.102 
 State ownership of Halk Bank, along with the AKP affiliation of the Istanbul 
mayor and the ministers whose sons were arrested in the raid, brought political as well as 
economic scandal to Ankara.  Shortly after the arrests, as Halk Bank’s stock prices fell 
under the shadow of the Iranian gold dealings, Prime Minister Erdoğan and the Turkish 
government quickly enacted countermeasures to protect the bank.  Using a combination 
of diplomatic pressure, domestic political intimidation, and bureaucratic reshuffling, the 
government succeeded in protecting the bank from penalty. 
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 Within days of the raid in Istanbul, police officers connected to the laundering 
investigation were either dismissed or fired from the force. Huseyin Capkin, the head of 
Istanbul’s police, resigned on Dec. 19, only two days after the raid on Halk Bank’s 
CEO.103 Amid the purging of over 30 senior police officials in Istanbul’s police force was 
the firing and reassigning of 350 police officers in Ankara the following month, over 
what Prime Minister Erdoğan claimed was a “dirty plot” on the part of Turkey’s judiciary 
in consort with the police.104 As the purges took place, Erdoğan declared in a speech that 
the police force itself was “tainted” while simultaneously assuring a zero tolerance 
approach to corruption.105 As for Halk Bank, Erdoğan decried the scandal as part and 
parcel of a “plot by Turkey’s enemies”, such as his political archrival Fethullah Gulen.106 
  In early 2014, the AKP-controlled government implemented a law aimed at 
curtailing the powers of Turkey’s judiciary.  During open debate prior to the law’s 
implementation, physical fighting erupted in parliament. The new law mandated that the 
Ministry of Justice would dictate judicial appointments, as opposed to the separate and 
independent High Council of Judges and Prosecutors.107 Judicial officials involved with 
the Halk Bank case were summarily dismissed or reassigned as part of a massive shuffle 
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of nearly 120 judges and prosecutors.108 Since the outbreak of the scandal with the arrests 
a month prior, thousands of police had also been reassigned or dismissed.109 Murat 
Arlsan, head of Turkey’s YARSAV association of prosecutors and judges declared the 
entirety of the bureaucratic shuffle to be politically motivated, stating that Erdoğan’s 
desire was to insulate himself and those affiliated with the AKP.110  As for Turkey’s 
banking authority, the BRSA, Erdoğan declared in an interview with Al Jazeera that the 
regulatory body conducted a full audit of Halk Bank and its CEO’s affairs.  According to 
the Prime Minister and the banking authority, there was “no trouble” to be found.111 
 Reza Zarrab, the Iranian at the center of the laundering scandal, enjoyed special 
protections provided by Erdoğan.  Erdoğan advocated for Zarrab’s integrity and 
described him as a charitable figure.112 Zarrab’s charitable activity included multiple 
donations to the Social Development Center for Education and Social Solidarity, a 
charity founded by Ermine Erdoğan, the Prime Minister’s wife.113 Zarrab also provided 
gifts to Halk Bank CEO Suleyman Aslan, including a $37,000 piano, a luxury watch 
valued at $350,000, and millions of dollars in currency.114 
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 The AKP’s countermeasures effectively insulated the bank and its General 
Manager along with others suspected of laundering money for Iran. In October 2014, 
prosecutors in Istanbul opted to drop all charges.  Ekrem Aydıner, the only Istanbul 
prosecutor for anti-terrorism and organized crime remaining with the case, announced 
that the case could not advance due to a combine lack of grounds and deficient evidence 
regarding any conspiracy.115 On October 17, the primary investigation against Suleyman 
Aslan was dropped.116 
 The Turkish state effectively deflected any threat finance enforcement on the 
domestic level.  If anything, Ankara’s domestic blockage of enforcement deepened the 
ruling AKP’s political grip on power and increased authoritarianism in the country.  
Internationally, the case would revive in the United States with the arrest of Halk Bank 
Deputy General Manager Hakan Atilla.  Reza Zarrab, the Iranian financier behind much 
of the laundering scheme would later resurface in the United States where the Turkish 
government would once again seek to protect its bank.  One police official involved in 
the investigation who purged in the wake of Ankara’s bureaucratic reshuffle fled Turkey 
to the United States, whereupon he handed it to American authorities.117 
 Halk Bank’s Iranian middleman, Reza Zarrab, was arrested in Miami on March 
19, 2016 while attempting a vacation trip.118  Halk Bank official Hakan Atilla was 
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arrested on charges of sanctions evasion while traveling to New York on business.119 The 
US indictment against Zarrab and Atilla included charges of fraud, money laundering, 
and conspiracy.  While the charges largely focused on sanctions evasion pertaining to 
Iranian state entities assisted by Halk Bank, it also included allegations that the Turkish 
bank facilitated transactions for a company called Mahan Air.120 As a commercial airline, 
the US Office of Foreign Asset Control blacklisted Mahan Air in October 2011 for 
supporting the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).121 The 
IRGC-QF is the arm of the Iranian military that helped form and continues to provide 
support for Hezbollah.122 Mahan Air supported the IRGC-QF through offering “covert 
travel” for personnel, weapons, and cash.123 Shortly after Mahan Air was designated as an 
entity supporting terrorism, Reza Zarrab wrote to Iran’s Central Bank governor offering 
his services for “economic jihad”.124 
 At the height of the arrests, Halk Bank issued a statement in 2016 that highlighted 
its purported compliance with the international fortified finance regime. It stated that the 
bank not only followed all AML/CTF regulations through its cooperation with Turkey’s 
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regulatory body, but also in “jurisdictions where the foreign branch is located”.125 
Moreover, it specifically claims that it complied with all sanctions, including those stated 
by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control.126 
 Notably, Zarrab became the primary witness against Atilla after striking a deal 
with prosecutors and agreeing to testify in how the bank was involved in laundering. 
After testifying that then-Prime Minister Erdoğan oversaw the use of Halk Bank to 
channel funds to Iran, Turkey seized assets of Zarrab and his family in the country.127 
Despite Zarrab’s testimony, Atilla was acquitted of money laundering while being 
convicted of conspiracy and fraud.128  
 Shortly after Atilla’s conviction, the Turkish state indicated its willingness to 
defend its bank should the US seek to penalize the institution. Turkey’s Deputy Prime 
Minister, Mehmet Simsek declared that Ankara would do “whatever is necessary” to 
assist banks threatened as a result of Atilla’s trial.129 Simsek’s verbal rebuttal to the New 
York trial also contained the telling contradiction when he stated that Halk Bank itself, 
rather than the Turkish government would pay any levied fines.130 Halk Bank serving as a 
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state-owned bank warrants the government’s negation of any fine through bailouts or 
subsidy.  The Turkish foreign ministry similarly stood firm in dismissing the US 
conviction of “any legal value”.131 After American prosecutors requested a sentence of 
prison time for Atilla, Halk Bank’s shares paradoxically rose, rather than fell.132 As for 
whether Halk Bank directly faces any financial punishment from the US, either in the 
form of fines or being blacklisting and severed from dollar transactions, the bank has yet 
to face financial penalties for its activities.  
VI. Analysis 
 The Halk Bank case clearly illustrates a financial firm with deep institutional 
linkage to its state escaping enforcement for laundering money for terrorism.  This 
Turkish case is unique in that it involves a state-sponsor of terrorism as opposed to 
simply a terrorist group using the financial system of another country.  Furthermore, this 
case is one involving overlapping sanctions against the state sponsor of terrorism for 
other issues than terrorism alone.  In their various manifestations, sanctions against Iran 
cover concerns over Tehran’s nuclear program and engagement in interstate war along 
with its support for groups such as Hezbollah.  Regarding the fortified finance regime, 
what is less explicable is how Ankara’s state-owned bank knowingly assisted Tehran in 
circumventing these sanctions while Turkey simultaneously deepened its adoption of 
AML/CTF regulations.  The only feasible explanation is that states defend banks that are 
extensions of the state themselves.   																																																								
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 Halk Bank fits the dependent variable of holding institutional linkage to its home 
state.  Aside from lasting state-majority ownership and failed privatization, the bank’s 
governance remains linked to the Turkish executive through its managerial structure.  
Furthermore, the bank’s primary client base places the bank in a unique position as a 
coalition binder for the political party in power. Indeed, Halk Bank’s main client base 
coincides with primary voting demographic for Turkey’s Islamists under the AKP.  
 Critics of the Turkish case may point out that significant international 
disagreement over Iranian sanctions make the case excessively American, and that rather 
than breach the international fortified finance regime, Ankara simply disregarded US 
interests.  However, Ankara opted into the fortified finance regime through its entry into 
the FATF in 1991, long prior to the depth that Iranian sanctions took on as a result of its 
nuclear ambitions.  Similarly, while the FATF had concerns over Turkey’s 
implementation of AML/CTF regulations, Ankara progressively adopted more 
international standards throughout the 2000s.  Turkey adopted financial regulations and 
the capacity to follow them through implementing know-your-customer rules and the 
monitoring of suspicious activity.  Indeed, the rules were effective, as evidenced by the 
government’s attempted crackdown in December 2013 when multiple arrests took place 
in Istanbul.  If the financial regulations were not present, no such enforcement attempt 
should have occurred.  Turkey’s judicial and law enforcement bureaucracy did not fail to 
act so much as be thwarted by the state itself through bureaucratic reshuffling and 
political intimidation.   
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As for the regulatory adoptions and legal changes that Turkey underwent to come 
under de jure compliance, none of these changes displaced Turkey’s statist legacy or its 
structural relationship with its bank.  Preexisting institutional arrangements between the 
Turkish state and Halk Bank remained intact despite deepening involvement with the 
fortified finance regime.  Furthermore, Turkey’s fortified finance regime did not disrupt 
Turkey’s economic reliance upon Iranian energy imports.  
 Halk Bank has thus far escaped any regulatory enforcement.  Domestically, the 
AKP under Erdoğan restructured Turkey’s judicial and law enforcement apparatus 
through bureaucratic reshuffling in combination with political intimidation.  The layoffs 
and reassignment of hundreds of judges, police, and prosecutors effectively thwarted any 
domestic charges against Halk Bank officials and others affiliated with the laundering.  
Internationally, the conviction of Hakan Atilla comprises the single punishment faced by 
Halk Bank or any of its personnel.  US prosecutors tried other individuals in absentia; 
however, only Atilla was arrested and convicted.   
Institutionally, Halk Bank remains free of any penalty.  Should the US advance 
any fines against the bank, similar to what occurred against European banks engaged in 
similar activity, Ankara’s statements indicate the state will negate any levied penalty.  A 
massive American fine against Halk Bank, severing it from dollar transactions, or SWIFT 
access would deliver a massive blow to Turkey’s economy while straining Ankara’s 
position in NATO and its involvement in Syria.  If any fine is levied, Halk Bank’s 
position as a state-owned bank places Ankara’s government as well as its financial sector 
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in the crosshairs of American economic statecraft.  Out of pure necessity, the Turkish 
government would be forced to thwart any further enforcement against its bank.  
 Halk Bank’s figure at the center of the case, Hakan Atilla, received a sentence of 
32 months in prison as opposed to the 20-year sentence sought by prosecutors.133 
Presiding judge Richard M. Berman declared that Atilla served as the “cog in the wheel” 
rather than the “mastermind” at the center of the operation.134 Indeed, judge Berman 
stated that Atilla was only “following orders” from Halk Bank’s CEO, Suleyman 
Aslan.135  Institutionally, the Turkish state has moved to protect its bank through high-
level diplomacy and economic statecraft.  Both Halk Bank and Turkey’s economy and 
foreign ministers took part in defending the bank.  Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoğlu 
declared in a statement to the Financial Times, that the state was working with the US to 
resolve the issue.  Furthermore, the Turkish state indicated it would step in if necessary 
financially negate any fallout from US regulatory fines.136 
 In the realm of economic statecraft, Ankara moved to defend its bank and the 
Turkish lira from American action a month prior to the Atilla conviction.  In April 2018, 
Ankara withdrew 28.6 tons of Turkish gold being held at the Federal Reserve and re-
deposited the holdings at the Bank of England the Bank of International Settlements.137 
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Domestically, Turkish banks also changed the makeup of their reserves with Turkey’s 
central bank, replacing foreign currency holdings with gold.138 Turkey also drew down its 
holdings of US bonds beginning in November 2017.139  
 Given the US and Turkey form part of an international conflagration of powers 
militarily involved in Syria, any American economic action against Halk Bank could 
have kinetic consequences for the Syrian civil war and the Middle East as a whole.  The 
Turkish state indicated it would defend its bank against regulatory attack, thereby 
negating any damage to the institution or even the linkage between the government and 
the bank. Turkey’s withdrawal from US assets and from exposure to unilateral American 
seizure of Turkish gold offers little indication of Ankara’s willingness to surrender on 
behalf of its bank.  
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Chapter 5: Institutional Independence and Regulatory Enforcement 
 
I. Introduction 
 The positive cases of blocked enforcement all occurred where institutional 
connections with their home states placed them in positions of critical importance to the 
security and stability of the state in which they are embedded.  In these instances, the 
home state came to the defense of banks in order to deflect or defuse the attempt in order 
to protect the integrity of the bank being targeted.  However, some banks do indeed 
succumb to enforcement measures without any meaningful protections from their home 
states.  This chapter explores why and how enforcement succeeds in the absence of such 
bank-state linkages, and to address potential rival explanations for enforcement outcomes 
such as regulatory presence, rule of law, and authoritarianism.  To account for these rival 
explanations, and to examine why fortified financial regulations are weak in enforcement, 
I explore the cases of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), and 
Jordan’s Arab Bank.  
The cases of both BCCI and Arab Bank display institutional independence from 
their home state regimes.  The case of BCCI operated out of the offshore tax havens of 
Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands.  Contrary to popular conceptions of offshore tax 
havens as being rogue financial jurisdictions that actively promote and attract illicit funds 
and protect them in the face of international pressure, both offshore tax havens took 
active roles in closing BCCI’s operations once it came under regulatory scrutiny for 
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financing terrorism and conducting other nefarious business activities.  In the early 
1990s, BCCI was forcibly closed by multilateral law enforcement and regulatory action.   
Arab Bank, which came under regulatory penalty through the form of 
administrative fines and civil suits based in the United States, paid fines without any 
blockage from the Jordanian government.  Arab Bank, a financial institution laudable for 
its ability to survive multiple wars, decolonization and population shifts in the Middle 
East, followed an American model of business drawing upon financial structural model 
from the United States. When both banks came under regulatory scrutiny for financing 
terrorism, this lack of institutional linkage left them exposed to regulatory crackdown 
 
II. Enforcement Against the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI) 
 
The history of the fortified finance regime is marked by a number of spectacular 
cases involving high-profile arrests, asset seizures, and publicized lawsuits.  BCCI met a 
rapid regulatory demise in the early 1990s following multilateral investigations into the 
bank’s laundering proceeds from numerous crimes and for financing terrorism.  While 
BCCI held a notable presence around the world, it was based in the tax havens of 
Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands.  Paradoxically, its legal grounding in offshore 
political economies did little to protect it from regulatory enforcement.  
BCCI was founded in the backdrop of bank nationalization in Pakistan, and its 
founder’s desire to avoid state interference in financial affairs.  Founded in 1972, BCCI 
was deliberately established as a legal presence in Luxembourg in order to avoid 
significant financial regulation and to become the root of a multinational bank devoted to 
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the developing world.1 BCCI’s founder, Agha Hasan Abedi, described the envisioned 
bank as a “world bank, a global bank for the third World”.2  
In seeking to avoid regulatory scrutiny, BCCI developed a two-pronged strategy 
of basing a legal presence in two offshore tax havens while basing its operational 
headquarters in London.  Its first legal founding in Luxembourg in 1972 was replicated 
by reflecting its legal registration in the Cayman Islands in 1975.  Additionally, its 
Cayman Islands office was registered as an offshore subsidiary of its Luxembourg entity, 
BCCI Holdings SA.3 BCCI’s founding structure was designed to preclude any state 
meddling through aggressive regulation or bank nationalization.  Abedi, sensing 
Islamabad’s coming nationalization of Pakistan’s banking industry in 1974, organized the 
new bank specifically to inhibit regulatory oversight and state linkage. 
Prior to BCCI, Abedi founded a Pakistani bank named United Bank Ltd in 1959. 
However, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s suspicion of United Bank’s association 
with Pakistani military led the Bhutto regime to place Abedi under house arrest prior to 
Islamabad’s 1974 nationalization of the country’s banking industry.4  While United Bank 
would eventually reprivatize in 2002, Abedi drew his past experience to design BCCI’s 
structure as a private bank beyond the reach of state authorities.  Notably, cultural 
connection between BCCI and Pakistan would remain close.  The Islamabad government 
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under Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq would provide political support for BCCI’s political 
activities despite the private bank’s registration in offshore tax havens.  
 BCCI’s legal homes in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands provided a 
jurisdictional grounding to help prevent any home state interference.  This institutional 
separation between bank and state not only assisted the bank in facilitating a number of 
money laundering crimes and financing terrorism, but also paradoxically enfeebled the 
bank’s position within the political economies it was embedded.  While tax havens 
provide an illusion of corporate freedom from the reach of regular states, tax havens also 
serve to lose little should a bank or other company face closure.  Not only did the 
Cayman Islands and Luxembourg both eventually assist American and European 
authorities in shutting down BCCI, they were also both early entrants into the emerging 
fortified finance regime.  Additionally, the closure of BCCI coincided with the founding 
of the Financial Action Task Force.  
 Popular depictions of tax havens conjure images of shadowy business people 
affiliated with the world’s wealthy engaged in tax evasion, drug dealing, and other 
activities. Such activity exists; however, tax havens are not entirely independent from the 
sway of powerful states seeking access to their financial systems.  Many tax havens hold 
affiliations with old established states through colonial legacies.  Similarly, despite the 
BCCI founder’s planned structure of the bank, the “global” corporate entity does not 
exist.  Every bank and corporation must be institutionally based in some legal framework 
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somewhere in order to effectively operate.5 In seeking insulation from state linkages, 
BCCI paradoxically left itself vulnerable to regulatory attack after it came under scrutiny.   
 Through its main London office and its Cayman Islands base, BCCI’s operations 
and the bulk of is legal presence rested within Britain’s financial arena.  While the UK 
was one of the early promoters of counter-terrorist financing regulations, the City of 
London paradoxically lay at the center of its own offshore financial network that included 
the Caymans and other pseudo-colonial holdings in its domain.  BCCI’s “global” 
structure was a façade that otherwise rested on Britain’s strategic legacy of competing 
with the United States as a financial center.  The idea behind offshore havens such as the 
Caymans, and indeed the City of London, was to offer a veneer of light and laissez-faire 
regulation.   
 BCCI’s first legal residency of Luxembourg emerged as a proto-tax haven as 
early as 1929, through the introduction of holding company laws that allowed 
nonresidents to enjoy a special status of tax exemption.6  In the 1970s, the city-state 
sprung forth as a major tax haven in parallel to the reorientation of the international 
financial system to monetarism.  In 1981, through its competition with Switzerland, it 
augmented its laws to increase bank secrecy.7 Not coincidentally, BCCI’s growth 
coincided with Luxembourg’s legal changes. 
 The Cayman Islands’ function as a tax haven derives from the island’s legacy as 
an otherwise innocuous holding of the British Empire.  Nicholas Shaxson notes that the 																																																								
5 See Paul N. Doremus, William W. Keller, Louis W. Pauly, and Simon Reich,The Myth of the Global 
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City of London rests at the center of a financial empire that encompasses otherwise 
unimportant island jurisdictions around the world.  Britain’s island pseudo colonies 
include several “Crown Dependencies” around the UK itself, and 14 other jurisdictions 
that only boast a combined population of 250,000 people while offering a home to much 
of the world’s hidden financial wealth.8  Contrary to BCCI’s calculations, these tax 
havens only comprise an appearance of statelessness.  In reality, the UK cultivated the 
City of London, the Caymans, and other offshores as lightly regulated arena where 
financial sector could operate with the state looming in the background.  
 BCCI’s founding in the 1970s coincided both with the international monetary 
system’s shift towards monetarism and with the emergence of offshore finance havens. In 
1962 the Bank of England began allowing the issuance of securities denominated in 
foreign currencies, thus augmenting the embryonic Eurodollar market in an effort to 
regain the City’s position as a major financial center.9 As noted by Eric Helleiner, the 
Euromarket effectively created an arena that was “offshore” and ostensibly “separate” 
from the rest of the British financial sector.10 As the then chief British regulatory body, 
the Bank of England actively promoted this arena of light regulation.11  As noted by Gary 
Burn, the City’s Euromarket “punctured a hole” in the regulatory system of the banking 
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industry.12 This British regulatory reorganization also coincided with an approach to 
decolonization through the means of financial statecraft. The City’s creating itself as an 
epicenter of offshore finance extended to the UK’s dependencies and pseudo-colonies.  
 The 1960s witnessed a surge in independence movements that virtually eliminated 
what remained of European colonialism.  However, not all colonies proved determined or 
able to free themselves from colonial rule.  In the Caribbean, the Bahamas under British 
rule attracted the financial activities the American mafia.  In 1961, the mafia’s financial 
networks under Meyer Lansky began serious operations in the islands, having bribed the 
British Bahamas’ finance minister.13 The Bahamas’ burgeoning illicit finance contributed 
to the election of independence-minded populists in 1967, and eventual independence in 
1973.  As a result, the Bahamas’ offshore finance moved to the Caymans.14 
 The Caymans’ forgoing independence while implementing the colony as an 
offshore tax haven was the product of commercial aristocracy in the islands seeking to 
retain the territory’s dependency on the one hand, and London’s state bureaucracies 
battling over how closely to regulate and revamp the island.  When Jamaica achieved 
independence in 1962, the Caymans opted for continued association with the UK as a 
colonial holding.  The UK remains responsible for its Caymanian holding’s executive 
functions. 
As offshore funds already stashed in the Caribbean flowed to the Caymans, 
London’s bureaucracies stood divided over the emerging tax haven.  From 1966-1979, 																																																								
12 Gary Burn, “The state, the City, and the Euromarkets”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 
6, No. 2, (1999), pp. 225-261, 226.	
13 Shaxson, 89.  
14 Ibid, 90.  
		 185 
the Caymans established a number of legal changes to attract unregulated finance.  
Notably, these laws coincided with the introduction of what would evolve into the 
AML/CTF regime, with the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act in the United States in 
1970.  These legal changes served to flush greater capital to the emerging Caymanian 
offshore from the United States.  In 1976, the Caymans implemented legal privacy 
coverage for the offshore corporations and funds placed on its shores via the Confidential 
Relationships Law.15 The Caymans’ enforcement of the Confidential Relationships Law 
is overseen by the Caymans Protection Board that not only oversees enforcing privacy, 
but also controls Caymanian citizenship and visa processes.16 
British bureaucracies clashed over the Caymans’ emergence as a tax haven, with 
the Bank of England and the British Overseas Development Ministry supporting its 
development, and the British Treasury and the British Foreign Office opposing it.17 
Tellingly, the Bank of England expressed little concern over the influx of illicit funds, but 
expressed greater concerns over maintaining the Sterling Area.  Palan notes that in a 1969 
letter, the Bank of England declared “no objection to providing bolt holes for 
nonresidents”, but did express concern over the Cayman’s possibility of becoming a 
haven for sterling.18 In 1972 London restricted the Sterling Area to the British Isles, while 
the Caymans adopted their own currency pegged to the dollar to increase the attraction of 
illicit financial holdings from the US and Latin America.19  																																																								
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Despite ongoing protests from other organs of the British state, the Bank of 
England’s fostering of the Caymans into a Caribbean tax haven continued.20 Tellingly, 
the Bank of England’s regulatory authority over illicit finance regulation was effectively 
replaced with the Financial Services Authority in 2000.21  The primary British 
bureaucracy responsible for overseeing the fortified finance regime that would later 
emerge in this era was the same British Treasury that opposed the Bank of England’s 
attempts to develop the Caymans as an offshore tax haven.22 Far from being 
unsupervised, the main stage of BCCI’s activities were deliberately created arena’s where 
the state was not so much absent as willfully aloof in a regulatory capacity.  As will be 
shown later, not only was the Bank of England knowledgeable of BCCI’s activities, it 
assisted in their obfuscation.  
The Caymans proved central to BCCI’s activities, and housed a virtual “bank 
within a bank” that cleared nefarious transactions and housed dubious accounts.23  The 
Caymans’ Confidential Relationship Law of 1976 afforded BCCI the ability to establish a 
subsidiary that kept much of its activities ostensibly secret.  BCCI established its 
subsidiary, ICIC Overseas in 1976 in the Caymans.  In an incestuous shareholding 
scheme, ICIC owned 41% of BCCI’s own official legal home entity in Luxembourg.24  
BCCI’s Caymanian presence allowed it to book transactions in the tax haven, even if 
funds were not housed in the jurisdiction.  Furthermore, BCCI’s reluctance to 																																																								
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computerize its operations and stubborn insistence upon maintaining handwritten ledgers 
and memos in Urdu effectively placed much of the bank’s $20 billion in assets within a 
black box.25 As early as 1978 alarm bells began to sound among banking circles over 
BCCI’s activities. 
The bank’s original backing came from newly oil-rich monarchies in the Persian 
Gulf. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahayan of Abu Dhabi proved a perennial political and 
financial backer for BCCI, despite the bank’s locating offshore and basing its primary 
headquarters in London.  Notably, Al-Nahayan came to power via a coup backed by 
British intelligence services.26 It was also Al-Nahayan to whom the Bank of England 
turned in an effort to forestall BCCI’s collapse.  Despite its support from the Gulf, BCCI 
secured support from Bank of America to increase the bank’s profile and legitimacy. 
Bank of America even became a significant shareholder.  While Bank of America’s 
support was initially significant, it was also the first to cast doubt upon BCCI’s legality 
and long-term health.  Bank of America jointly founded and invested in National Bank of 
Oman with BCCI in order increase its access to the Gulf.27 
As early as 1977, concerns arose at Bank of America about BCCI’s viability due 
to the offshore bank’s lending practices.  BCCI’s lending included the issuing of 
unsecured loans, lending to major shareholders, and lending over 10% of its capital to a 
single borrower.28 Indeed, Bank of America’s own documents outlining its concern about 
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BCCI revolved around the offshore bank’s lending to “insiders”.29 A number of high-end 
loans on BCCI’s balance sheet were for real estate in the Persian Gulf, often to political 
figures who offered no security and went mostly unpaid.  Such borrowers included Saudi 
Arabia’s intelligence chief at the time, Kamal Adham.  Adham not only took out real 
estate loans for unvalued property, he also borrowed from BCCI in order to reinvest the 
loan in the bank itself.30 By 1978, Bank of America issued a press release announcing its 
planned selloff of all of its BCCI shares by 1980.31 
Across the Atlantic, the Bank of England took measures to curtail the bank’s rapid 
growth in the UK, but did nothing to regulate its activities.  In 1978 the Bank of England 
froze the number of BCCI’s allowed branches in the country at 45, and a year later 
refused to issue the bank a license as a “recognized bank”.32 The UK’s 1979 Banking Act 
formulated two allowable forms of British financial institutions, and stipulated that a 
bank must either function as a “recognized bank” or a “licensed deposit taker” with the 
latter enjoying less status than the former.  The Bank of England relegated BCCI to the 
status of the latter.33 Despite concerns and knowledge of BCCI’s lending activities and its 
involvement in terrorism and money laundering, the Bank of England did nothing to 
reign in the institution until 1991. 
While BCCI lacked any institutional linkage with what could be considered a 
home state in the Caymans or Luxembourg, it did everything it could to immerse itself in 
political affairs and foster relationships with political figures.  Ranging from arms 																																																								
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financing to laundering drug money and financing terrorism, BCCI’s list of high profile 
political allies and acquaintances offers an idea of how it managed to operate for over a 
decade after concerns over its practices emerged.  BCCI’s catalogue of political friends 
and relations consists of little less than the geography of a shadow world filled with the 
darker aspects of international crime and statecraft. 
Meeting immediately after Jimmy Carter left office, BCCI’s founder, Agha Hasan 
Abedi met the former president and cultivated a relationship based upon the bank’s 
support for Carter’s presidential library and humanitarian work.34 One of BCCI’s major 
account holders, a Saudi arms dealer named Adnan Khashoggi, helped fundraise for the 
library.35 Through the bank’s relationship with Carter, BCCI made political relationships 
in the West that included former British Prime Ministers James Callaghan and Margaret 
Thatcher.36 Along with its Gulf connections, BCCI had a number of high profile political 
figures as either allies or clients.  BCCI provided financial assistance to Manuel 
Noriega’s regime in Panama, financed both sides of Nicaragua’s civil war, laundering 
Columbian drug proceeds, and providing banking services to a number of different 
intelligence agencies.37 In Zimbabwe, BCCI was initially the only bank allowed into the 
country in 1980, due to the bank’s longtime support for Robert Mugabe.38 In Pakistan in 
the late 1980s, BCCI’s charitable activities included funneling money through its BCC 
Foundation to the Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Engineering Sciences and Technology.  
The institute’s director at the time, Abdul Qadeer Khan, was the mastermind behind 																																																								
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Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.39  In the Middle East and Afghanistan, BCCI’s 
activities would include the financing of terrorism and would even provide the initial 
financial rubric for Al Qaeda. 
In the mid-1980s BCCI’s primary Gulf backer, Sheikh Zayed, began financing the 
Palestinian Abu Nidal terrorist organization as part a means of placating the group and 
preventing it from attacking Gulf interests.40 Following the bank’s closure, regulators 
discovered that BCCI’s London headquarters served as an intermittent office for Abu 
Nidal, where the terrorist organization also held an account.41 In return for BCCI’s 
services, Abu Nidal occasionally assisted in coercing specific clients on behalf of the 
bank.42  The attacks carried out by Abu Nidal’s organization include bombings, 
assassinations, and kidnappings of citizens and officials from multiple countries.  
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), one terrorist group demonstrating 
astute long-term financial planning, used BCCI extensively to finance its investments.  In 
1981, the PLO lent the Nicaraguan government $12 million via BCCI, and used funds in 
BCCI accounts to purchase holdings in airline companies and access to duty free airport 
space across the developing world.43 Iran-backed Hezbollah oversaw the activities of its 
Europe-based fighters through BCCI’s London infrastructure.44 Other terrorist groups 
who used BCCI’s services included Peru’s Shining Path, which used the bank to 
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institutionalize routine payment mechanisms for cartels seeking access to drug 
shipments.45 
The CIA, which itself used BCCI’s services to channel funds to anti-Soviet 
fighters in Afghanistan, claimed to begin looking into the bank’s financing of terrorism as 
early as 1983 and that it was informing other intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
about the bank’s activities; however, other organs of the US intelligence community 
denied ever receiving the information.46 In the regulatory aftermath of BCCI’s closure, it 
was found that Ghassan Qassem, the bank’s primary London manager, worked as a paid 
informant for American and British intelligence services in order to provide information 
related to some of the bank’s dealings with terrorism.47 
The 1980s witnessed a multinational increase in outside support for Afghan 
fighters against the Soviet Union.  The US and Saudi Arabia worked with Pakistan under 
Zia ul-Haq to provide the Afghan mujahedeen with needed materiel, financing, and 
training.  BCCI’s longstanding relationship Sunni Gulf monarchies and the Islamabad 
government placed it in a unique relational position to assist, while its hyper-cloaked 
regulatory homes offered an easy means by which intelligence services could channel 
money to the war effort.  Al Qaeda, one of the terrorist groups to emerge out of the 
Soviet-Afghan war, utilized BCCI as both a model for money laundering and secrecy and 
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likely relied upon the bank’s former employees to establish its financial networks in the 
1990s.48 
After BCCI’s closure, one area the bank’s operations that proved difficult for the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to decipher was the bank’s relationship with the 
CIA.  Bureaucratically, an image emerged that pitted the Federal Reserve against the 
intelligence community over the central bank’s attempts to discover the CIA’s 
relationship with the bank.  The Fed, which worked in close consort with the Manhattan 
District Attorney to crack down on the bank, received not only pushback from Langley, 
but also from the Bank of England.  In both cases, both the UK and the US had ample 
awareness of the bank’s activities and tried to obfuscate relevant investigations prior to 
its collapse.   
New York congressman Charles Schumer noted that as early 1983, the Federal 
government had extensive awareness of BCCI’s activities.49 In 1984, Senator Paula 
Hawkins met with Zia ul-Haq as part of a congressional delegation in which she queried 
him over a “Pakistani bank’s” involvement in money laundering through the Cayman 
Islands.50 Indeed, former CIA deputy director Richard Kerr claimed that the CIA claimed 
that agency began reporting on BCCI’s activities that same year.51 However, the agency 
had in fact begun reporting to the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the FBI and other 
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intelligence agencies about the bank’s money laundering activities beginning in 1983.52 
Despite such reporting, the CIA pled ignorance over much of BCCI’s activities related to 
intelligence operations financed by the bank and activities of many of the bank’s 
shareholders.  The CIA feigned ignorance over the bank’s secret control of First 
American Bank, and the bank’s activities pertaining to the Iran-Contra affair and its use 
by other intelligence services.53  The bank would only suffer a regulatory coup de grace 
in 1991 at the hands of the Fed and the Manhattan District Attorney.  The US Treasury’s 
FIU, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), would come into being in 
1990.  
Across the Atlantic, the British government also had longstanding knowledge of 
the bank’s activities in London and the Caymans.  However, London only opted to take 
action as the result of intense American regulatory pressure.  What becomes clear in the 
Bank of England’s defense of BCCI is that the UK sought not to defend the bank itself so 
much as preserve the reputation of its own central bank and integrity of its offshore arena.   
Findings from Senator John Kerry’s report to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
claimed that the Bank of England only had partial regulatory oversight BCCI’s operations 
due to the bank’s offshoring in Luxembourg and the Caymans.54 The Bank of England, 
considering those jurisdictions to be “lead regulators” overlooks the fact that the 
Caymans was not a separate jurisdiction from the UK.  As noted earlier, the Bank of 
England actively cultivated its island holding into an offshore tax haven following its 
																																																								
52 Beaty and Gurwin, 325.		
53 Kerry, 320-321. 
54 Ibid, 353.  
		 194 
decision to effectively remain a British colony. The Caymans not only provide a 
playground for secretive financial dealings, but also serves as a hub of British intelligence 
activity, with MI6 enjoying a major presence on the islands.55  
For their part, Luxembourg also knew of BCCI’s activities and in 1985 sought to 
have the bank relocate its legal home to the UK in order for the Bank of England to 
become its lead regulator.  The Bank of England refused.56 Luxembourg continued to 
spread around the regulatory liability that BCCI posed through its push for the 
formulation of a College of Regulators under a 1983 Basle agreement that offered such a 
mechanism as a means of regulating renegade banks.57 Luxembourg complained that only 
2% of BCCI’s activities occurred within its jurisdiction, thus warranting such 
collaboration.58  Eventually, the group did meet in 1988; however, despite multiple audits 
outlining malfeasance, the regulators recommended no specific action.59 
In the late 1980s, the Bank of England sought to conceal audits of BCCI, even to 
the point of eventually seeking to broker a deal with Abu Dhabi to cover the exposure of 
British depositors to the bank’s malfeasance. In 1987, the Bank of England undertook a 
half-baked audit of BCCI’s ledgers using the bank’s own auditors, which found nothing 
amiss with the bank’s dealings.60  
After conducting a future audit of the bank in 1990, the accounting firm Price 
Waterhouse described magnitude of BCCI’s nefarious affairs and bad balance sheets to 																																																								
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the Bank of England; whereupon the British central bank began to lobby Abu Dhabi for 
assistance in letting Sheikh Zayed move the bank to the emirate from London.61 The UK 
was hesitant to close the bank over concerns of the ensuing financial scandal that would 
ensue due to the foreseen losses on the part of the bank’s 120,000 British depositors.62 
Individual British depositors stood to lose nearly $404 million, while deposits from local 
British municipal governments stood to lose nearly $160 million.63 Bank of England’s 
governor, Robin Pemberton, flew to Abu Dhabi in an effort to lobby Sheikh Zayed for 
cash infusions into the bank and for the possibility of moving the bank’s home of 
operations to the emirate.64 The Abu Dhabi government agreed to the move, and flushed 
the bank with $1.2 billion in addition to promising London to cover the bank’s potential 
losses.65  
In his testimony before the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service 
Committee, Pemberton defended the move, and declared that “it was a matter of realism 
that we do have occasions of fraud in banks, but that if we close down a bank every time 
we find an individual act or two of fraud we would have rather fewer banks than we do at 
the moment”.66 From Pemberton’s statement, it becomes clear that the motive behind the 
UK’s defense of BCCI lay in an effort to secure the integrity of its financial sector and 
diffuse blame across multiple jurisdictions.  This is in sharp contrast to an effort designed 
to defend a bank in which the London held an institutional linkage.  																																																								
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In Britain, the Parliamentary record in the aftermath of BCCI’s closure indicates 
how the Bank of England’s feigned ignorance of BCCI’s attempts to avoid a 
jurisdictional base.  British MPs described the Bank of England as having created a 
“culture of the 1980s, when a nod and a wink were given in the direction of regulation”, 
but otherwise followed a laissez faire attitude regarding how much of British banking 
took place.67 In 1992 parliamentary debates, it was noted that BCCI was the only bank to 
have ever faced attempted regulation via a “college of regulators”.68  
On both sides of the Atlantic, BCCI was discussed as if it was structured much as 
Abedi originally intended; namely, as a “global” bank without a state.  However, the 
bank was not so much a stateless financial entity as one for which no state wanted 
ultimate responsibility.  The scope of BCCI’s criminality may never fully be known, but 
what is more apparent is the bank’s involvement in a wide array of political circles that 
included current and former heads of state, revolutionaries, drug cartels, terrorists, and 
multiple intelligence services.  Any ostensive quality of “statelessness” the bank sought 
to obtain by locating in two tax havens was a veneer at best.  While Luxembourg may 
have had limited comprehension of the bank’s activities, the UK did not.  The Caymans 
was actively cultivated as an offshore tax haven by the UK, and the Bank of England in 
particular acted as a bureaucratic driving force behind this cultivation.  The fact is that the 
Bank of England eventually had to face a financial monster that was the product of a 
regulatory environment it created, and one about which it had prior knowledge.   
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In 1990, as British authorities worked with Abu Dhabi in an effort to remove 
BCCI as a financial liability through Gulf-backed bailouts and relocating the bank, 
regulatory pressures were building across the Atlantic.  In the US, Jack Blum, a lawyer 
working for the Senate subcommittee on terrorism and drugs, reported BCCI’s activities 
to the Manhattan District Attorney at the time, Robert Morganthau.  After relating to the 
prosecutor his knowledge of BCCI’s array of criminal and terrorist activities, the New 
York DA commenced pressuring actions against the bank.69After bureaucratic resistance 
from Price Waterhouse and government agencies in the US and the UK, Manhattan 
prosecutors secured needed audit results.  The Federal Reserve, after obtaining 
information from Morganthau’s office, began exerting pressure against the Bank of 
England for action.70 
July 5, 1991 witnessed a multinational crackdown on BCCI’s operations.  British 
police raided the bank’s UK offices, while the Bank of England contacted regulatory 
authorities in over sixty countries to ask for cooperation in closing the bank.71 The British 
governor of the Caymans placed the bank’s three divisions stationed in the country under 
receivership, and froze the assets of eight corporations linked to the bank.  Luxembourg 
and other European jurisdictions followed suit.72 Later that year in the US, the State 
Department confirmed BCCI’s involvement with Abu Nidal, other terrorist groups, and 
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terrorist financing’s symbiosis with drug dealing.73 By the end of that July, BCCI’s 
offices were closed in forty-four separate states.74 
In the end, BCCI was not institutionally linked to any particular state.  No state in 
which BCCI was legally rooted carried any ownership stake in the bank.  Certainly, the 
history of the bank’s activities illustrates a financial institution instrumental to the 
shadowy dealings of a number of states and non-state actors alike.  However, the bank 
was not the going concern of any specific state so much as one that provided a variety of 
services to state clients engaged in covert activity.  The Caymans and Luxembourg 
continue to function as offshore tax havens, and so long as have the need to conduct 
business dealings beyond the view of their constituencies, banks such as BCCI have the 
potential to resurface in the future.  
Unlike Abedi’s considerations to the contrary, BCCI was not a bank without a 
state home, was one without state linkage. In its home jurisdictions of the Cayman 
Islands and Luxembourg, both financial arenas remained the purview of state power.  The 
Cayman Islands was actively cultivated to serve as an offshore by its colonial masters in 
the UK, even contrary to the recommendation of a number of bureaucracies in the British 
government.  Even geographically minute Luxembourg demanded in 1990 that BCCI 
relocate out of the city-state within a year.75 The two locales that might have proven 
durable state backers of BCCI, Abu Dhabi and Pakistan, were not BCCI’s home 																																																								
73 Ehrenfeld (1992), 201-202.	74	Raj K. Bhala, Foreign Bank Regulation After BCCI, (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1994), 9. 	
75 Bhala, 134-135. See also, The Right Honorable Lord Justice Bingham, “Inquiry into the Supervision of 
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International”, Prepared for The Right Honorable Norman Lamont, MP 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Right Honorable Robin Leigh-Pemberton, Governor of the Bank of 
England, (October 22, 1992), Parliament, paragraphs 2.213-.215. 
		 199 
jurisdictions.  Both the emirate under Abu Zayed and Pakistan under Zia ul-Haq provided 
political and financial backing to the criminal bank, but neither Abu Dhabi nor Pakistan 
proved capable of safeguarding BCCI from its multilateral closure in its primary 
jurisdictions in Europe.  Abedi established the bank in offshores in order to avoid the fate 
of a state takeover of the bank, such as that which occurred to his previous bank in 
Pakistan.  As for Abu Dhabi, the UK actively sought out support from the emirate in an 
effort to forestall the deterioration of the bank’s balance sheets.  If BCCI had been linked 
to a home state, a situation it sought to avoid, the bank would have enjoyed protections in 
the face of regulatory crackdown.  During the fated attempt by the ad hoc “college of 
regulators” to restructure the bank, the Bank of England, Luxembourg, and the Caymans 
sought to have BCCI relocate to Abu Dhabi where the emirate held a stake in the bank.76 
In the end, the emirate was given no advanced notification when regulators around the 
world commenced closing BCCI.  
Concurrent with the collapse of BCCI was the emergence of the international 
lynchpin of the fortified finance regime.  In 1989, the Financial Action Task Force was 
formulated by the G-7.  In the United States in 1990 created the prototypical financial 
intelligence unit in the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. 
That same year, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, opening terrorist 
financiers to civil litigation.  While the UK’s fortified finance apparatus would continue 
evolving, the Bank of England eventually lost its premier status as the country’s financial 
regulator.   
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Contrary to notions that the UK could not regulate an otherwise “global” bank, 
the UK actively chose to selectively regulate BCCI.  The British government facilitated 
the growth of the Caymans as a financial colonial holding designed to attract banks like 
BCCI.  Furthermore, if the Bank of England proved incapable of regulating it, the UK 
would not have proved able to limit BCCI’s growth in the country in 1978 and relegate 
the bank to a second tier status in 1979. Rather than regulate the bank in the face of 
multiple audits in the 1980s, the Bank of England engaged in financial geopolitical 
diplomacy in an attempt to shift the problem abroad. 
II. Enforcement Against the Arab Bank of Jordan 
 Little research exists on how banks manage to survive political upheaval of the 
states in which they operate.  However, Arab Bank of Jordan is one such financial 
survivalist.  Headquartered in Amman, Jordan, the bank survived decolonization, shifting 
borders, and multiple wars between Arab states and Israel.  However, despite its 
adeptness at surviving Middle East turmoil the bank came under regulatory penalty for 
financing terrorism in 2005 when the bank faced a $24 million penalty over its ties to 
Hamas.  Over the course of ensuing years, Arab Bank faced multiple civil lawsuits in US 
courts for violations of the 1990 Anti-Terrorism Act.  Unlike many longstanding banks in 
the Middle East, Arab Bank was founded following an American model that maintained 
the privatized integrity of the bank.  Additionally, the era of the bank’s founding and 
growth precluded any attachment to a burgeoning state. 
 Outside of Egypt, localized modern banking in the Arab Middle East did not take 
root until the 1930s.  Many locally developed banks in the region faced a number of 
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institutional hurdles in modernizing traditional lending and bookkeeping practices.  
Additionally, political uncertainty due to remnants of Ottoman institutions intermingling 
with the abrupt entry of European administration and nascent nationalist movements 
hindered effective overall economic growth.   
Arab Bank, now the largest indigenous Middle East bank not based out of the 
Gulf, was founded in Jerusalem in 1930 following American banking models.  The 
founder, Abdul Hameed Shoman, drew upon his exposure to Wall Street banking in the 
1920s.77 Arab Bank would emerge closely intertwined with Palestinians in the following 
decades, while remaining at arm’s length from the Jordanian monarchy and other state 
governments in the region.   
 Palestinian businessman Abdul Hameed Shoman came to the US in 1911, 
whereupon he commenced a successful career in the textile industry and sales.  Driven by 
a combined admiration for the manner in which American banks worked with their 
clients, Arab nationalism, and rabid anti-Semitism, Shoman desired to create a bank that 
could serve the political motivation of decreasing Arabs’ reliance on European banks, 
and those run by Jews.  In his memoirs Shoman argues that the Arabs “must gather 
strength by creating their own national institutions, for they would be their best buttress 
against the encroaching power of Zionism, the Mandate and colonialism”.78  Notably, one 
primary aspect of Shoman’s desire for creating Arab Bank was his anti-Semitism.  
Shoman declared in his memoirs that, “all business dealings with the Jews-buying, selling 
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or banking transactions-are damaging to our country’s self-interests”, and that there was 
“no need to fear any other group”.79 
Arab Bank opened in Jerusalem in 1930, and from its opening Shoman went out 
of his way to secure private deposit holders and clients.  Initially going “door to door” 
himself, Shoman actively engaged local shopkeepers and merchants among the Arab 
population of British Mandate Palestine.80  As he gathered clients, Shoman argued for the 
benefits that such a modern bank could provide, and even developed interest-free savings 
accounts in order to secure clients wary of the Islamic prohibition of interest.81  Both 
within British Mandate Palestine and beyond, Arab nationalism emerged as a constant 
theme of Shoman’s business motivations, and those of the bank he founded.  This 
motivation animated the bank’s efforts to open branches elsewhere in the Levant, North 
Africa, and the Gulf.  
While statism served as the primary feature for a number of banks opening in this 
era, particularly those in areas seeking independence, Arab Bank’s ownership structure 
was private in nature, and paradoxically tied to Arab Nationalism.  In describing the 
bank’s logo, Shoman emphasized that the bank was not intended as a national bank.  
Shoman declared that Arab Bank was not “backed by any government or central bank”.82 
Instead, Shoman declared that “God is our only refuge” when describing the solvency of 
the bank in times of crisis.83  
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When the bank expanded its capital through increasing its issuance of shares, the 
bank’s board discussed the importance of issuing ownership throughout the Arab world 
rather than one state.  The bank’s board decided for “a new issue of shares which Arab 
nationals of any part of the Arab World served by the Arab Bank shall be permitted to 
purchase”.84 While the bank was founded, and for a time headquartered in British 
Mandate Palestine, Arab Bank deliberately sought to keep itself from becoming simply a 
Palestinian bank.  Shoman himself declared that the bank “is not a Shoman property” and 
that it “does not belong simply to the people of Jerusalem, nor even to the people of 
Palestine but to the entire Arab nation”.85  
At the time of its founding, and continuing through much of the 20th century, 
Arab Bank’s competition has largely been with national banks.  When Arab Bank opened 
its Jordanian branch in Amman in 1934; Ottoman Bank conducted most banking in the 
immediate region.  Founded in 1856, Ottoman Bank was a joint venture between the 
Ottoman Empire and European imperial interests in the Middle East.86  While Ottoman 
Bank’s original purpose was to help safeguard British and French financial interests in 
the Ottoman Empire and to ensure the security of long-term Turkish debt, the bank in 
Transjordan became the purview of the British administration following WWI.  Banking 
in Transjordan under British administration was dominated by a combination of foreign 
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banks with “little interest” in providing financial services for local businesses.87 Local 
Arab merchants were precisely those sought by Shoman in expanding Arab Bank.   
As Arab Bank expanded across what would become multiple countries after 
decolonization, Transjordan remained overly reliant upon British subsidized aid and most 
Mandate spending focused on administrative infrastructure rather than the local 
economy.88 With Arab Bank’s drive to secure clients among local indigenous small 
businesses and the detachment of Shoman’s sentimentality to any specific area of the 
Arab world, the Jordanian monarchy agreed to allowing the bank to open presence in 
Amman.  In both 1934 when Arab Bank was established in Transjordan and in 1944 
when it expanded its shares, both the British administration and monarchy were 
suspicious of its intent.  For their part, British authorities were skeptical of potential 
competition with Ottoman Bank’s position in the country while Prince Abdullah was 
concerned with rumors at the time regarding the possibility of the bank disrupting 
political stability.89 In 1944 at a meeting with Prince Abdallah, Shoman assured him that 
“none of the bank’s people will interfere in any activity of a political nature”.90 
The late 1940s and early 1950s proved pivotal for Arab Banks’s standing in the 
political economy of the region, and set the stage for its position for the remainder of the 
20th century into the present.  In 1948 with the Israeli war for independence, Arab Bank 
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relocated its headquarters to its Amman branch.91 The founding of Israel in combination 
with the rise of Arab socialism led to a number of branch losses for the bank that 
undermined its position in the Middle East and North Africa. From 1948-1970 Arab Bank 
lost 34 branches entirely due to political risk from either wars between Arab states and 
Israel, or from nationalization under dictatorships in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, 
and elsewhere.92 Tellingly, Arab Bank opened branches in Switzerland in 1961 and a 
Swiss subsidiary in 1962.93 
Unlike the bureaucratic authoritarian dictatorships in Arab countries around 
Jordan, the Hashemite kingdom remained a steadfast Western ally throughout the Cold 
War and into the 21st century.  Additionally, Jordan managed to sidestep the internal 
tumult that characterizes modern Middle East history.  In contrast to other Arab states in 
the region, Jordan’s relationship with Israel displays a nuance in which Amman played an 
intermediary role between otherwise hostile states.  Similarly, Jordan’s affiliation with 
the UK and the US remained a constant factor in its foreign policy while other states in 
the region engaged in decades of hostility with the West under the sway of Gamal 
Nasser’s socialism or Baathism in Syria.  Similarly, Jordan has thus far remained a stable 
state despite multiple jihadist groups and Palestinian groups operating in the kingdom and 
against the Jordanian government.  Such diplomatic and domestic political acumen on the 
part of Jordan’s monarchy also impact the kingdom’s political economy, where Arab 
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Bank not only never faced nationalization, but was also allowed to function as the 
American-style bank envisioned by its founder.  
Jordan’s fortunate record of political stability is not coincidental.  Over the course 
of the 20th century and into the 21st, Jordan became a safe haven for multiple waves of 
refugees and political migrants from surrounding states in the region.  Shortly after its 
independence in 1946, Jordan faced its first major geopolitical crisis in the context of 
Israel’s 1948 war for independence.  After reluctantly entering into the war against Israel, 
Jordan would come to occupy and eventually annex one-fifth of what encompassed 
British Mandate Palestine.94 Between its annexation of East Jerusalem and the West 
Bank, along with Palestinian refugees flooding into the kingdom, much of Jordan’s 
population is of Palestinian origin.  This influx of Palestinian refugees permanently 
altered the kingdom’s demography and political economy in a way that was conducive to 
Arab Bank’s expansion.  At the same time, Jordan’s conservatism prevented both the full 
political enfranchisement of the kingdom’s Palestinian population while its Western 
alignment served to keep banks privatized.  
The influx of Palestinian refugees into Jordan created a unique problem in the 
kingdom’s political economy.  On the one hand, the new Palestinian population created a 
bourgeoisie in the kingdom due to their high caliber of human capital and wealth relative 
to the indigenous Transjordanians.  Indeed, the influx of Palestinians’ wealth 
significantly increased the kingdom’s money supply while the Palestinians’ business 
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activity created the core of Jordan’s skilled middle class.95 On the other, the new 
Palestinian population created an imbalance of economic power in relation to the 
kingdom’s indigenous subjects.  In order to safeguard power the kingdom restricted 
Palestinian political activity and sought to empower Jordanian Bedouins and rural areas 
deemed loyal to the monarchy.96  
While other Middle East states experimented with nationalizing banks and certain 
industries, Jordan’s political economy commenced private sector development.  As early 
as 1949, Jordan implemented Law No. 41 that established the legal basis for the country’s 
Chamber of Commerce97 The structure of Jordan’s private sector deepened its autonomy 
vis-à-vis the state over the course of ensuing decades, with the formation of Jordan’s 
Chamber of Industry in 1964 and the Association of Bankers in 1978.98 The Association 
of Bankers, along with the other business organizations, effectively acts as a legal interest 
group that can lobby the state on behalf of its members.99 The General Assembly for 
Association of Bankers not only represents Jordanian banks in the kingdom, but also 
foreign banks operating in the country.100 Arab Bank is the oldest bank in the group.  
Aside from state funding for government-backed projects in the agricultural and housing 
sectors, Amman’s liberal banking sector remains devoted to commercial lending, 
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remittances, and the financial activity of private actors.101  For its part, the state’s direct 
involvement in specific industries is restricted to such areas as phosphate mining, oil, 
fertilizer, and cement.102 Banking in Jordan is a private sector affair.  
The Shoman family that founded the bank remains the predominant governing 
element in the bank’s shareholding and on the bank’s corporate board.  When Arab Bank 
came under regulatory scrutiny for financing terrorism, the Shoman family alone 
controlled 35% of the bank while other prominent shareholders include the government 
of Saudi Arabia (17%), former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, influential 
Palestinian-Jordanian families, and a share from the Jordanian Social Security 
Corporation.103 Along with the Shoman family presence on Arab Bank’s board of 
directors, all members but the one representing the Hariri family support the Shoman’s 
guidance of the bank.104 
While the Jordanian state has influence on Arab Bank through the involvement of 
the Jordanian Social Security Corporation in the bank’s affairs, the bank’s majority 
shareholders are private.  Additionally, the majority of its board members are either 
private economic actors or politically connected to states other than Jordan. Indeed, when 
then-Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri sought to increase his ownership share of the 
bank, Jordan’s King Abdullah intervened to preserve the bank’s control by the Shoman 
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family.105 In this instance, the Jordanian state sought to preserve the bank’s integrity as a 
private financial concern legally based within its borders.  
Due to its absorption of Palestinians in 1948, roughly 40% of Jordan’s population 
is of Palestinian origin.106  The kingdom’s political economy and political system place 
its Palestinian population in a nebulous position.  Jordan’s Palestinian demographic is 
kept at a distance in the country’s political system, with occasional tensions arising with 
the state.  Amman’s challenges with the kingdom’s Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas 
relate to these sociopolitical tensions. Jordan’s Palestinians outside of refugee camps are 
not economically disadvantaged.  Palestinians dominate the top echelons of the 
kingdom’s private sector, while indigenous Jordanians of old Bedouin extraction 
dominate state bureaucracies.107 
The Palestinian dominance in the country’s private sector is profound, with 60% 
of Jordan’s top 500 companies being owned by Palestinians and Palestinian capital 
comprising 87% of the kingdom’s GNP.108 Palestinian dominance of Jordan’s banking 
sector is even stronger, with Palestinian-owned banks comprising 92% market 
capitalization of the kingdom’s banking industry.109 Arab Bank dwarfs its rivals in the 
country, where it alone encompasses 62% of the country’s market capitalization.110 
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outcomes for terrorist financing, it is worth noting that Arab Bank’s behemoth presence 
in Jordan did not preclude enforcement from occurring.  Additionally, the political divide 
between the Jordanian state and the Palestinians assists in partially explaining why no 
institutional linkage developed between it and Arab Bank.  
Despite Palestinian business dominance, Jordan’s political system diminishes the 
influence of the Palestinian demographic while the magnifying the political power of the 
kingdom’s rural Bedouin base and other indigenous segments of the kingdom’s 
population.  This divide has grown in recent decades with political reforms in Jordan’s 
bureaucracies and increased opposition activity on the part of segments of the Palestinian 
population.  
Since the late 1940s, Jordan’s population lays divided along a cleavage of native 
Jordanians on the one hand and those of Palestinian extraction on the other.  While 
Palestinians would come to dominate the kingdom’s private sector, the Jordanian state 
remained dominated by indigenous Jordanians based along old rural and tribal lines.  As 
the Jordanian state expanded, the monarchy considered the indigenous population to hold 
greater loyalties to the crown than the incoming Palestinians and drew from the 
kingdom’s tribal structure to fill the ranks of the military and state agencies.111 Indeed, 
“Jordanian” identity in the kingdom is often affiliated with work and affiliation with 
working in the public sector.112 
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Politically, Palestinians in Jordan have always remained partially disenfranchised 
from the state, despite their economic prowess.  This virtual lockout from a meaningful 
presence in the state apparatus, in combination with power and influence concentrated in 
the monarchy and tribal affiliations, placed the Palestinians in a position of active 
involvement in the kingdom’s political opposition.  Participation in the opposition among 
segments of the Palestinian population placed in a unique position when groups such the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas began operations in Jordan. 
The security of the Jordanian state has long interlocked with Western security 
interests in the Middle East, and this interlocking has involved the kingdom’s thwarting 
domestic opposition to the monarchy.  Jordan is situated in the midst of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and yet managed to maintain continuous rule despite being 
surrounded by Arab nationalist dictatorships, jihadist movements, and state collapse in 
neighboring states.  The 1967 war with Israel brought an end to Jordanian control of the 
West Bank, and introduced a second wave of Palestinians into the kingdom.  The 
resulting year long Jordanian civil war brought a permanent rift between Palestinian 
political organizations in the country and the monarchy. The secular nationalist Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) lost against the short conflict against Jordanian troops and 
was driven out of Jordan.113 On the macro political scale, the civil war in Jordan 
crystalized “Jordanian” as opposed to “Palestinian” identity while religious Palestinian 
groups grew in the ensuing years.  Hamas, the terrorist group involved with Arab Bank’s 
laundering, was one such group. 
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Although Hamas’ origins date to 1987, the group’s roots in Jordan trace to the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in the country.  Unlike secular Palestinian nationalists, 
Jordan did not initially consider religious groups as potentially threatening to the state.  
Indeed, in the 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan cooperated with the monarchy 
against secular nationalist groups.114 When the Muslim Brotherhood helped create 
Hamas, the new organization’s structure included a formidable apparatus that included 
administration, charity, public relations, and political activity alongside its paramilitary 
operations.115 In Jordan, Hamas not only refrained from seeking a linkage with the state, 
it actively supported political liberalization and democratization movements in the 
country.116  
The 1980s catalyzed Jordanian experiments with political liberalization that 
would culminate with the monarchy’s expulsion of Hamas from the country in 1999.  As 
the oil boom subsided in the 1980s, Jordan experienced an exodus of Palestinian capital 
from the kingdom’s private sector as the country’s economy entered a downturn.117 As 
the Jordanian monarchy detached itself from claims to the West Bank in 1989, the state 
introduced political reforms as a means of increasing the throne’s legitimacy.118 Such 
reforms included the holding of full parliamentary elections, the legalization of political 
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parties, an easing of press censorship, and the ending of martial law in 1991.119  The 
reforms favored indigenous Jordanians and the social loci of the monarchy’s historical 
powerbase, such as Transjordanian-dominated bureaucracies, Bedouin tribal groups, and 
the military.120 Jordan’s political liberalization coincided with economic adjustments that 
bolstered segments of the opposition.  In the 1989 election, the Muslim Brotherhood won 
the largest share of parliamentary seats.121 
In the 1990s, relations between Jordan and Israel brought Amman’s tolerance of 
Hamas to a breaking point.  A serious Hamas presence in Jordan formed in 1990, only a 
year after the Muslim Brotherhood’s influential entry into the kingdom’s limited system 
of representation. Khaled Mishal, the Hamas leader who became the chair of the group’s 
political wing in 1996, relocated to Jordan in 1990 after his expulsion from Kuwait.122 In 
1997, Israel’s botched attempt to poison Mishal in Jordan opened a rift between Amman 
and Jerusalem that emboldened the group within the country.123  While Jordanian 
diplomatic pressure helped secure the antidote to the Mishal’s poisoning, Hamas 
operations designed to undermine Middle East peace negotiations brought pressure to its 
presence in the kingdom.  Hamas interpreted Amman’s response to the Israeli 
assassination attempt as the monarchy offering full political backing to its activities.124 In 
1999, Jordanian security forces closed Hamas offices in the capital and charged Mishal 
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and other Hamas figures with illegal weapons’ possession, fraud, and  “raising funds for a 
non-authorized association”.125  
Jordan severed ties with Hamas in 1999, despite the surging of Islamist influence 
in other countries in the Middle East in early 2000s.  Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Jordan, Hamas is a primarily Palestinian and urban phenomenon.126 The Muslim 
Brotherhood in Jordan enjoys genuinely Transjordanian roots in the country, where it was 
founded in 1942 prior to the arrival of the Palestinians.127 Additionally, the Brotherhood 
in Jordan has enjoyed an overall easier relationship with the monarchy through its 
provision of social services alongside royal-run charities and its close ties with the 
business community.128 However, the late 1990s rift between the monarchy and pro-
liberalization opposition movements brought even the Brotherhood to abstain from the 
1997 Jordanian elections.129  
When Jordan banned Hamas activity in 1999, Prime Minister Abdel Rauef al-
Rawabdeh deemed the organization a threat to the country’s stability.130 Indeed, 
Jordanian intelligence officials discovered a weapons smuggling and paramilitary 
training scheme that linked Hamas to Hezbollah in Syria, and included ongoing Hamas 
intelligence gathering operations on the Jordanian state.131  The early 2000s marked a 
shift in Jordan’s stance towards Hamas and its dealings with Arab Bank, such that 
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Amman’s monitoring of the terrorist group would align with increasing animosity the 
group faced from the secularist Palestinian Fatah faction of the PLO. The acrimony 
Hamas faced from secular Palestinian factions and Jordan combined with increased 
Israeli scrutiny of the Arab Bank’s activities.  In 2005, Arab Bank’s lack of institutional 
linkage with Jordan left it exposed to administrative penalties and civil suits emanating 
from the United States.  
The US designated Hamas as a terrorist group in 1997 and began designating 
entities as its financiers in the early 2000s.132  In 2003 the US designated Hamas-
affiliated charities in Europe as financiers of terrorism.133  Through a network of charities 
in the West, money funneled from abroad to Hamas’ local charities via Arab Bank.134 
Security services with the Palestinian Authority noted as early as 2000 that Hamas 
routinely reallocated funds meant for social projects to the group’s combatant arm and 
often transferred monies raised from Gulf through Arab Bank.135 
In 2004 during the height of the Second Intifada, the Israeli military raided Arab 
Bank’s Ramallah offices under suspicion that it was financing terrorism for Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, and the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade.136 In 2009 the Israelis later declared the 
bank to be in the clear of financing terrorism.137 However, the early 2000s witnessed 
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penalizations against the bank in the form of American fines in 2005 and civil suits in US 
courts that commenced in 2004. 
Zarate notes that one year after the raid, on August 17, 2005, the US Comptroller 
of the Currency and the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN) levied a $24 million fine against Arab Bank for failure to comply with the 
Bank Secrecy Act.138 The US accused the bank of conducting “willfully blind” business 
and facilitating suspicious transactions through its New York branch for terrorism.139 The 
American regulatory order also reduced Arab Bank’s New York branch into an 
“uninsured administrative office” without a real ability to conduct transactions.140 The 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network found that Arab Bank conducted no monitoring 
of transactions through its New York office before June 2002.141 American regulators 
discovered that Arab Bank failed to submit adequate suspicious activity reports (SARs) 
on transactions through its New York branch despite most of its funds dealing with 
jurisdictions with high risk of terrorism and terrorist financing.142  These regulatory 
penalties served as the first salvo in enforcing the fortified finance regime against Arab 
Bank.  Shortly after the levying of regulatory fines, survivors of terrorism commenced 
pursuing further enforcement against the bank in the form of civil lawsuits.  
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 While FinCEN’s penalty against Arab Bank was levied in November 2005, the 
Jordanian government was already in dialogue with US officials regarding penalizing the 
bank for financing terrorism.  In February 2005, a US delegation that included the 
Treasury Department’s Undersecretary of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence traveled 
to Jordan to address concerns over Arab Bank’s terrorist financing.143  The US delegation 
met with the Central Bank of Jordan, the Ministry of Finance, and Arab Bank’s CEO, 
Abdulhameed Shoman.144 In 2000, Shoman personally contributed to terrorism, while 
his staff contributed 5% of their own salaries to terrorist operations during the Second 
Intifada.145 
While Jordan stressed Arab Bank’s importance to American regulators from the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Jordanian government declared it would 
support regulatory penalty “as long as Arab Bank received due process”.146 Regarding 
Jordan’s regulatory capacity, the American delegation lamented “significant systemic 
problems” with the country’s fortified finance structure, while both American and 
Jordanian officials discussed the difficulty of effectively policing terrorist financing due 
to the lack of any significant regulatory capacity within Arab Bank and in the 
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neighboring Palestinian Authority.147 Jordan expressed that it was seeking Cypriot or 
Lebanese sponsorship into the Egmont Group, and that planning was already underway 
for its own enforcement body under the auspices of the Central Bank.148 Jordanian Prime 
Minister Faisal al-Fayez agreed with Treasury Undersecretary Levey over the need for 
the kingdom to adopt its own fortified finance regime.149 
The meeting between US officials and Arab Bank in Jordan illustrate the bank’s 
earliest attempts at defending itself.  Arab Bank administrators declared that had the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency given additional prior warning that the bank 
would have acted upon any noncompliant branch with the “wrath of God”, and that the 
bank itself was offered “no time” in responding to regulatory charges.150 Arab Bank 
stated its intent to officials that it was seeking to end all individual account transactions 
through New York and instead focus on “corporate credit and finance”, ostensibly in an 
effort to decrease risk of money laundering and terrorist financing.151 Despite repeated 
concerns from both Arab Bank and various organs of the Jordanian state about the effect 
a scandal would have on the country’s financial system, Amman made no attempt to 
block American regulatory actions against the bank. 
 Meanwhile, in 2004 lawyers representing victims of terrorism during the Second 
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for knowingly financing Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups between 1995 and 
2004 (See Figure 5.1 below).  However, the civil case was stalled due to Arab Bank’s 
refusal to produce court-ordered documents during the discovery process of the trial.  
Arab Bank refused to produce relevant documents to the court on the grounds doing so 
would violate multiple laws and regulations pertaining to bank secrecy in Europe and the 
Middle East.152 On December 13, 2006, Judge Nina Gershon of the Eastern District of 
New York ordered Arab Bank to produce the documents it had earlier proffered to 
FinCEN and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.153 In 2010, the court initiated 
sanctions on the bank for continual failure to produce discovery documents on the 
grounds of violating bank secrecy laws.154 During the bank’s attempt to stall, the bank 
attempted to obfuscate its previous activities while Jordanian authorities were working 
with American officials to bring greater regulatory policing to both Arab Bank and the 
Jordanian banking sector.  
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Figure 5.1: Sample of Hamas Members and Arab Bank Accounts (Source: Osen Attorneys at Law, LLC)155 
Hamas Member Role Account Number(s) Amount Date Range Arab Bank 
Branch 
Ghazi Ahmed 
Hamad 
Hamas 
spokesman: 
2006-2007 
Hamas Editor: 
(Al-Watan, Al-
Risala 
1170465510 
706785 
$152,986 July 2000-Jan. 
2002 
Gaza 
Jamal Salim Senior Hamas 
W. Bank leader 
4033906500 $13,500 Dec.2000-
March 2001 
Nablus 
Ismail Abu 
Shanab 
Qassam 
Brigades 
Commander, 
Sheikh Yassin 
Deputy 
236519510 $173,172 Aug. 2000-Aug. 
2001 
Gaza 
Ismail Haniyeh Hamas Party 
Leader 
63517500 $409,400 July 2000-Sept. 
2001 
Gaza 
Muhammad 
Hasan Shama’a 
Hamas Co-
Founder 
513636510 $144,000 Jan. 2001-Dec. 
2001 
Gaza 
Jamal and Muna 
Mansur 
Jamal Mansur: 
Founder-Hamas 
Research 
Institute, W. 
Bank 
Spokesman 
Muna Mansur: 
Palestinian 
Legislative 
Council 
Member for 
Hamas 
4064788500 $85,000 Dec. 2000-Sept. 
2001 
Nablus 
Salah al-Din 
Darwazah 
Qassam 
Brigades 
Commander, 
Hamas leader in 
Nablus 
4286871510 $302,000 July 2000-July 
2001 
Nablus 
Sheikh Ahmed 
Yassin 
Hamas founder 
and Spiritual 
Figurehead 
36444 $60,000 May 5, 2001 
(single 
payment) 
Gaza 
 
 During the period in which the bank was pressed by US courts to produce 
evidence pertaining to discovery, the bank was taking actions to clean up its own account 
records and obfuscate its involvement with terrorist financing.  During a meeting in 
February 2005, Treasury Undersecretary met with Israeli Counterterrorism Director, 
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General Danny Arditi to discuss terrorist financing and Arab Bank in particular.156  In the 
briefing of US Treasury officials, the Israelis informed them that while Arab Bank ceased 
financing terrorism after the filing of civil suits, the bank was “playing with evidence, 
cleaning the records, and deleting accounts”.157  While the bank purportedly took 
measures to destroy the evidence of its financing terrorism, Jordan worked with US 
regulators in their efforts to foster and strengthen the fortified finance regime in the 
kingdom. 
Throughout 2005, diplomatic meetings between the US and Jordan indicate that 
kingdom’s efforts related to countering terrorist financing were hampered by the 
immaturity of the regulatory regime rather than home-state efforts to protect Arab Bank.  
In July 2005, American Treasury officials met again with Jordan’s central bank governor 
and Minister of Finance to call on the kingdom to institute AML and CTF regulations for 
its banking system.158 Jordan’s central bank chairman, Umayya Touqan, noted that the 
fortified finance regulations of customer due diligence were already practiced by banks in 
Jordan, aside from Arab Bank.159  Two months later in meetings between US and 
Jordanian officials regarding implementing counter-terrorist financing controls, the 
Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Jordan noted that the Amman government was 
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“pressing the bank hard to comply fully and expeditiously with all US regulatory 
requirements”.160 Jordanian officials noted that they believed their intermediate 
regulatory efforts should have prevented Arab Bank’s terrorist activity.161 Previous 
Jordanian efforts to counter terrorist financing relied heavily upon its intelligence 
services.162 Indeed, the kingdom began implementing aspects of the fortified finance 
regime in 2000. 
At the turn of the millennium, Jordan sought to counter the financing of terrorism 
in its banking system.  Article 93 of the Jordan’s 2000 Banking Law mandates that banks 
report suspicious activities to the Central Bank if such activities were suspected of being 
linked to a crime.163  Jordan’s Central Bank Regulation No. 10, implemented in 2001, 
specifies money laundering as a primary concern.164 Bank Regulation No. 10 was 
implemented in conjunction with the kingdom’s more generic Banking Law No. 28 that 
compels banks to report suspicious activity to the Central Bank, and frees the reporting 
banks from any potential legal liabilities pertaining to the violation of privacy.165 
Regarding Hamas in particular, the Central Bank of Jordan mandated that all banks in the 
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kingdom “freeze any dealings” with Hamas and its charity affiliates in 2003.166 Building 
off of its Penal Code No. 16 of 1960, Jordan implemented a number of laws designed to 
counter terrorism and terrorist financing in the years prior to the arrival of US regulators 
in 2005.167  Amman’s assurances to implement terrorist financing and money laundering 
regulations came to full fruition in 2007 with Law No. 46 that established the country’s 
financial intelligence unit within the central bank.  
The numerous civil cases against Arab Bank brought mixed levels of punishment 
against the bank.  In one case, Linde v. Arab Bank, a jury found the bank liable for 
financing terrorism in 2014.  While the verdict was vacated upon a technicality, an 
undisclosed settlement was reached between the plaintiffs and the bank in 2015.168 The 
bank stated in 2016 that it had amassed $1 billion to cover settlement obligations.169 The 
undisclosed settlement covered all of the more than 500 plaintiffs in the case.170 Notably, 
the bank stated in its Annual Report of 2015, that the settlement was “in the best interest 
of the Bank, and it has been entered into upon acceptable and satisfactory terms and 
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without admission of liability of any wrongdoing by the Bank”.171 Additionally, the bank 
noted that it had “sufficient provisions to cover the expected financial obligations under 
this agreement”.172 Litigation for the nearly 6,000 foreign nationals brought against the 
bank under the Alien Torts Statute (ATS) of 1789 was dismissed in 2018.173 
  In the course of the civil suits against the bank, Jordan did protest what it viewed 
as excessive efforts to penalize the bank.  In August 2017, Jordan filed an amicus curia 
brief that argued for the dismissal of civil suits against Arab Bank that had been sought 
under the Alien Torts Statute Act.  The ATS, the 18th century law that allows non-US 
nationals to sue in American courts, was the legal basis for the thousands of plaintiffs 
seeking damages against Arab Bank.  Unlike Linde v Arab Bank, where the plaintiffs 
were both American and smaller in number, civil penalties for the 6,000 foreign nationals 
under the ATS carried the possibility of undermining the very integrity of Arab Bank and 
destabilizing the Middle East.  The Jordanians noted that aside from the ATS action 
comprising infringement on sovereignty, Arab Bank was the financial institution through 
which US aid to the kingdom was processed.174 Additionally, Jordan argued that since 
Arab Bank alone encompasses between 20%-33% of the value of the country’s stock 
exchange, a massive shock in civil penalties would potentially lead to the kingdom’s 
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economic collapse.175 Jordan receives on average over $1 billion in American aid per, 
with $6.375 billion pledged in US aid from 2018-2022.176  With the Middle East facing 
anemic reconstruction in Iraq, growing tensions between Gulf states, Israel, and Iran, and 
unfolding state failure in Syria, Jordan’s stability comprised a lynchpin of US interest in 
the region while Arab Bank was one conduit for maintaining such stability.   
 While the civil suits filed under of the ATS were dismissed in 2018, Arab Bank 
did face regulatory enforcement for violating the fortified finance regime.  The first 
penalty came as a $24 million fine in 2005 from the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency and FinCEN, while the second litigious penalty was settled out of court for the 
case of Linde v. Arab Bank Bank for up to $1 billion a decade later in 2015. Throughout 
the enforcement period, the Jordanian state did not act to block enforcement efforts from 
the United States; rather, Amman continued to work with American officials in 
implementing the fortified finance regime in its banking system while building off of 
unilateral efforts from the preceding years.  
IV. Analysis 
 The cases of BCCI and Arab Bank demonstrate banks being penalized for 
financing terrorism.  In each case the bank involved operated as a private bank without a 
linkage that tied the financial institution to the regime of its own state.  Furthermore, the 
arrangements between the banks and their home states were characterized by reluctance 																																																								
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of the banks to have significant government control or stake holding.  In terms of 
enforcement befalling the banks for their illegal activities, enforcement occurred either in 
the absence of the fortified finance regime or as it deepened and integrated into the 
domestic political economy in which the bank was legally based. 
One of the stereotypes of terrorist financing and money laundering is that such 
activities are the natural byproduct of jurisdictions with bank secrecy and tax havens.  
Certainly, terrorist groups, fraudsters, and criminals launder money through such 
countries; however, in order to understand why such jurisdictions exist, it must be 
understood that they are the products of the states that create them.  BCCI’s structure was 
designed to avoid significant state oversight through legally basing itself in mutual tax 
havens in an effort to avoid truly having a home state.  Both BCCI and Arab Bank sought 
institutional arrangements in their founding and growth that allowed them to avoid 
politics.  Abedi’s placing BCCI in tax havens and Shoman’s promise to the Jordanian 
monarchy to avoid meddling in political affairs illustrate this fact.  
 Based on Abedi’s experience with Pakistan where his previous bank was 
nationalized, Abedi legally grounded BCCI in the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg.  
While Luxembourg was not indifferent to the bank’s activities, most of its transactions 
were based out of the Cayman Islands.  The Cayman Islands was cultivated as an 
offshore tax haven in the 1960s while remaining a British domain.  Promoted as a haven 
by the Bank of England, the Cayman Islands offered the appearance of a regulation-free 
domain where innumerable financial dealings of questionable legality could occur.  This 
state-created laissez-faire environment allowed BCCI to engage with numerous high 
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profile political leaders around the world, terrorist groups, intelligence agencies, and drug 
cartels.  Despite doing business with such politically powerful actors, including states, the 
bank did not enjoy protection from its largest backers.  If the bank had been based in Abu 
Dhabi, where the UK endeavored to have BCCI relocate, it could have enjoyed the 
protection and backing from the state that provided its greatest largesse.  However, BCCI 
succeeded in precluding the formation of any state linkage that would have protected it 
from enforcement.  
Because of Arab Bank’s headquartering in Jordan, the bank managed to avoid the 
formation of any significant institutional linkage with its home state.  Much of this 
political economic luck is purely circumstantial due to the fact that there was almost no 
independent state in the Arab world at the time to which the bank could have formed a 
linkage at the time.  In 1930, Egypt served as the only fully independent Arab state in the 
region.  Indeed, in establishing Arab Bank in British Mandate Palestine, the bank’s 
founder avoided facilitating any linkage with the Cairo government.  Similarly, unlike Al 
Rajhi Bank in Saudi Arabia, where tribal and familial connections tied the Saudi 
monarchy to the bank, Arab Bank’s modernist orientation and Western structure at the 
time of its founding and formation precluded any pre-independence linkages between 
ruling families and the bank itself.   
The bank’s expansion beginning throughout the 1930s and 1940s across what 
would become multiple Arab independent states similarly kept the bank from forming 
any linkage with a single state where the bank remained private and independent.  
Certainly, multiple wars and bank nationalization programs across the region dealt Arab 
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Bank a number of geopolitical blows. However, Jordan, where Arab Bank has been 
legally based since 1948, refrained from nationalizing it or instituting a majority 
ownership stake.  Thus, once Arab states commenced nationalizing Arab Bank’s presence 
in other countries, the institution’s early multinational expansion afforded it the flexibility 
to maintain its operation as a private bank. 
When facing enforcement from US civil suits, Jordan did apply pressure to help 
safeguard the bank’s survival.  After facing administrative fines from the US in 2005 and 
a negotiating a settlement with the first wave of civil suits against it under the Anti-
Terrorism Act, the bank faced potential collapse under the weight of potential penalties 
under the Alien Torts Act.  When Jordan sought to have this third wave of enforcement 
dismissed, Amman did note that its Social Security Corporation owned roughly 15%.177 
However, the bank has remained a privately owned concern throughout its existence.  
Geopolitically, the Arab Bank case illustrates Jordan’s precarious position vis-à-vis the 
bank since it processes critical US aid for the kingdom while also serving as the premier 
financial organ for the country’s political economy.  Despite such importance, the Arab 
Bank remains much as it was established; namely, a private bank based upon an 
American model.  
One of the highlights both the BCCI and Arab Bank cases is what the cases 
demonstrate regarding the efficacy of the fortified finance regime.  In both cases, 
enforcement occurred either in the near-absence of AML/CTF regulations, or occurred 
while they matured within their home state.  BCCI faced simultaneous crackdown in 																																																								
177 Brief for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Joseph Jesner, et 
al., v. Arab Bank PLC, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 16-499, Aug. 2017, 8. 
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jurisdictions around the world in 1991 over its operations that long predated the 
establishment of the Financial Action Task Force.  Indeed, the global shutdown of BCCI 
in the earliest phases of the fortified finance regime becoming truly international begs the 
question as to whether or not the regime is effective at all.  Certainly, BCCI’s structure of 
apparent “statelessness” and its lack of state linkage offered it no means of political 
protection when the crackdown commenced. Additionally, its unique structure provided 
no pre-existing relationship between bank and state that needed to be disrupted by the 
arrival of the fortified finance regime.  When enforcement commenced in 1991, the bank 
had now linkage to call upon for political assistance.  
In the case of Arab Bank, the fortified finance regime was already present when 
American regulators implemented initiated the first wave of enforcement against the 
bank.  However, Jordan’s domestic laws were not yet fully developed.  As early as 2000, 
the kingdom began implementing the legal groundwork for criminalizing money 
laundering, and domestic laws grew over the course of the early 2000s until their 
culmination in 2007 with the establishment of a financial intelligence unit for the 
kingdom.  Notably, when US regulators arrived in 2005 to discuss the kingdom’s 
adoption of the fortified finance regime and to discuss Arab Bank’s financing of 
terrorism, the Jordanian state did not attempt to block the enforcement mechanism.  Even 
when faced with civil penalties under the Anti-Terrorism Act, Jordan did not block 
enforcement efforts, and the bank defended itself through negotiated settlements with the 
American plaintiffs involved.  Only in the prospect of the bank being entirely shut down 
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due to facing the prospect of payouts to 6,000 plaintiffs did the Jordanian state step in to 
diplomatically pressure US courts to safeguard the bank’s existence.  
While BCCI had no home state stakeholder to call upon for assistance when 
facing enforcement, the obvious question arises as to how BCCI managed to conduct so 
many illegal financial activities in a British domain.  Certainly, London designed the 
Caymans to provide a venue for bank secrecy and tax evasion.  However, with its 
primary base of operations in London and its legal home in the Caymans, the question 
arises as to how the UK, with its sophisticated centuries-old banking sector, allowed 
BCCI’s laundering and terrorist financing to take place.  
One theory disproven by the cases of BCCI and Arab Bank is the fact that both 
cases illustrate enforcement against banks for financing terrorism despite illustrating 
massive disparities in GDP, regulatory presence, and corruption.  Additionally, with 
Jordan’s being an authoritarian monarchy and the UK’s existence as a parliamentary 
democracy, the fact that both cases demonstrate enforcement outcomes for banks 
financing terrorism is counterintuitive.  In both cases, enforcement was carried out, 
despite the unpleasantness that enforcement actions carried for London and Amman.  
Similar enforcement outcomes indicate that regulatory capacity and a country’s political 
system may be irrelevant to ascertaining whether or not enforcement will occur against 
banks that finance terrorism.  Rather, the cases indicate that a bank’s relationship to its 
home state regime play the causal role in determining enforcement outcomes while a 
state’s regime type and the bank’s regulatory environment play marginal secondary roles.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion  
The central theoretical and normative concern in literature on the fortified finance 
regime is whether or not AML/CTF regulations work.  Financial regulations meant to 
combat money laundering and terrorist financing have proliferated and deepened in states 
around the world since the US passing of the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970.  However, the 
effectiveness of these regulations remains suspect.  This research helps answer this 
question through addressing trajectories of enforcement, and under what circumstances 
enforcement leads to penalties against the bank as opposed to when enforcement is 
blocked.   
The guiding theory of this research is that when a bank is institutionally linked to 
the state in which it based, enforcement will be blocked by its home state.  This research 
tests this theory by hypothesizing that institutional linkage is sufficient to thwart 
attempted enforcement.  Using comparative cases to control for the possibility of rival 
causes, this research tests this hypothesis of sufficiency by tracing the history of banks 
suspected of financing terrorism and their relationships with the states in which they are 
embedded. 
This theory posits that when a bank enjoys a structural institutional linkage with 
its home state, then that state will come to its defense at home and abroad.  At first 
glance, this phenomenon would seem confined entirely to state-owned banks.  However, 
state linkages are not confined to such majority state-owned enterprises.  A state’s 
relationship to the banks within it is determined by the unique institutional characteristics 
of the country’s political economy that country’s financial sector.  Furthermore, a 
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relationship between a state and banks within it may extend from deep institutional 
legacies that the fortified finance regime will not succeed in displacing.  
Using comparative case studies, I tested how state-bank linkages affect 
enforcement outcomes for banks coming under penalty for financing terrorism.  First, I 
demonstrated the institutional linkages of banks to their home state, and how these banks 
evolved alongside the states in which they developed until the attempted enforcement 
took place.  I also accounted for the presence of the fortified finance regime within the 
state in question, and how its presence impacted the bank that financed terrorism.  Using 
qualitative data in the form of court and governmental documents, journalistic accounts, 
and communiqués from Wikileaks, I established the bank’s actual financing of terrorism 
whenever possible using account numbers gleaned from the data.  Then, using the same 
documentary data, I traced how enforcement was blocked or allowed to proceed.  
Contrary to popular belief, this shadowy world of threat finance is not obfuscated due to 
lack of data.  
The Bank of China and Turkey’s Halk Bank both fit the classic model of state-
owned enterprises.  In both cases, the banks were formed to be of service to the state and 
help financially safeguard national interests in the lingering threat of foreign financial 
dependence.  The Bank of China survived multiple upheavals as China moved from 
various forms of authoritarianism and multiple wars.  Throughout the tumult, the bank 
operated as an extension of Beijing’s respective governments without any structural 
severance between it and China’s ruling regimes.  Similar to the Bank of China, Halk 
Bank formed in the earliest phases of Turkey’s state development, and formed as a means 
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of fostering the growth of a Turkish middle class with the assistance of the state.  Unlike 
Bank of China, Halk Bank underwent genuine efforts of partial privatization; however, 
the state’s majority ownership remained a constant throughout its history.   
Unlike the total state ownership of the Bank of China case, Halk Bank’s role in 
Turkish politics was one of semi-democratic coalition binding.  The bank’s specific focus 
on small and medium-sized enterprises helped create a durable socioeconomic political 
coalition for emerging Islamist parties based in the working and middle classes.  
Domestic coalition binding aside, Halk Bank also served as an instrument of Turkish 
foreign policy in reengaging with the Middle East and exercising leverage over Iran as its 
historical competitor. 
Unlike Halk Bank and the Bank of China, Al Rajhi Bank was never a state-owned 
concern.  The private bank emerged as a family business originating in the pre-modern 
Arabian economy, and developed into a modern bank in conjunction  the development of 
the Saudi state.  Due to the bank’s involvement with the Saudi ulema and its support of 
religious institutions, the bank’s operations became vital to the Saudi monarchy.  Like 
European monarchies of the distant past, Saudi Arabia’s monarchy relies heavily upon 
religious legitimacy as well as economic vibrancy for its survival.  Because of Al Rajhi’s 
linkages with both the royal family and the religious pillar of the country’s historic ruling 
elite, any capitulation on the part of the state to enforcing the fortified finance regime 
places the integrity of the state at risk.   
While the fortified finance regime has spread around the world, it remains 
questionable as to whether or not such regulations have displaced pre-existing 
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relationships between banks and the states in which they are based.  In the cases of 
blocked enforcement, every state in question exhibited some level of a fortified finance 
regime at the time that enforcement efforts ensued.  It is also worth noting that any 
imported financial regulations from abroad pertaining to terrorism layered onto existing 
regulatory efforts that began domestically.    
This research controls for potential rival causes  such as authoritarianism and state 
capacity. Every state in which enforcement was blocked comprises an example of a 
strong state with more than enough capacity to control and surveil its financial system.  
Additionally, every state that blocked enforcement was at least partly authoritarian, and 
the linkage of each bank to its home state virtually ensures that the bank’s home state 
exercised some oversight of the bank’s affairs.  The fact that Arab Bank suffered 
penalties for financing terrorism indicates that authoritarianism itself is not sufficient to 
block enforcement.   
Both China and Turkey had formidable surveillance and enforcement capacities in 
place at the time enforcement was attempted against their banks.  China’s surveillance 
apparatus in its financial system, and its adoption of the fortified finance regime pre-dates 
the enforcement attempts made against the Bank of China for financing Hamas and 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad.  The Turkish attempt at enforcement is unique in that 
enforcement actions were attempted by the state’s own bureaucracies, at the hands of the 
country’s own police and judiciary.  The manner in which enforcement was attempted in 
Turkey indicates that Ankara’s fortified finance regime was indeed working at the time 
that enforcement was initiated.  While the Chinese case demonstrates a state protecting its 
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bank from a foreign state’s punishment through diplomatic pressure, Turkey’s massive 
bureaucratic reshuffling and the firing of key judicial and police officials illustrates the 
regime enacting a veto against its own enforcement apparatus in order to protect the 
integrity of its bank. 
The case of Saudi Arabia’s Al Rajhi Bank demonstrates a functioning and capable 
surveillance apparatus within the kingdom’s financial sector overseeing a bank that 
influences Saudi financial regulatory policy.  The Saudi central bank that regulates the 
kingdom’s financial sector was not only in place when Al Rajhi’s became suspected of 
financing terrorism, but the bank itself assisted the kingdom in developing the state’s 
fortified finance regime. The structural braiding of Al Rajhi Bank with the monarchy on 
the one hand, and the ulema on the other existed prior to the development of the Saudi 
financial surveillance system.  Furthermore, this system was not displaced when this 
system deepened at the behest of the US.  
 The Jordanian case of executed enforcement juxtaposes with that of Saudi 
Arabia.  Both states are conservative Sunni tribal monarchies originating in the same era, 
and both states share a number of similar characteristics across their political economies.  
However, unlike Al Rajhi’s coalition binding function in Saudi Arabia, Arab Bank was 
founded as a Western-style bank with an arm’s length structural relationship to the state.  
In contrast to the familial ties linking the Al Rajhi Bank family with Saudi monarchy and 
the ulema, Arab Bank is embedded in the economy of the Palestinian middle class.  
While the Palestinians and their political activities carry consequences for the Jordanian 
state, Amman developed policies aimed at binding the Hashemite monarchy to the 
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kingdom’s non-Palestinian Bedouin population.  Indeed, the orientation of Jordan’s 
political economy heavily focuses upon linking state bureaucracies with the kingdom’s 
rural Transjordanian base that pre-dated later waves of Palestinian settlement.  Unlike 
most of the monarchies of the modern Middle East, Jordan’s financial system 
demonstrates a legacy of private banking without any significant royal largesse.  This 
institutional distance did not preclude Arab Bank from suffering administrative fines and 
settlements from civil suits brought against it.  
In every case of blocked enforcement, the institutional structural relationships 
between states and their banks remained intact despite the arrival and adoption of 
AML/CTF regulations.  The implications of this study are multifarious for questions 
pertaining to the international financial system and how it relates to international affairs.  
For institutional theory, the findings should not be surprising.  Namely, deep institutional 
configurations within a country’s political economy are not likely to be dislodged by the 
importation of institutional paradigms from the outside.  Rather, the institutional imports 
are likely to simply overlay on top of pre-existing configurations.  Furthermore, a state’s 
adoption of institutions from outside is no indication that they will correctly work in their 
new environment.  As noted by other scholars of terrorist financing, one of the drawbacks 
to the entire regime is that they are ill suited for many of the environments where they are 
most needed.  The second institutional finding is also not surprising, given that a moral 
hazard exists for states seeking to enforce CTF regulations upon banks to which they are 
linked.   
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 The fortified finance regime emerged and matured in liberal Western political 
economies where banking is a regulated, yet private affair.  Regulations designed to 
counter terrorist financing and money laundering, complete with the surveillance of bank 
customers and of the banks themselves, effectively deputize banks to act as an extension 
of the state’s security and intelligence apparatus.  Designed for commercial private banks 
in developed economies, these regulations are ill suited to monitor state-owned banks, or 
financial systems based upon pre-modern relationships between the state and banks.  In 
such structural configurations, such regulations place the state in the morally hazardous 
situation of having to monitor their own affairs and those of politically critical allies 
within their own political economies.  In these cases, it is not surprising that enforcement 
misfires due to diplomatic pushback, bureaucratic shuffling, intimidation, or some other 
manifestation of state power.  
 A second implication of this research pertains to power politics and should come 
as no surprise; namely, states will defend their interests.  The financial sector is not 
typically viewed as a strategic terrain in international relations, despite the fact that it is 
such.  As actors, banks are involved in geopolitics and security, whether they choose to 
be or not.  Terrorists deposit their money in bank accounts, while bankers and regulators 
now act as spies.  Despite states, bankers, regulators, terrorists, and intelligence agencies 
inhabiting the same political economic universe, this motley crew of actors is rarely 
theorized in political science as interacting within the same environment.  Yet, these 
actors not only interact in ways that are often out of sight of scholars, they are intimately 
intertwined.   
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 Normatively, the implications are somewhat chilling.  Terrorists’ use of banks 
should come as no surprise.  Banks offer incredible efficiency and ease of use when 
compared to alternatives, and terrorists must pay for gasoline and groceries as much as 
they must pay for bullets and publishing propaganda.  The normatively disconcerting 
implication of this research is that states are intimately aware of the malfeasance that 
takes place in bank branches and recorded in ledgers all over the world.  With the 
possible but doubtful exception of Jordan, every state in this study had knowledge of the 
terrorist financing taking place in banks within their territories.  In cases of institutional 
linkage, banks escaped punishment and remained in positions to finance terrorism in the 
future.  
Even in the cases where enforcement occurred, banks’ home states did not want to 
take enforcement action against the targeted banks.  Rather, for both BCCI and Arab 
Bank, officials only made moves against the banks due to pressure from the United 
States.  While Jordan did not stand in the way of administrative penalties or the first salvo 
of lawsuits against Arab Bank, none of the data indicates that Amman was eager to 
penalize the bank.  Instead, the state in this case allowed enforcement to proceed, and 
only intervened in order to maintain the integrity of the bank as a financial institution.  
The case of BCCI and the Bank of England is even more nefarious.  Not only did 
the Bank of England cultivate the offshore financial realm in the Caymans that allowed 
BCCI to thrive, it also sought to save the bank through assisting its relocation to Abu 
Dhabi.  BCCI did business with dictators, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and even assisted 
Pakistan with the smuggling of nuclear materials.  When BCCI’s activities are taken into 
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account, the Bank of England’s treatment of the case moves beyond the realm of simple 
regulatory corruption to one with real kinetic consequences for geopolitical stability and 
public safety.  In light of the global crackdown on BCCI, the UK’s actions indicate a 
desire to safeguard the offshore system rather than only one bank of many that thrived 
within it.  In short, even though the UK did not own BCCI, it sought to preserve the 
environment in which it thrived due to its own interests.  
Building off of the fact that states have so much knowledge of bank’s activities 
related to money laundering and terrorist financing, a deeper possibility arises as to the 
implications of this study for how states and banks interact within their shared 
institutional universe.  The implications of conscious regulatory failure travel far beyond 
issues of terrorism.  Given that governments carry such deep awareness of what takes 
place regarding threat finance, questions arise as to whether states can similarly surveil 
coming financial crises and the financial activities that catalyze them.   
The fortified finance regime was well implemented in major economies around 
the world by the time of the financial crisis of 2008.  With such a surveillance apparatus 
in place inside of banks around the world, the dark question arises as to how states 
missed the subprime mortgage crisis, the Eurozone crisis, and other economic crises 
surrounding 2008.  Contrary to urbane notions that banking and the financial system is 
somehow above political affairs, the world of threat finance indicates that ballots, bombs, 
and bankers are more interconnected than mainstream political science subfields would 
care to admit.  Murky as it is, this area offers a number of sordidly fruitful avenues for 
future research.  
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The policy implications of this study are straightforward.  While state-bank 
linkages are sufficient to thwart enforcement, the presence of these regulations in a given 
country offers leverage for potential enforcers.  Given the international scope of the 
banking system, banks seldom hold all assets within the confines of their home 
jurisdictions.  This multinational presence of banks’ assets allows for states seeking 
enforcement to target these assets beyond the borders of the bank’s home state.  
Additionally, instead of seeking to simply deepen the fortified finance regime, it may 
prove more effective to target specific banks through fines and disallowing such banks 
from engaging in specific currency transactions.  This unit-specific targeting could 
provide ample disincentive for banks to finance terrorism.   
If a bank financing terrorism is linked to its home state, it may alo prove more 
effective to target the home state itself, rather than simply the bank.  Currency 
prohibitions, and sanctions against state officials or governmental entities may be more 
effective in curtailing banks from financing terrorism.  Instead of targeting a bank linked 
to its state, potential enforcers may enjoy greater success in curtailing terrorist financing 
by targeting the enabling state beyond the confines of the bank in question.  From the 
standpoint of economic statecraft, this expands the range of potential opportunities for 
those states seeking to stop terrorists from using banks to finance their operations.  
Regarding terrorists themselves, there is little scholarship regarding how they 
choose to finance their activities.  While banks provide an incredibly efficient means of 
moving funds and integrating them into the financial system, not all banks are equal.  
While most economic actors should hypothetically entrust their money to the most 
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efficient banks for transactions and investment, these same banks may not offer the 
requisite security that a terrorist group needs.  Terrorist groups may seek to entrust their 
funds with state-linked banks, and may do so with the knowledge that the state in such 
cases will assist in safeguarding the terrorists’ bank of choice from outsiders.  While 
terrorist groups may prove to be identical to other economic actors in that they seek 
maximum efficiency, further research is needed to determine how terrorists choose their 
banks and other aspects of their financial operations.  
At the banking level, further research is needed to answer questions of corporate 
governance, corruption, and how financial institutions choose to engage in illicit activity.  
Regulations assume that a bank’s financial intelligence unit will pass relevant 
information along to higher management levels within the bank, and to government 
officials.  However, communication and cooperation within the bank itself may not 
efficiently work.  Some personnel in the bank may be the subjects of bribes or coercion, 
while other departments are unaware or negligent.  Similarly, a bank’s FIU may clash 
with the bank’s sales department and other offices within the bank, whereupon higher 
management is placed in the position of choosing between following the law and 
following their business interest.  At the bank level, greater research into the corporate 
governance of illicit activity is needed to answer these questions.  
Similarly, as this study illustrates, the unitary actor assumption pertaining to states 
must be relaxed in order to answer a number of questions related to threat finance.  States 
are not monoliths with uniform interests.  Different bureaucracies may have diverging 
interests and differing professional cultures that dictate how they approach affairs of this 
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nature.  Clearly, as illustrated in the case of BCCI and Halk Bank, different organs within 
the state may conflict over issues related to terrorist financing and money laundering.  In 
the BCCI case, the Bank of England was in clear conflict with other elements of the 
British government over its transformation of the Cayman Islands into an offshore 
financial center.  Similarly, Turkey’s judiciary and law enforcement apparatus did 
attempt domestic enforcement against Halk Bank’s activities, despite later being thwarted 
by the government in power through mass firings and bureaucratic shuffling.  Further 
research is needed in order to explore how and when certain bureaucracies and state 
organs conflict over areas of financial regulation and enforcement.  
At the level of the international financial system, there is no research exploring 
the possibility that states may have foreknowledge of malfeasance in the banking system 
in areas aside from terrorism.  If states know of terrorism being financed through the 
mainstream financial system and refrain from overt regulatory action, states may 
similarly know of other indecent practices such as risky lending, the laundering of 
criminal funds, political corruption, and other types of illicit economic activity 
detrimental to growth and geopolitical stability.  Often in studies of financial regulation 
or political economy, it is generally assumed that relationships between banks and states 
are formal and cordial.  As shown in this study, interactions between banks and 
governments may be informal, messy, conflictual, and not intended for widespread public 
knowledge.   
Another international aspect of this phenomenon is one of American hegemony.  
In some form, the US is present at some level in every case of this study.  Certainly, the 
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US is the state seeking enforcement against banks financing terrorism in the cases of 
BCCI, Arab Bank, Halk Bank, and Al Rajhi Bank.  However, even when the US 
government is not directly seeking action against banks, the American legal system is 
often the venue for private actors seeking restitution against banks financing terrorism.  
In a number of cases, private actors were either spearheading enforcement efforts, or 
involved in additional enforcement moves in conjunction with administrative action by 
the US government.  The fact that the American legal system is so prevalent in 
enforcement attempts, even when the government is not the primary actor, indicates a 
form of judicial hegemony in the financial realm.  This prevalence of the American 
judicial system raises questions of judicial autonomy and geopolitical interference.   
In the negative cases of BCCI and Arab Bank, the American legal system 
impacted political economies far-removed from the United States.  Similarly, in the case 
of Halk Bank, American courts offered a secondary enforcement mechanism after 
domestic enforcement attempts within Turkey were thwarted by the AKP.  With the Bank 
of China, ongoing lawsuits were effectively stillborn due to the actions of outside states, 
with Israel and China both taking action to prevent requisite testimony from occurring.  
The fact that such geopolitical jockeying is occurring in the American legal system 
underscores an aspect of US hegemony not often discussed in political science, despite its 
impact.   
The complexity of this phenomenon combines substantive focuses from security 
studies, comparative political economy, international law, and financial regulation.  
Because of this complexity and substantive overlap, there is little theoretical development 
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about terrorist financing and money laundering in political science.  Literature about 
regulatory development and expansion does not address studies about terrorist groups, 
while studies about terrorist groups and financing do not connect with those about great 
power politics and the financial system.  This study offers a first foray into the crevasse 
between the existing literatures.   	
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